RADS, BUGS, AND GAS: THE THREAT OF NBC TERRORISM

RADS, BUGS, AND GAS: THE THREAT OF NBC TERRORISM

Department of Defense and Strategic Studies

Southwest Missouri State University, 14 May 1999

Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies

Rodney L.M. Stark

A B S T R A C T

The phenomenon of international terrorism is evolving. Terrorism is by no means a form of warfare unique to the present era. However, contemporary terrorism has become a global concern of expanding proportions. The emergence of transnational state-sponsored terrorist organizations whose members may be supplied with nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare capabilities (NBC) adds a new dimension to terrorism. Proliferant states are the largest providers of military technologies, weapons, and instruction to terrorists. As a result, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction may pose a significant threat to U.S. security interests in the near future. International law and American policy are inadequately organized to deal with the threat of NBC terrorism. U.S. policymakers should discard inadequate treaties and initiate policy that is better equipped to deter, detect, and deny the threat of NBC terrorism against U.S. security interests. NBC terrorism is capable of mass destruction and disruption, which the United States cannot and should not tolerate. This thesis examines the threat of NBC terrorism and offers recommendations for dealing with it.

This abstract is approved as to form and
content

Dr. William R. Van Cleave______ ____________
Chairman, Advisory Committee

Southwest Missouri State University

This thesis, in addition to the requirements for a Masters of Science degree in Defense and Strategic Studies, would not have been possible without enlightenment from Dr. William R. Van Cleave and Dr. J. D. Crouch II. The professional and intellectual experiences of both professors provided me with a unique perspective on national security affairs and the basis to work productively in a variety of roles related to international security interests.

I would also like to thank Valerie Murphy, an invaluable and dedicated contributor to the Defense and Strategic Studies program, for her patience and continued support in my graduate pursuits.

And to Sarah, thank you for your patience with my countless hours away from home, emotional support, love, and belief in my abilities. Also, I thank my family, SarahÕs family, my friends and their families, for their years of support and encouragement. Each has helped me come this far.

This thesis is dedicated to those Americans who have lost their lives to cowardice acts of terrorism and to those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice defending the United States from rogues who have no regard for freedom and democracy, which we hold so dear.

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
LOOKING AT NBC TERRORISM

Defining NBC Terrorism
Current Trend in Terrorism
Proliferation of NBC Weapons and Technology
Potential NBC Terrorists
Motivations to Resort to NBC Terrorism
Religion as a Motivator
Millennialists
Right-Wing Terrorism
Ethnic Fanatics
Conclusion

CHAPTER II
THE NBC TERRORISTÕS NETWORK

Non-State, Loose Affiliation, or State-Sponsorship
Loosely Affiliated Terrorist Groups
Non-State Terrorist Groups
State-Sponsored Terrorist Groups
NBC Terrorism and State-Sponsors
Cuba
Iran
Iraq
Libya
North Korea
Syria
Conclusion

CHAPTER III
NBC TERROR WEAPONS

Nuclear Weapons
Threat to Nuclear Facilities
Fissile Material Threat--Radioactive Dispersal Device
Homemade Nuclear Weapon
Chemical and Biological Terror Weapons
Historical Perspective of CBW Warfare
Historical Precedence of Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Setting an Example: Aum Shinrikyo
Characteristics of Chemical and Biological Weapons
Chemical Weapons
Biological Weapons
Methods of NBC Entry
NBC Terrorist Dissemination
NBC Dissemination Considerations
NBC Targets
Likely Scenarios for CBW Terrorism
Conclusion

CHAPTER IV
NBC TERRORISMÑWHERE AND WHY?

Why NBC Weapons May or May Not be Attractive Tools for Terrorists
Constraints against NBC Acquisition and Deployment
Consequences of an NBC Attack
Conclusion

CHAPTER V
U.S. Policy AND NBC TERRORISM

Current U.S. Policy towards NBC Terrorism
Counter-NBC Terrorism Acts
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment
Domestic Preparedness Initiative
Chemical Weapons Convention
Biological Weapons Convention
Recommendations
Recommendation: Address public education issues related to the threat of NBC terrorism.
Recommendation: Do not place faith in Òfeel-goodÓ arms control.
Recommendation: Integrate new policy measures that buttress U.S. deterrent forces and counter-terrorism policies.
Recommendation: Restrict the civil liberties of suspected terrorists.
Recommendation: Further develop first-responderÕs capabilities to respond to acts of NBC terrorism.
Recommendation: Improve cooperation between military, federal and local law enforcement agencies responsible for responding to NBC terrorist attacks.
Recommendation: Improve intelligence operations and capabilities so they are commensurate with the nature of NBC terrorism.
Recommendation: Enhance current capabilities to detect the movement, storage, and production of NBC weapons and associated production materials.

CONCLUSION

Bibliography

Books
Articles and Papers
Internet
Lectures
Government Documents

Appendix

Table Page

1. Declared and Suspected NBC Possession by States . 38

3. Biological Agent Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . 173

4. Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Events . . . . . . 325

5. Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

6. Non-State Actors, Mass Casualties, and
NBC Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

7. Responsibility for Counter-Terrorism . . . . . . . 345

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ÒActs of terror are as old as history itself. But terrorism in our time has grown from a national to an international to a global threat,Ó said Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on United Nations Day in 1996.

As the nineteenth century ended, it seemed no one was safe from terrorist attack. In 1894 an Italian anarchist assassinated French President Sadi Carnot. In 1897 anarchists fatally stabbed Empress Elizabeth of Austria and killed Antonio Canovas, the Spanish Prime Minister. In 1900 Umberto I, the Italian king, fell in yet another anarchist attack; in 1901 an American anarchist killed William McKinley, President of the United States.

Contemporary terrorism seems to be evolving with a dynamic political environment churning with political, religious, and ethnic strife. Traditional concepts of terrorism are beginning to incorporate aspects of the global security environment, which is characterized by political instability throughout much of the world.

Before looking at the nature of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) terrorism, it is important first to acknowledge the current security environment that is being assessed. Traditional terrorist attacks have generally included high profile bombing attacks, but now they appear to be growing more destructive in nature. Religiously-motivated terrorism is becoming ubiquitous, followed by politically-motivated and even millennial-based terrorism. The Cold War rivalry that held satellite states and ethnic groups together has changed. Instead of a single unifying threat to U.S. national security, there are multiple threats reflecting regional conflict and the potential use of NBC weapons: Òresurgent nationalism, growing ethnic and religious unrest, internal instabilities, medical emergencies and food supply crises, economic dislocations, and various forms of civil unrest, from the narcotics trade to varied forms of terrorism.Ó While the fall of the Soviet Union has reduced the risk of a major war between the United States and a bipolar challenger, it has fathered new threats stemming from NBC proliferation and uninhibited ethnic transgressions, which could have an unprecedented affect on U.S. security interests. The Soviet collapse has destabilized the security of an estimated thirty thousand nuclear weapons, hundreds of tons of fissile material and radioactive waste, more than forty thousand metric tons of chemical and biological weapons, huge stockpiles of sophisticated conventional weapons and thousands of scientists with the knowledge to produce NBC weapons. Proliferants such as Iran, North Korea, Russia and the PeopleÕs Republic of China (PRC) exchange NBC technology and production facilities with pariah states known to sponsor terrorism.

More than twenty-five countries have--or may be developing--NBC weapons and the means to deliver them; a larger number are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice. In addition, the NBC proliferation threat has become transnational and now has the potential to come from terrorist organizations or organized crime groups.

There are numerous security challenges that pose long term threats to U.S. security interests--ChinaÕs rise, RussiaÕs decline, the stability of the Middle East, North KoreaÕs nuclear acquisition efforts, NBC proliferation to rogues, and widening economic inequality.

Arguably, the level of prosperity enjoyed by todayÕs advanced democracies is virtually unprecedented in modern history. There are only a scant amount of ongoing and significant military threats, though there is potential for emerging conflicts.

NBC weapons share common connections to one another that may be attractive for terrorist organizations looking to destabilize U.S. foreign policy or domestic security. The first is select and immense lethality: a single weapon can kill thousands of people or be used on one or several individuals. The second is portability, which allows them to be easily delivered against civilian populations and inadequately prepared military forces. And the third is accessibility, which means that they may fall into terrorist hands, despite the best efforts at prevention. These three characteristics combine to make NBC weapons one

of the single most serious long-term security threats

facing advanced democracies of the West.

All advanced societies are vulnerable to mass loss of life caused by an attack involving NBC weapons. This is due to the vulnerabilities inherent within most advanced societies: accessibility to elements used in NBC weapons, porous borders, free and open societies, and high population densities in cities. Government leaders have recently acknowledged terrorists threats and NBC weapons together; however, they have lacked the necessary insight into the possibility that these weapons might be used by loosely-affiliated, non-state, or state-sponsored terrorist groups in pursuit of a national, religious, or ethnic-supremacist agendas. Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), James R. Woolsey stated, Òthe prospect of terrorists acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest threats facing the United States today and in the future.Ó

ÒGovernment officials today are less worried about going to war with another regional power than they are about absorbing NBC attacks,Ó said Dr. Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Director of National Security Studies at Harvard. In a discussion with DCI George J. Tenet, the author asked what the DCIÕs stance was regarding current policy with the threat of NBC terrorism and whether he felt the United States was adequately prepared. He replied, ÒTerrorism using weapons of mass destruction is a very serious threat against the United States and warrants further preparation.Ó He went on to add that the United States would probably suffer an NBC attack, probably chemical or biological, before rising to meet the challenge sufficiently.

Terrorism is by no means a form of warfare unique to the present era. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, ÒIt is as old as conflict itself.Ó However, contemporary terrorism has become a global concern of expanding proportions for yet another reason: the emergence of terrorist organizations whose members are supplied by proliferants such as the former Soviet Union (FSU), PRC, and ÒrogueÓ states. Together, these states are the largest providers of military technologies, weapons, and instruction to terrorists. As a result, NBC terrorism is likely to be a more prominent threat to the interests of the Free World if constraints against the use of NBC weapons are transcended, proliferation continues, and state-sponsored or non-state organizations decide it would best suit their interests to utilize NBC capabilities. The Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, recently commented:

As the new millennium approaches, the United States faces a heightened prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate armies, terrorist cells, and even religious cults will yield disproportionate power by using--or even threatening to use--nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against our troops in the field and our people at home.

International terrorists long ago declared war on the United States. The targets are Americans everywhere-- citizens, diplomats, military forces, men, women, children, and property. Should terrorists develop the means to employ NBC terror, totally new vistas of terror would be possible. NBC terrorism is an international problem, one without borders that demands a solution on an international scale. Terrorists are known to be informed and capable. The techniques and materials associated with NBC acquisition programs are becoming more accessible and within reach for well-connected terrorist organizations.

This thesis will explore the nature of NBC terrorism and attempt to answer the question: ÒWhat is the nature of NBC terrorism and how could it affect U.S. security interests?Ó The objective of this thesis is not to predict when or where an attack will occur or by whom; rather, it is to identify the nature of the threat of NBC terror by describing the characteristics of weapons, various characteristics of terrorist groups and their sponsors, if applicable, and recommendations for retarding NBC terrorism in the next century.

Chapter One will attempt to determine a working definition for the phenomenon of terrorism and NBC terrorism. To date, officials have been unable to derive a universal definition for terrorism that is applicable to all degrees of the phenomenon due to the fact the motivations, circumstances, objectives, and sources of terrorism are ever changing. The chapter will further discuss an emerging trend in terrorism towards mass destruction in addition to its relationship with the potential for future NBC terror.

Chapter Two will look at terrorist profiles and the relationship between loosely affiliated, non-state, and state-sponsored terrorist organizations. Lastly, this section will look at some of the countries currently on the State DepartmentÕs list of countries that sponsor terrorism and will analyze their behavior and assess their potential for NBC terrorism.

Chapter Three will focus directly on the characteristics of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Specifically, this section will address the types of weapons, their effects, methods of delivery, historical backgrounds, and conditions affecting employment. While this chapter will not predict which agent will be used over another, it will define the nature of each class of weapon and explain what sets these agents apart from one another. This section will attempt to describe the characteristics associated with NBC weapons and what can be expected if NBC terror becomes a reality for Americans.

Chapter Four will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of terrorists using unconventional weapons of mass destruction as a means to their ends. Moreover, this chapter will address the nature of traditional constraints that have allegedly deterred terrorists from escalating their conventional methods to NBC weapons. The chapter will also address how these constraints may be weakening, thereby creating opportunities for NBC terrorism. For the purpose of brevity, this chapter will touch briefly on factors contributing to NBC terrorism such as proliferation, NBC smuggling, porous borders, and various motivations for using NBC weapons. This chapter will also address particular target sets that may be attractive to terrorists seeking to cause mass destruction and/or disruption. Identifying targets will help to prepare civilian and military targets for NBC terrorist attacks that are likely to occur in the future.

Chapter Five will discuss current U.S. policies for counter-terrorism efforts. This section will go one step further to offer policy recommendations that may enhance US security against NBC terror. The difficulty with laws made to deter NBC terrorism is that terrorists have no regard for laws other than those established by their own religion or ideologies. Arms control and international agreements do not govern the behavior of terrorists. Furthermore, rogue states and terrorists tend not to recognize the authority of international governments or any other laws that impede their autonomy. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations designed to enhance existing counter-terrorism policies and efforts. These include improving intelligence operations, public awareness, assertive disarmament, movement away from counter-productive and unverifiable arms control, additional diplomacy measures, and enhanced technical capabilities to spot potential NBC hotspots. Also, this section will attempt to identify a probable hierarchy of likely agents to be used and what factors may affect a terroristÕs decision making process regarding an appropriate NBC weapon for terrorist operations. NBC terrorism has not been a significant threat in U.S. history. However, proliferation of NBC capabilities in tune with emerging trends in terrorism and myriad terrorists willing to use unconventional methods are making the occurrence of NBC terror on U.S. territories more likely.

Defining NBC Terrorism

Attempts to derive a single definition of terrorism have proved to be unsuccessful. Determining a universal definition of terrorism is elusive because this dynamic phenomenon involves a host of constantly changing motivations, ideologies, goals, and methods. The FBI defines terrorism as, Òthe unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.Ó Although adequate for many types of terrorism, the FBIÕs definition does not adequately define the phenomenon of NBC terrorism. Therefore, a general understanding of NBC terrorism is warranted. Working definitions of NBC terrorism, international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction are necessary to develop an understanding of the scope of the threat surrounding NBC terrorism. For the purposes of this thesis, NBC terrorism is defined as the following:

NBC terrorism is the purposeful or threatened use of politically, socially, economically or religiously motivated violence via nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons conducted by a terrorist group, whereby the primary mechanism to influence the target is through the inducement of fear, anxiety, and/or destruction.

International terrorism is defined as threatened or purposeful unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual, who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of religious, economic, political or social objectives.

Most definitions of terrorism include the use or threatened use of violence against civilian targets. In the past, motives tended to be mostly political and terrorist actions were generally carried out in a way that would achieve maximum publicity. Much the same is still true today. However, a trend is currently emerging that indicates terrorism is becoming more dangerous than previously thought because terrorists appear to be seeking elevated levels of maximum destruction in addition to maximum publicity, but not to be dependent upon publicity for themselves. In other words, in some cases, anonymity is preferred. This is known as Òsilent terrorism.Ó These terrorists appear to be developing an interest in the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as a means of causing mass destruction.

The term Òunconventional weapons of mass destructionÓ (UWMD) is synonymous with the term NBC weapons in that these agents include nuclear explosives or radiological contaminants; lethal chemicals; and lethal biological agents (toxins or pathogens). They have acquired the title Òweapons of mass destructionÓ because NBC agents, if used to the full extent of their potential, have the ability to cause mass casualties and destruction. They are further characterized by the small amount of agent or small number of weapons necessary to cause mass destruction. Although NBC weapons are considered unconventional weapons of mass destruction, these weapons are capable of causing low casualty numbers either through extremely low yield explosions or small doses of agent. Terrorist uses for NBC weapons may be intended to cause mass disruption or casualties in order to coerce, compel, or destroy the target nation, government, or society.

Current Trend in Terrorism

The defense community is particularly concerned that the current trend in terrorism is evolving towards more destructive means, especially towards NBC weapons. This evolution in thought is occurring for a list of reasons: the disintegration of the Soviet Union and displaced NBC weapons; evolving terrorist motivations and emerging ideologies; the proliferation of technologies of mass destruction; increased access to information and information technologies; and the Òaccelerated centralization of vital components of the national infrastructure,Ó which has increased their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

Terrorist groups, whether independent, loosely affiliated, or state-sponsored, have historically made little effort to kill mass numbers of noncombatants. However, non-state and state-sponsored violence appears to be moving towards the more deadly and destructive. Spanning the last decade, terrorist incidents that have the potential for large-scale casualties are occurring more frequently, and terrorist attacks are accruing higher casualties. For example, during 1997 the FBI initiated over one hundred criminal cases pertaining to NBC threats. According to the State DepartmentÕs annual look at terrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, the last decade has been marked by a significant rise in death and

destruction as terrorism has escalated toward more ruthless attacks on civilian targets and the use of more destructive methods. In 1998, the total number of persons killed or wounded in terrorist attacks has been the highest on record with 741 persons killed, and 5,952 persons wounded. Recently, terrorist attacks have been punctuated by the use of mass casualty attacks in events such as the Oklahoma City bombing, U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, World Trade Center bombing, Khobar Tower bombing and the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack in Japan. Since 1995, the degree of mass destruction tactics has increased exponentially. Citing only a few of the widely publicized terrorist attacks since 1993, property losses number into the billions of dollars while the death toll has climbed past five hundred with a total of more than twelve thousand injuries.

While statistics show that the total number of terrorist attacks worldwide has decreased in the past ten years, the percentage of those attacks that resulted in fatalities has actually increased. And high-profile attacks in the United States--unheard of even a decade ago--have shown that no country is safe. Since the explosion of a truck bomb under the World Trade Center in Manhattan in 1993, terrorism on American soil has been increasingly in the headlines, from Oklahoma City and the Olympic Park bombing, to efforts to bomb New YorkÕs Lincoln Tunnel and a plot--foiled last July--to set off explosives in a Brooklyn subway station during rush hour.

In the book, AmericaÕs AchillesÕ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, authors Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer contend the reason for the rise in terrorism may be Òbecause there are increasing numbers of violent non-state actors for whom the logic of limited lethality applies only slightly.Ó The authors went on to say NBC terrorism may be anticipated from fanatical religious groups and cults, anti-American Islamic extremists in the Middle East, right-wing chauvinists, and loosely affiliated terrorists who lack the traditional concern or desire for group preservation.Ó This explanation accurately describes one of the primary reasons for the growing likelihood of NBC terrorism; however, the proliferation of NBC munitions and technology from or to rogue nations is an additional source of this growing terrorist threat.

Recently, the world became witness to increasingly destructive terrorist attacks. On 26 February 1993, a truck bomb exploded in the parking garage of the World Trade Center causing more than one thousand injuries and six deaths. In June 1994, a Japanese terrorist group by the name of Aum Shinrikyo initiated nerve gas attacks in Matsumoto, Japan that killed seven and injured five hundred, and an attack on the subway in Tokyo in March 1995, that killed twelve and injured fifty-five hundred. Just two years later, Americans felt the sting of another cowardly act of terrorism. An ammonia nitrate bomb exploded on 19 April 1995 in a rental truck parked just outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The blast resulted in the deaths of 168 men, women, and children, including nineteen infants with over four hundred others injured. On 25 June 1996, a fuel truck exploded near the northern perimeter fence at the Khobar Towers complex on a military base in Saudi Arabia. The blast killed nineteen Americans, injured over 368, and completely destroyed the northern face of the building. On 7 August 1998, simultaneous truck bombs exploded at U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. The attack killed 250 people while injuring over four thousand Americans, Kenyans, and Tanzanians.

Terrorists are developing more destructive means that have previously been too technologically complex and financially cumbersome. Former Defense Secretary William Perry expressed concern about the Khobar Tower bombings and the implications on terrorist trends. Perry said the bombers were not just Saudi Arabian dissidents, but were well organized and had high-quality military explosives and Òextensive support from an experienced and well-financed terrorist organization.Ó

The range of terrorists interested in NBC capabilities and the technical capacity to develop and utilize NBC weapons is increasing. In a recent interview with ABC news, infamous terrorist Osama Bin Laden acknowledged that he had tried to purchase chemical weapons and the fissile material for nuclear weapons, saying it is not a crime to acquire such weapons. Bin Laden replied to ABC news correspondent John Miller when asked about his desire to obtain chemical and nuclear weapons:

To seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then this is an obligation I carried out and I thank God for enabling us to do that. And if I seek to acquire these weapons I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims. But how we could use these weapons if we possess them is up to us.

Because proliferation continues, constraints preventing the acquisition of NBC weapons may be surmounted by terrorist groups interested in causing mass destruction. The next section will describe elements of NBC proliferation that may be contributing to the plausibility of NBC terrorism.

Proliferation of NBC Weapons and Technology

In order to understand the implications of NBC proliferation, it is important first to acknowledge the source of NBC weapons and secondly, what state is looking to acquire such weapons. Table 1 lists declared, seeking, and suspected NBC possession by states.

In testimony provided to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Donald Cobb and Walter Kirchner stated that:

There are over twenty countries suspected of some form of nuclear, biological, or chemical proliferation. In addition, subnational, organized crime, and other terrorist groups that could gain access to these (NBC) materials are of growing concernÉ The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most urgent and direct threat to national security. The threat to U.S. civilians and interests is real, and the political, societal, economic and psychological impacts are potentially devastating. The consequence of failure in countering the threat could be catastrophic. We cannot afford to be surprised, nor, as one senior government official put it, Òexchange calling cards at the site of an NBC incident.Ó

According to the Department of Defense, the proliferation of NBC weapons and the availability of individuals Òschooled in their design and constructionÓ represent a significant threat in the phenomenon of terrorism. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris assert ÒThe dozen or so [countries] that had chemical programs in the late 1970s had grown to more than twenty a decade later. And despite the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibited the possession of biological weapons, at least ten countries had biological programs by 1989.Ó Proliferation efforts are further assisted by scientists and technicians prepared to sell their skills to the highest bidder.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a potential smorgasbord of NBC weapons, scientists, and material became increasingly accessible. Testifying in March 1996 on the nature of NBC proliferation from Russia, DCI John Deutch stated, ÒWe believe that several nations at one time or another have explored the possibility of purchasing strategic nuclear materials as the simplest, quickest, and cheapest way to acquire nuclear weapons capability. Obvious examples include Iran and Iraq and, to a lesser extent, North Korea and Libya.Ó Government officials assert that:

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons that may be used intentionally by states and terrorist organizations is the most urgent, long-term pressing intelligence challenge that we face... The materials and expertise necessary to build chemical and biological weapons are more readily available today than ever.

During an international security seminar, ÒThe Future Role of the U.S. In the International System,Ó Dr. William R. Van Cleave commented on the acquisition of NBC weapons by rogue states:

Among the many threats and security challenges to be anticipated in the next few years, I would like to dwell a little on a particular threat, against which I believe the United States will have to play a leading role: The proliferation of modern technology arms, particularly so-called unconventional arms, or Òweapons of mass destruction....Ó The problem is not the development of such weapons by stable, responsible, defensive, and democratic regimes, but their acquisition by unprincipled, aggressive, and predatory regimes.

Thousands of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons remain in place at weapons facilities throughout the Republics of the former Soviet Union. The Ònuclear facilities alone number well over a hundred,Ó house over a million employees, and contain some Òtwelve hundred tons of weapons grade fissile material--enough for thousands of nuclear bombs.Ó Some believe that RussiaÕs NBC stockpile integrity may be compromised. As a testament to the potential for nuclear ÒleakageÓ from Russia, a military prosecutor who investigated the theft of fuel rods from a naval facility in Murmansk commented:

Even potatoes are sometimes better protected nowadays than radioactive materials. . . . Everyone in the fleet knew about the poor state of repair of the alarm
system on the [fuel rod] storeroom. . . . officers and specialists had submitted written reports on this. . . but the answer was always the same: no money.

The difficulty with RussiaÕs inheritance of the vast Soviet NBC stockpile is that Òsoldiers, scientists, and maintenance personnel who are now primarily concerned with feeding their families staff these facilities.Ó According to an October 1995 report by the Henry L. Stimson Center, Russian CBW stockpiles are:

Inadequately secured in aging facilities guarded by poorly paid soldiers. Security is problematic at four of the seven CBW storage sites in Russia, including poor lighting, gaps in wood fencing, wooden storage buildings with padlocked doors, few guards at main entry and exit points, and a lack of computerized inventory control systems.

Furthermore, the Stimson Center report closed with the following conclusion: ÒRussian chemical and biological weapons storage facilities appear to be vulnerable to theft from within and attack from without.Ó

Conceptually, there are four potential sources of Russian nuclear erosion. The first is RussiaÕs stockpile of nuclear weapons that is controlled by the Ministry of

Defense. Today this stockpile contains between thirty thousand and forty thousand nuclear weapons. Second, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) controls a large and growing stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material that it both produces and extracts from the dismantled nuclear weapons. Allegedly, Russia is dismantling some two thousand nuclear weapons annually, which shifts some fifteen tons of plutonium and forty-five tons of HEU from the Ministry of Defense to Minatom each year. Third, Minatom is in possession of a large supply of fissile material produced by nuclear energy reactors, generating over thirty tons that are in the form of Òseparated reactor-grade plutonium.Ó Finally, there is a widespread supply of fissile material dispersed across Russia in research institutes and facilities used for non-standard nuclear fuel cycles, such as the naval propulsion and space reactor programs. ÒCustody over the material in this fourth category is not centralized, but rather is shared among the Ministry of Defense, Minatom, and a variety of other government ministries or independent agencies.Ó

The probability that a pre-assembled nuclear weapon may be stolen or diverted has been described as Òlow, yet plausible.Ó At the same time, nuclear fissile material that could be used in the production of radiological dispersal devices or low yield nuclear weapons may be more available.

According to the Center for Counter-Proliferation Research, Òsupplier groups and export controls, although essential, will not always be effective because, over time and with even modest resources, a determined state or non-state actor will likely succeed in acquiring [NBC] weapons. In terms of use, international norms will not likely affect the calculations of those who ignore legal barriers.Ó

News from Russia is beginning to sound ominous. Igor Rodionov, former Minister of Defense, recently claimed in an interview that the main question in the military is ÒWhat is your price?Ó A general who supervised the dismantling of chemical weapons systems in Russia was recently apprehended while trying to sell CBW technology for binary nerve gas to Syria. In early 1995, Viktor Mikhailov, the head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, signed a contract with the Iranians to sell them nuclear reactors and a centrifuge to make highly enriched

uranium and a breeder reactor to make plutonium. One of IranÕs nuclear officials, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, visited several nuclear energy research sites in Russia and made plans with Russia to build an additional $800 million nuclear power plant in Iran, which TehranÕs critics suspect use is to further its nuclear weapons acquisition program.

Dr. William Van Cleave wrote:

Both supply and demand are increasing. Technology has advanced and spread. Many industrialized nations with loose or no controls are willing to sell components nearly indiscriminately. And large quantities of modern weapons are available on virtually unlimited and often uncontrolled bases from Russia, China, North Korea.

Some authors believe Òrogue nations and clientless states, terrorist groups, religious cults, ethnic minorities, disaffected political groups, and certain individuals appear to have joined a new arms race toward weapons of mass destruction.Ó These groups are interested in underground trafficking of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or associated technologies. ÒIndeed, there is a considerable effort within Russia to fill the supply side of an emerging international NBC black market,Ó said one government official.

U.S. officials can expect interests in NBC weapons to be wide ranging. There is reason for concern over the long list of Ònon-state actors, such as separatists and terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and individual thieves who could choose to amplify their cause by using fissile or non-fissile (but radioactive) nuclear materials [in addition to chemical and biological weapons].Ó Potential NBC terror attacks can be expected from traditional terrorist organizations such the Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad with particular attention paid to Nth terrorists. For example, the Aum Shinrikyo Cult was rarely known by anyone prior to their chemical and biological attacks on Japanese subways.

In the book, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, authors Graham Allison, Owen Cote, Richard Falkenrath, and Steven Miller point out the following.

More fissionable material is now stored in improvised, insecure facilities at Sverdlovsk [a city in Russia] than is contained in the entire stockpiles of Britain, France, and China combined. Even if 99.99 percent of RussiaÕs fissile material stocks remained secure, but the other .01 percent leaked, more than ten North KoreaÕs worth of fissile materials would be loose and no one know.

Demand for such weapons and technology is more ubiquitous than ever. The Òdeterioration of Russian borders, inadequately guarded nuclear reactors and weapons facilities, and diminishing security measures have inadvertently contributed to the illegal supply of nuclear weapons, related materials, and technologies on the international market.Ó

In 1993, Germany recorded 234 incidents of suspected smuggling of an assortment of nuclear-related materials. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya have shown tremendous resolve in their continuous efforts to obtain fissile materials. The German government recently reported more than seven hundred cases of attempted nuclear sales between 1991 and 1994 to these countries. On 14 December 1994, Czech police arrested a Czech nuclear physicist and two citizens of the FSU and seized 2.72 kg of fissile material, later identified as 87.7 percent enriched U-235, in Praque. This is the largest recorded seizure of such material. The uranium apparently came from the FSU and was to be smuggled to Western Europe. Russian reports indicate that there were eleven attempted thefts of uranium, some nine hundred attempts at illegal entry at nuclear facilities, and nearly seven hundred instances in which workers at nuclear sites tried to classified documents related to nuclear weapons. There were over one hundred reported instances of nuclear smuggling from the FSU during the first nine months of 1994. None of these involved weapons quantities or quality materials. Despite the increasing number of attempted nuclear thefts, officials believe that there has yet to be a successful transfer of a nuclear weapon or fissile material. Conversely, it is unlikely that every attempt to steal or smuggle nuclear weapons is detected and reported. By definition, successful transactions throughout international crime and terrorist architectures are done surreptitiously and may go unnoticed.

Potential NBC Terrorists

Who is more likely to use NBC weapons in terrorist campaigns? The recent uses of NBC agents by the Aum Shinrikyo cult and World Trade Center bombings indicate that NBC terror can come from any azimuth or Nth terrorist. It is possible to suggest probable sources of loosely affiliated terrorist groups, non-state and state-sponsored terrorists with the capacity and motivations to acquire and use NBC weapons. The following list will attempt to describe a sample of such profiles.

· Religious extremists, particularly those who have goals coinciding with a political terrorist agenda or an apocalyptic theology;

· ShiÕite terrorists operating in the Persian Gulf against U.S. forces and moderate sheikdoms, with or without state-sponsorship;

· Ethnic hate groups, particularly those who have goals of genocide of a particular race or religion and separatism;

· Groups that wish to mimic the trappings and functions of a state, such as secessionist guerilla movements and some militia groups;

· ÒExtremeÓ terrorists and revolutionaries, who are willing to run the great risks associated with massive casualties and NBC weapon use;

· Weapons fanatics, possibly from the radical right, and technophiles for whom the acquisition of an exotic weapons has intrinsic value; and

· ÒCopycats,Ó who wish to imitate an incident that has already occurred.

While the use of NBC terrorism is not necessarily limited to any of these potential NBC actors, the consideration of these general categories of actors may provide some insight into the specific precepts of a terrorist group that may elect to use NBC weapons as vehicles to achieve its ends, whatever they may be. ÒSeeking to achieve ideological, nationalist, or other goals, these groups have varying objectivesÓ ranging from political, economical, and social to religious influences. Indigenous state or non-state groups (acting independently in most cases but sometimes as proxies of foreign governments) are dispersed throughout the world and can be assumed to be a potential source of NBC terrorism.

In the United States, indigenous domestic groups have been involved in terrorist activities and have supported a policy of violence over the past two decades. Known domestic terrorist organizations represent a wide array of political and religious ideologies with varying social goals. For example, the Aryan Nation is one of the most

violent right-wing groups in the United States. The Aryan Nation allegedly provides Òan umbrella of support to maintain ties among affiliate groups, such as the Christian Identity Movement, the Covenant and the Sword, the Arm of the Lord, and the Ku Klux Klan.Ó These groups have a long history of armed confrontation with law enforcement agencies. For example, in 1995 a Justice Department raid on the Òheavily armed compoundÓ of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSAL) netted a Òlarge weapons cache, large quantities of the chemical weapon, potassium cyanide, and plans to use the chemical to poison the water supplies of several cities.Ó The technical background of many right-wing terrorist organizations is said to be sufficient enough to successfully develop and weaponize Òlow-techÓ NBC and dispersal systems.

In Europe, there are a plethora of ideological and nationalist groups in existence. The Provisional Irish Republican Army or PIRA is typical of European-based terrorist groups. PIRA, otherwise known as the Provos and commonly referred to as the IRA, hopes to reunite and purify Ireland by casting out British presence. In 1969, PIRA split from the IRA and began a terrorist campaign of their own using high profile assassinations and bombing politicians, security forces, sympathizers and informants. They reportedly receive a great deal of support from Libya in terms of armaments and partial support from the Czech Republic.

In the Middle East, the number of terrorist organizations is significant. Middle Eastern-based terrorist organizations are often independent in action but are united in operations to destroy or expel Western influence from the Middle East. This includes the expulsion of the Israelis in order to create a state of Palestine. Many of these groups have become increasingly active and less dependent upon state-sponsors. Regional state-sponsors have provided security, resources, and direction in their indigenous terrorist organizations. For example, the Hezbollah and Hamas are both state-sponsored terrorist organizations that receive a great deal of support from their perspective hosts. They operate and have elaborate support infrastructures set up in countries across the globe including the United States, Western Europe, and Asia. Now that we have discussed potential NBC terrorists, it is important to discuss the motivations that may drive terrorists to use NBC weapons. The next section discusses motivations that are likely to inspire NBC terrorism.

Motivations to Resort to NBC Terrorism

Terrorists have been and are continually motivated by a wide variety of factors. These motivations have evolved out of religious protest movements, political revolts, and social uprisings. Motivations have led to Òdeep and bitter ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts which remain unresolved and which fester in the international system, spawning many forms of violent conflict including terrorism, and periodically erupting into civil and international wars.Ó

Primarily, religion and ethnocentrism may provide the Òmoral justification necessary to convince terrorists that using NBC agents is justified, particularly within groups that believe they have only God to answer.Ó For these groups, using NBC weapons to inflict casualties against a targeted society may be a duty dictated by their fanatical views. This school of thought is similar to those in various Middle Eastern terrorist groups espousing Muslim extremism and other groups such as Aum Shinrikyo. The DoD expects that the majority of terrorism directed against U.S. targets will be tied to ethnic and religious conflicts in the future. It will be primarily urban in nature, often occurring in capital cities. In a report assessing NBC technology and terrorist trends, David Ronfeldt and William Slater of Rand add that the Òpotential users of such weapons [NBC] will most likely be apocalyptic millenarian cults or terrorists operating under a religious imperative.Ó

Politically motivated terrorism, which was the most common form of terrorism from the late 1960s through the late 1980s and is still the most widely seen form today, is less likely to be a motivation for NBC terrorism than other motivations discussed in this chapter. This is because politically motivated terrorism has tended to avoid causing mass destruction. The theory is that political terrorists must carefully Òcalibrate the level of violence they employ--enough to underline their cause (and attract attention) but not too much to undermine their legitimacy.Ó However, politically motivated terrorists seeking to destabilize an adversaryÕs military or social existence or to undermine confidence in the ability of an adversaryÕs national government may be interested in employing covert NBC terrorism. Therefore, politically motivated NBC terrorism, however unlikely, must not be fully discounted.

The following sections will identify the motivations that are most likely to influence a terroristÕs decision to use UWMD. It is the opinion of the author that the following motivations are most likely to incite terrorists or fanatics to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons depending on the capabilities and objectives of the respective terrorist organization.

Religion as a Motivator

This section will address the topic of religiously motivated terrorism and why NBC weapons may be utilized under the rubric of religious terrorism. Religious terrorism will refer to those groups or acts that are primarily religious in nature, but may have a political agenda as well. Some authors contend religious terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today. Terrorism motivated by religious differences has received a great deal of attention in the last three decades and is considered by many to be a likely source of future NBC terrorism.

Traditional terrorist motivations, some believe, have begun to shift from Òideology and separatism to ethnic animosity and religious fanaticism--motives that lend themselves to widescale atrocities.Ó Historically, terrorism often occurred as a tactic among warring religious sects.

In recent years, religiously motivated terrorists have begun to grow in numbers and destructive power. Of the eleven identifiable terrorist groups that existed in and around 1968, none can be classified as religious or predominantly religious in nature. The first ÔmodernÕ religious terrorist groups appear in 1980 as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran the previous year. ÒOnly two of the sixty four groups active in 1980 could have been classified in 1980 as predominantly religious in character and motivation: the Iranian-backed ShiÕa organization al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic

Revolution.Ó Since then, the number of religious terrorist groups has increased greatly. In 1994, for example, more than a third of the forty nine identifiable international terrorist groups active that year could be classified as religious in character and/or motivation. In 1995, their number grew yet again, accounting for nearly half of the fifty-six known, active international terrorist groups. In 1996, however, only thirteen (28 percent) of the forty-six identifiable terrorist groups had a dominant religious component. Nevertheless, Òdespite this decline in the 1996 figure, religion remained a significant force behind terrorismÕs lethality. Groups motivated in part or in whole by a salient religious or theological motivation committed ten of the thirteen terrorist attacks recorded in 1996.Ó In 1997, 20 percent of the approximately fifty known groups have a dominant religious base. These are not terrorists Òwho claim to want political change or a change in policy; they are terrorists who are using their religion as a justification for committing high casualty terrorist acts, even if the end is political.Ó

A particularly distinguishing characteristic of religiously motivated terrorists, which may contribute to NBC terrorism, is the belief that ÒHoly FightersÓ will be rewarded in the afterlife if they are martyred in pursuit of their religious goals. Religious terrorists tend to view violence as a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological pursuit. Terrorism then becomes an all-encompassing and superior duty that usually finds its perpetrators free from the political, moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists. Moreover, religious terrorists may be more inclined to seek the total devastation or removal of their adversary (ies) and would view NBC terrorism as morally justified and appropriate for their purpose.

Bruce Hoffman writes:

What is particularly striking about Òholy terrorÓ compared to purely Òsecular terrorÓ is the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world view that the Òholy terroristÓ embraces. For the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Indiscriminate violence is not only morally justified, but is a necessary expedient for the attainment of their goals.

In response to a question about the resolve of religious terrorists to seek mass destruction in Israel and lands of other pro-Israeli governments, the general secretary for the Hezbollah remarked, ÒWe are completely prepared to plunge the Zionist entity into a condition that would lead the end of tourism.Ó He went on to say, ÒI have a word of advice for the Zionists and their political leaders: Understand the message of my sonÕs death correctly. The Zionists can do nothing against an opponent who loves death and seeks martyrdom.Ó

Religious terrorist Osama Bin Laden expressed his sincere desire to obtain chemical and nuclear weapons for the purposes of removing the United States and Israel from the Middle East before eventually creating a worldwide Muslim state. This notion supports fears that religious terrorists may be less constrained to elevate their Holy War to NBC terrorism if they believe they are acting within the parameters as set forth by their respective religion. ÒWe donÕt call this suicide, which is forbidden in Islam,Ó said Imad Falouji, publisher of a Hamas newspaper. ÒThese are martyrdom operations. We are commanded to wage Holy War for the sake of God. Here the attacker is assured success, he avoids arrest, inflicts heavier casualties on the enemy, and gains martyrdom.Ó

Religious terrorism both legitimizes, justifies, and advocates the use of NBC weapons. In a recent interview with the HezbollahÕs general secretary, Sheik Sayed Hassan Nasrallah comments on the loss of his son who was killed by Israeli soldiers during a Hezbollah action. He commented, If I told you the death of my son did not cause me pain, I would be lying. But he died a martyrÕs death, and that is the greatest feeling of joy that a father can know. Martyrs are like saints to us. We are believers in God, and according to our belief, the martyr begins a new, much more beautiful life in paradise.

Modern religious terrorism has not been confined to any particular region, religion, or association. Religious terrorism impacts every major region in the world. Recent acts of religious terrorism range from the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack to the American Christian Patriots bombing of the Murrah Federal Building and the usual attempts to disrupt peace processes in the Middle East. ÒI have no regrets,Ó said Yigal Amir, the young Jewish extremist who assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yithak Rabin. He went on to say, ÒI acted alone and on orders from God.Ó

Religion, or religion-based political movements, as the most likely catalyst of NBC terrorism is evidenced by the fact that some of the most serious terrorist acts throughout the 1990s have all stemmed from religious motivation. It is important to note that some of these attacks have involved the use of WMD and high casualties. They include:

· The March 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, perpetrated by an apocalyptic Japanese religious cult, which killed twelve and injured over 5,500 others. The group also planned to carry out additional strikes in the United States modeling previous chemical and biological attacks in Tokyo;

· The bombing in April 1995 of the Oklahoma City Federal Building caused 168 deaths, by Christian Patriots seeking to foment a nationwide revolution;

· The 1993 bombing of New York CityÕs World Trade Center by Islamic radicals who deliberately attempted to topple one of the twin towers on to the other, reportedly while also simultaneously releasing a deadly cloud of poisonous gas;

· The November 1995 assassination, as mentioned above, of the Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish religious extremist, intended as the first step in a campaign of mass murder designed to disrupt the peace process;

· The June 1995 truck bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where 19 soldiers and civilians died and several hundred were wounded. Allegedly, religious militants opposed to the reigning Saudi family were responsible for the attack;

· The string of attacks by Hamas suicide bombers that turned the tide of IsraelÕs national election, killing sixty people, between February and March 1996;

· The machine-gun and hand-grenade attack carried out by Egyptian Islamic militants on a group of Western tourists, killing eighteen outside their Cairo hotel in April 1996;

· The massacre in November 1997 of fifty eight foreign tourists and four Egyptians by terrorists belonging to the Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) at the Temple of Queen Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt;

· The series of thirteen near-simultaneous car and truck bombings that shook Bombay, India, in February 1993, killing four hundred people and injuring more than one thousand others in reprisal for the destruction of an Islamic shrine in that country;

· The December 1994 hijacking of an Air France passenger jet by Islamic terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who plottedÑunsuccessfullyÑto blow up themselves, the aircraft and the 283 passengers on board precisely when the plane was over Paris, causing the flaming wreckage to plunge into the crowded city below;

· The wave of Paris bombings unleashed by the GIA between July and October of the following year, in metro trains, outdoor markets, cafes, schools, and popular tourist spots, during which eight people were killed and more than 180 others wounded;

· The terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists in Algeria, that have claimed the lives of an estimated 75,000 people since 1992.

As this list suggests, religiously motivated terrorism may involve more intense acts of violence causing higher death tolls and elevated levels of destruction. For example, religious terrorists committed only 25 percent of the recorded international terrorist incidents abroad in 1995; however, their acts were responsible for 58 percent of the total number of fatalities that year.

Abu Abbas, head of the Palestine Liberation Front and terrorist mastermind of the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro, responded to U.S. initiatives during the crisis preceding the Gulf War by saying:

If not my son, then the son of my son will kill you. Some day, we will have missiles that can reach New York. And I would love to be able reach the American shore, but this is very difficult. Some day an Arab country will have

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ballistic missiles. Some day an Arab country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the United States and for Israel to reach peace with the Palestinians before that day.

With this in mind, the potential use of NBC terrorism by religious terrorists can be assessed as probable. Religious extremist and international terrorist Osama Bin Laden commented in a recent interview:

Our battle with the Americans is larger than our battle with the Russians. We predict a black day for America and the end of the United States as the United
States, and it will become separate states and will retreat from our land and collect the bodies of its sons back to America, God willing.

That is to say, terrorist organizations that are characterized by religious extremism can be expected to possess interests in NBC terrorism. The spread of religious zealotry in conjunction with the proliferation of NBC weapons may result in the use of NBC terrorism by any number of terrorist organizations with interests inimical to those of the United States.

Millennialists

Millennial terrorists are apocalyptic Òreligious extremists who believe the present age of the world is irredeemably evil, ruled by a Satanic figure personifying evil.Ó This ideology also believes that the Òevil ageÓ is soon to be ended with the millennium, destroyed by God or GodÕs servant, who is good. The subsequent period is Òlauded as one of utopia, where everything is perfect and only those who were formerly oppressed or those who are believers will survive to enjoy it.Ó Furthermore, Norman Cohen contends that millennialism refers to the belief held by some Christians that after His Second Coming, Christ will establish a Messianic Kingdom on Earth and will

reign over it for one thousand years before the Final

Judgment. However, in order to begin the one thousand

years of peace, a cataclysmic war between the forces of good and evil will be waged, with the forces of good emerging triumphant. Although this event could occur at any time, people began to associate it with the end of the millennium. According to historical records, the end of the last millennium was marred with acts of terrorism designed to bring about the ÒendÓ and by worshippers believing the world was coming to an end.

As the year 2000 approaches, government officials fear millennialists may be increasingly interested in the use of NBC terrorism to bring the Second Coming. As previously discussed, the Aum Shinrikyo cult initiated several chemical and biological attacks in support of their millennarian objectives. The most serious example took place on 20 March 1995 when sarin gas was released in several Tokyo subway cars, which led to fifty-five hundred casualties and twelve deaths.

Shoko Ashara, leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, is an example of the many cult leaders government officials fear will be attracted to the use of NBC weapons. In an effort to bring about the millennium, Ashara researched, developed, and deployed chemical and biological weapons in addition to searching for nuclear weapons. Certainly, with the new millennium approaching, the potential for additional acts of NBC terrorism is becoming more plausible.

Right-Wing Terrorism

Right-wing extremism has existed in the United States for a considerable portion of American history and promises to continue to threaten U.S. internal security in the future. For example, from 1812 to 1844, there was a concerted effort involving Protestant terrorists who targeted Catholic priests, nuns, and churches. In 1844, Protestant groups banded together in terrorist operations against an abundant influx of Irish Catholics who emigrated to the United States as a result of the Irish potato blight. A more familiar and recent example of right-wing extremists in the United States is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Generated at the end of the Civil War by Confederate veterans of the Civil War, the Klan mounted terrorist attacks against emancipated slaves, sympathizers, and other religions.

Right-wing, ethnically oriented terrorism is important to consider in the realm of NBC threats because of previous attempts by various right-wing terrorists to acquire chemical and biological weapons for the purposes of terrorism. For the purpose of brevity, this section will only focus on present day examples of right-wing terrorism.

Right-wing extremists all share a common bond--they are all vehemently opposed to any form of government over the county level. They share anti-Semitic, anti-black, and anti-Catholic views and have a religious orientation supporting ideologies associated with racial supremacy. These groups have a history of armed confrontation with law enforcement agencies.

We can trace the origins of the contemporary militias

back to the Posse Comitatus Movement of the 1970s. According to 1997 reports, there are between forty and one hundred militias currently in the United States. These groups claim a membership of over three million people but Òare more likely to number around 25,000. They consider themselves patriots, vehemently defending the second article of the U.S. Constitution which allows provision for a well regulated civilian militia with the right to bear arms.Ó

It should be stated, not all right-wing extremists are terrorists and not all right-wing terrorists are interested in the acquisition of WMD. Most right-wing extremist groups express animosity for the federal government and ÒoutsidersÓ with the parameters as set forth by judicial protocol rather than acts of terrorism. However, this is not always the case. Right-wing extremists have expressed interests in WMD that may indicate a trend towards more destructive behavior. Examples of right-wing extremists attempting to acquire chemical and biological weapons are discussed later in this section.

The most ominous aspect of the right-wing extremists/terrorists is their open conviction that an impending armed conflict with the federal government necessitates paramilitary training and the stockpiling of weapons. Some militia members believe that federal authorities are enacting gun control legislation in order to make it impossible for the people to resist the imposition of a Òtyrannical regimeÓ or a Òone-world dictatorship.Ó Furthermore, many of these right-wing extremists have turned to terrorist acts and have actively pursued weapons of mass destruction. Right-wing terrorists that engage in criminal acts commit a wide variety of criminal activities, such as bombings, bank robberies, and destruction of government property.

As one can discern from the following points, there have been several incidents involving right-wing terrorists

and chemical or biological agents in the last decade. They

include:

· Late 1960s, early 1970s: A plot by the Minuteman Organization to introduce hydrogen cyanide gas into air conditioning system of the United Nations building in New York City. This group also threatened to release a virus developed by its leader, Robert De Pugh, on the floors of major airline terminals. De Pugh owned a veterinary drug firm known as the Biolab Corporation in Norborne, MO.

· 1972: Members of the Neo-Nazi group ÒOrder of the Rising SunÓ were arrested in Chicago, IL, for plotting to contaminate city water supplies with eighty lbs. of typhoid bacillus.

· 1985: a Department of Justice raid on the heavily armed compound of the Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord (CSAL) netted a large weapons cache, large quantities of potassium cyanide, and plans to use the chemical to poison the water supplies of several U.S. cities.

· 1995: Four members of the Minnesota Patriots Council were convicted in federal court for conspiracy to use ricin to kill federal agents and law enforcement officers.

· 1995: Patriot Larry Wayne Harris arrested for buying three vials of bubonic plague bacteria by mail order for $240. Harris claimed he was working on an antidote for plague and was Òconcerned about an imminent invasion from Iraq of super-germ-carrying rats.Ó

· In December 1995, Thomas Lewis Lavy attempted to smuggle 130 grams of ricin across the Canadian border. Lavy, an supposed white supremacist with alleged ties to survivalist groups, had enough ricin to kill possibly thousands of people. At the time of his apprehension, Lavy was carrying four assault weapons, twenty thousand rounds of ammunition, and several pieces of Òsurvivalist literature,Ó including The PoisonerÕs Handbook and Silent Death.
· In Oregon 1997, federal agents apprehended James Dalton Bell, a chemist who developed botulinum toxin and sarin, a synthesized nerve agent, for the purposes of assassinating various local government officials.

These examples of right-wing terrorism, in conjunction with the proliferation of CBW technologies and weapons, may be the harbinger of future NBC terror attacks to come. Moreover, these attacks might increase in destructive power and be more widespread than previously imagined. The potential for an American-based Aum Shinrikyo style attack

must not be discounted. Right-wing militias possess the motivation, financial and technical resources for low-tech CBW and dispersal systems, disregard for retaliation, and the willingness to take risks. These factors combine to create a formidable threat for American security interests. The potential threat for NBC terrorism stemming from right-wing terrorists should be considered high.

Ethnic Fanatics

As previously stated, ethnocentrism may provide the Òmoral justification necessary to convince terrorists that using NBC agents is justified.Ó For ethnic fanatics, using NBC weapons to kill massive amounts of a targeted society may be a duty dictated by their fanatical views.

Ethnic fanatics have already established the use of widespread violence as a means to an end. The question is, ÒWill fanatics, motivated by ethnic beliefs, use NBC weapons?Ó

To answer this question, it is important to look at ethnic conflict on an individual level. The most extreme cases of non-state violence have occurred in large-scale internal conflicts, usually along ethnic lines. The death tolls are significant:

· 30,000 to 60,000 killed in Algeria since 1992;
· 100,000 in Burundi in 1993;
· 100,000-500,000 in Angola since 1992;
· 150,000 in Liberia since 1989;
· 200,000 in Bosnia since 1992;
· 400,000 dead in Somalia since 1990;
· 800,000 killed in Rwanda in a few months of 1994;
· A million dead in the Cambodian genocide of 1975-1979;
· More than a million dead in the wars in Afghanistan since 1978; and
· More than a million dead from the Sudanese civil war that began in 1983.

From these statistics, we can discern that high death tolls are unlikely to constrain various ethnic fanatics. In fact, ethnic wars may be oriented towards high death tolls. The Òcombatants in an internal conflict generally do not have limited political objectives. Instead, their aim is at a minimum to survive, and at a maximum to secure total control over a contested piece of territory by eliminating the adversary.Ó Any aversions to mass casualties in most other forms of non-state violence often do not apply to ethnic fanatics.

Ethnically motivated conflict is likely to reoccur in the future as it has in the past, leaving mass casualties in its wake. To date, Òno non-state faction in an internal conflict has chosen to employ any weapon except conventional ones.Ó Ethnic fanatics have found great success in conventional weapons such as knives, machetes, guns, and bombs. However, the use of NBC weapons by ethnic fanatics cannot be discounted because of their established propensity to cause mass casualties. The spread of ethnic conflict in conjunction with the proliferation of NBC weapons may facilitate the use of NBC weapons by any number of ethnic fanatics hoping to achieve mass casualties.

Conclusion

The trend in terrorism appears to escalating towards mass destruction attacks. In recent attacks involving international terrorism, over twelve thousand people have been injured. U.S. officials fear the break up of the Soviet Union has compromised Russian NBC weapons and associated technologies. State and non-state actors have clearly expressed interests in obtaining CBW for their private agendas. Based on U.S. intelligence, the number of CBW possessors ranges from approximately twenty two to twenty four nations. This number may expand to include subnational members in the near future. As the Aum Shinrikyo nerve agent attack indicated, NBC terrorism is a threat that many governments are only now beginning to make counter-terrorism efforts towards.

Prior to the subway attacks, Aum Shinrikyo was relatively unknown to Japanese officials and was not considered to be an NBC terror threat. The use of nerve agent in the World Trade Center bombing and various domestic uses of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) also suggests that any one of the aforementioned terrorist groups, loosely-affiliated terrorist actors, or Nth terrorist have the potential to use NBC weapons. NBC terrorism can be expected to emerge from previously established terrorists to unknown terrorist groups.

However, the likely motivations contributing to NBC terror are religious, millennial, right-wing, and ethnically based. The trend in terrorism may be evolving. Whether or not it becomes a strategic threat to U.S. security interests depends upon U.S. efforts to negate the threat.

In this next chapter, these profiles will be expanded to include those actors who are likely to desire NBC weapons, which may in turn be used in conjunction with a terrorist campaign. Covert NBC terror is an operationally distinct form of attack that can be employed by three fundamentally different types of attackers: loosely affiliated, non-state, and state-sponsored terrorists.

Non-State, Loose Affiliation, or State-Sponsorship

Loosely Affiliated Terrorist Groups

Loosely affiliated extremists interacting with terrorist organizations or terrorist alliances have recently received a great deal of attention. This group, which is characterized by the World Trade Center bombers and rogue terrorists such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Osama Bin Laden, pose a significant threat to the United States because membership in such groups is relatively unknown to law enforcement and because they can exploit the mobility that emerging technology and a loose organizational structure offer. This category consists of independent terrorist organizations or otherwise independent actors who, for the purposes of a unifying cause, come together to share resources and act collectively during a terrorist operation before separating under a cloak of anonymity. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, these terrorists are Òneither surrogate of, nor strongly influenced by, any one nation. They have the ability to tap into a variety of official and private resource bases in order to facilitate terrorist acts against U.S. interests.Ó Loosely affiliated terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden are said to consist of Òwell-organized disorganization.Ó This type of terrorist architecture has given rise to concern because of the recent successes in anonymous terror attacks. As a result, terrorist groups seem to be more difficult to track and penetrate, and their targets are harder to predict.

In a brief by Congressional Research Service, author Raphael F. Perl commented:

One likely profile for the terrorist of the 21^st century may well be a private individual not affiliated with any established group. Another profile might be a group-affiliated individual acting independent of the group, but drawing on other similarly minded individuals for support. Because the current U.S. international counter-terrorism policy framework is sanction-oriented, and has traditionally sought to pin responsibility on state-sponsors, some policy realignment may be required.

An example of a loosely affiliated terrorist is Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden, born approximately in 1955 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was the son of a wealthy Saudi magnate, Muhammed Bin Laden. Osama got his start when he left Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan-Soviet War in 1979 after being recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood. In the mid-1980s, Bin Laden established an organization to help funnel fighters and money to the resistance. After the war, he briefly returned to Saudi Arabia but was expelled due to dissident activity and fled to Sudan, where he then established his business and mujahedin empire. The Saudi government revoked his citizenship in 1994 and his family officially disowned him. U.S. pressure on Sudan led to Bin LadenÕs expulsion in early 1996. Until recently, Bin Laden has resided in or near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he appeared to have had good relations with the Afghan Taliban. Bin Laden comprises the most significant threat to U.S. security under the rubric of loosely-affiliated terrorist organizations. Reportedly,

· Bin Laden is worth some $300 million, with businesses in Sudan and elsewhere.

· Bin Laden appears to be the leader or senior member of an international mujahedin organization variously known as the Mujahedin Brigades.

· While the extent and design of Bin LadenÕs infrastructure is not known, Bin Laden has boasted of having supplied soldiers and resources to anti-Western mujahedin in theaters such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, the Phillipines, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Eritrea.

The terrorist network of Osama Bin Laden is one of a few known examples of this new rubric of loosely-affiliated terrorist groups, which is not to say that there have not been or will not be other terrorists similar to him and his delusions. Although Bin Laden has interacted with different states such as Sudan, Syria, and Iran, he is not dependent upon state-sponsorship. For Bin Laden, this lack of dependency convolutes western distinction between state-sponsorship, loosely affiliated, and independent terrorist classifications. At times, Bin Laden acts independently and without any support but his own. While other times, Bin Laden provides financial aid to like-minded states (such as Syria, Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Yemen) in exchange for sanctuary and protection from within host countries.

Bin LadenÕs objective is to buttress indigenous militant Islamic movements, but also to liberate Palestine from Western influences and prepare the basis for a worldwide Islamic state, referred to in the literature as the Khilafa. Bin Laden abhors the United States--based on the activities of the United States in the Gulf, and because of its support for the state of Israel. He sees U.S. support of Israel as American opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state. He has been quoted saying, ÒIf someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other matters.Ó In a recent interview, he spoke of his ongoing efforts with Islamic alliances to counter Western influences in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Praise be to God, the cherisher and sustainer of the Worlds. Peace and blessings be upon Prophet Muhammad, his companions and his kin. Let me begin by stating that we, in the World Islamic Front for jihad against Jews and Crusaders, have, by the grace of God Almighty, issued a crystal clear fatwa calling on the Nation to carry on jihad aimed at liberating Islamic holy sites, and the Ancient House (the Holy KaÕaba), and Al-Aksa Mosque and all Islamic lands. We will continue this course because it is part of our religion, and because God, praise and glory be to him, ordered us to carry out jihad so that the word of God may remain exalted to the heights. If the instigation for jihad against Jews and the Americans, in order to liberate Al-Aksa Mosque, and the Holy KaÕaba, is considered crime, let history be a witness that I am a criminal.

Bin Laden has been linked to Al-Jihad, among other terrorist groups, which is the Egyptian Islamic extremist group that is responsible for the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Moreover, Bin Laden has been accused of having links to various state-sponsors of terrorism including IranÕs Hezbollah and SudanÕs National Islamic Front. Each country, Iran and Sudan, allegedly has supported Bin LadenÕs terrorist architecture in many of the same ways associated with state-sponsors of terrorism.

Osama Bin Laden became a legitimate threat when he sponsored Ramzi Yousef, among others, in the World Trade Center bombing that rocked the very foundations of AmericaÕs sense of security in 1993. After fleeing from U.S. law enforcement, Yousef was apparently apprehended in an apartment provided by Bin Laden in Pakistan. Since then, Bin Laden was convicted, in absentia, in a ÒclassifiedÓ trial for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the Khobar Tower bombings in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden has escalated his anti-Western efforts in recent attempts to purchase chemical and nuclear weapons.

The next section will address the nature of terrorist organizations that are united together with similar objectives.

Non-State Terrorist Groups

There is an emerging school of thought among government officials that the threat of non-state-based NBC terrorism is becoming one of the most serious challenges to U.S. national security interests. Non-state actors are defined as Òan autonomous organization devoid of any formal, overt connection to the state government. Non-state groups may be Ôtransnational,Õ e.g., members may not see themselves as citizens of any one country, but instead enjoy with those who manifest common religious, ethnic, political, social, economic or personal objectives that transcend nation-state boundaries.Ó These groups may be recognized as Òlegitimate organizations by the state i.e., be granted legitimate status accorded to religious groups or social organizations.Ó Non-state actors include but are not limited to the following:

Paramilitary guerilla groups fighting for the control of territory; cults and other religious terrorists organizations; militias or other geographically fixed paramilitary groups; organized crime syndicates; mercenary groups; breakaway units of a stateÕs military, intelligence, or security services; corrupt multinational corporations; and lone individuals.

Following a nerve gas attack by the non-state terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, Senator Sam Nunn commented, Òthis attack could signal the world has entered

a new era.Ó A year before becoming secretary of defense,

Senator William Cohen noted that Òit does not require much imagination to envision that those who hire terrorists to blow up jumbo jets might enlist them to poison our populations.Ó Walter Laqueur, a terrorism expert once skeptical of the threat of NBC terrorism, wrote in 1996 that Òproliferation of weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorist groups are likely to use them in the foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating against it.Ó

Among non-state terrorists, the threat of NBC terrorism becomes more credible when certain conditions are met such as the conditions listed in table 5 of the appendix. When a non-state group falls under the following three categories, the particular non-state group may be considered a legitimate NBC threat, which may warrant preemptive military or covert action:

· Capable of NBC weapons acquisition and use.
· Interested in causing mass casualties.
· Interested in using NBC weapons.

Dr. Richard Falkenrath commented during a lecture series on the phenomenon of terrorism at Southwest Missouri State University, ÒThe difficulty with developing NBC terror capabilities is the same as it has ever been. It doesnÕt change. However, terrorists are increasing their capabilities everyday.Ó He went on to say that, ÒRogue nations today, if they desire, can have a chemical and biological weapons program if they direct some of their resources in that direction. The same is becoming the case for many state and non-state terrorist groups.Ó This can be attributed to the Òincreasing ease of access to information, the current revolution in biological agent research,Ó as well as Òspecific NBC-related developments such as the erosion of the Soviet nuclear custodial system.Ó

Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced the formal acknowledgment of several terrorist organizations during a press briefing on 8 October 1997. Under a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the State Department has designated thirty of the most prominent non-state and state-sponsored terrorist groups as foreign terrorist organizations. As a result, it is now a crime to provide any support to these terrorist organizations. According to the list, the terrorist organizations are as follows:

* Abu Nidal Organization (ANO);
* Abu Sayyaf Group (non-state);
* Armed Islamic Group;
* Aum Shinrikyo (non-state);
* Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (non-state);
* Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Hawatmeh Faction;
* HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement);
* Harakat ul-Ansar;
* Hizballah (Party of God);
* Gama'a al-Islamiyya;
* Japanese Red Army;
* al-Jihad;
* Kach (non-state);
* Kahane Chai (non-state);
* Khmer Rouge;
* Kurdistan Workers' Party;
* Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam;
* Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents (non-state);
* Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization;
* National Liberation Army (non-state);
* Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction;
* Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF);
* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP);
* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC);
* Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia;
* Revolutionary Organization 17 November (non-state);
* Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (non-state);
* Revolutionary People's Struggle (non-state);
* Shining Path (non-state); and
* Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement.

This list includes both state and non-state groups who have significant access to a wide variety of human and material resources. The State Department has taken a positive step in creating such a list, however, it is important to maintain an Òall azimuthsÓ threat assessment of potential sources of NBC terrorism. As the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack indicated, NBC terrorism can come from otherwise obscure or unknown terrorists. Rennselaer

Lee, President of Global Advisory Services, Inc., cites a 1991 letter faxed to RussiaÕs Arzamas-16, nuclear research center, purportedly from the Islamic Jihad, offering to buy a nuclear weapon, and he quotes the centerÕs director as saying Jihad representatives in 1993 offered $2 billion for a warhead.

In response to a question regarding the next likely source of a WMD attack, Dr. Richard Falkenrath replied, ÒIt is important to keep an eye on all terrorist organizations, both state and non-state. However, I believe the next source of WMD terrorism is going to surprise us just like Aum Shinrikyo.Ó

The next section will address state-sponsored terrorist organizations and their potential for the use of NBC terrorism.

State-Sponsored Terrorist Groups

State-sponsored terrorism is defined as Òpurposive acts of a nation intended to strike fear into groups or individuals so as to achieve state policies, or the deliberate acts of violence directed against individuals or groups by a nation so as to achieve the ends of the state.Ó Typically, state-sponsorship has provided a wide variety of support and resources to terrorist organizations. State-sponsored terrorist groups and state-seeking groups, such as those operating in the Middle East that follow radical religiously oriented political ideologies, represent a typology highly likely to threaten use of NBC weapons. State-sponsored terrorists may effectively employ tactics that are considered to be outside prevailing norms of state conduct. In the book, Almanac of Modern Terrorism, authors Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregory E.J. Scott contend:

State-sponsors can get away with more violence than can any other institution in society because there is usually either some popular support for even the most brutal political regime, or legitimization of the government from outside by the recognition of international law.

According to the U.S. State Department, seven countries remain designated as state-sponsors of terrorism: Sudan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba. These countries are on a list maintained by the Secretary of State that indicates countries have Òrepeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.Ó Critics of the State DepartmentÕs List say its punitive measures are not damaging enough because several members seem to be ÒcomfortableÓ with their continual inclusion in the list. There also seems to be a discrepancy surrounding states that have not been included on the list but have established themselves as state-sponsors of terrorism. As a result, there have been suggestions to create an informal list subordinate to the main list.

Various advocates of expanding the terrorism list contend that there is utility in drawing ÒCongressÕ attention to countries that do not qualify for the list but do qualify to be held under strict scrutiny.Ó Some of the countries that have been suggested for inclusion on an informal list are Russia, China, Vietnam, Egypt, Afghanistan, Yemen, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. It is believed these countries warrant special consideration due to their support for terrorist activity among various opposition governments. When discussing international terrorism, the seven governments listed by the State Department are considered as terrorist-like as the numerous non-state or independent terrorist groups that plague the international security environment. Indeed, some of the independent groups are known to be closely aligned with the seven governments listed as state-sponsors.

In the 1993 U.S. Senate hearings on Rogue Regimes, Committee Chair Tom Lantos explicitly defined state-sponsors as the Òinternational bomb-throwers.Ó The countries who are on the periphery of the international system, countries which have little stake in international order and are seeking through various reprehensible means to disrupt that order.Ó He later asserted:

These are the countries that are usually on the U.S. list of state-sponsors of terrorism, countries that are under sanctions imposed by the United Nations for irresponsible and unacceptable international behaviorÉ At present, I personally would include in the list of such regimes: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, Serbia, the Sudan, and possibly Burma.

International terrorism threatening the United States is often foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States. Many government officials feel terrorist groups are more likely to acquire NBC capabilities from sympathetic nations rather than develop them alone. According to these Senate Hearings and the Department of StateÕs analyses, the principal threat coming from terrorists today is the possession of NBC weapons.

A significant contributor to the likelihood of NBC terror, in terms of a terroristÕs capability to acquire, develop, stockpile, and disseminate NBC weapons in covert operations, is state-sponsorship. But why would a state want to sponsor terrorism? States sponsor terrorism for a host of reasons. In the past, states have done so in order to complement other instruments of state policy, to achieve Òforeign policy objectives that could not otherwise be achieved through conventional political or military means, to retain plausible deniability and escape identification and punishment, to commit criminal acts, and because it is less expensive than to wage military action.Ó

States also sponsor terror to create or expand their power and influence among ideological or religious movements, or as a means of establishing credentials with revolutionary movements worldwide. State-sponsors may also be geared toward stifling domestic opposition through Òselective assassination of dissidents abroad.Ó This is the direct work of state-sponsors and indigenous terrorist groups. Indigenous terrorist organizations working under the umbrella of rogue states could have access to various resources that non-state groups would have great difficulty trying to obtain due to international constraints. State sponsorship is a likely source of support for terrorists in pursuit of NBC weapons.

State-sponsored terrorist organizations, such as the PLO or Hamas, have many advantages over non-state groups. Typically, states will provide greater access to technical and financial resources in addition to international connections. Past activities have included direct support for operations by providing official, yet undercover, state agents. Generally speaking, typical state-sponsors can be found engaging in terrorist activity themselves by providing sophisticated weapons, training, geographic sanctuary, diplomatic facilities, financial assistance, logistic, and/or other support to terrorists. In addition, state-sponsors may also provide ideological alliances, propaganda support, other forms of diplomatic assistance, and organizational assistance. In the 1993 U.S. Senate hearings on Rogue Regimes, CIA Director James Woolsey commented that both state-sponsors and terrorist groups either together or independent of each other might acquire NBC weapons. Senator Lantos reaffirmed the DirectorÕs contentions by saying ÒAll the rogue regimes under discussion, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea, are building a broad range of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.Ó

Groups such as the Japanese Red Army and the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) have raised sizeable funds to support terrorist organizations as proxies for Syria, Iraq, and Libya during the 1980s. By 1988, Abu NidalÕs Organization had turned its earnings into a $400 million portfolio that included multinational arms trading with a company based in Poland.Ó For the terrorist, the benefits of state-sponsorship are significant.

Such a relationship appreciably enhanced the capabilities and operational capacity of otherwise limited terrorist groups, placing at their disposal the resources of an established nation-stateÕs entire diplomatic, military and intelligence apparatus and thus greatly facilitating planning and intelligence. The logistical support provided by states assured the terrorists of otherwise unobtainable luxuries such as the use of diplomatic pouches for the transport of weapons and explosives, false identification in the form of genuine passports, and the use of embassies and other diplomatic facilities as safe houses or staging bases. State-sponsorship also afforded terrorists greater training opportunities: thus some groups were transformed into entities more akin to elite commando units than to the stereotypical conspirational cell of anarchists wielding Molotov cocktails or radicals manufacturing crude pipe-bombs.

As a result of international counter-terrorism policies, terrorists are beginning to conceal evidence of support for terrorist operations by engaging anonymously in terrorist operations. This characteristic is emerging throughout the world as a new phenomenon of terrorism called Òsilent terrorism.Ó Within silent terrorism, terrorists do not claim responsibility for their attacks and will make every effort to make sure culpability cannot be assigned. Silent terrorism is especially advantageous for state-sponsors that wish to retain plausible deniability by concealing their involvement through proxies and other means. Silent terrorists have proved difficult to monitor, so terrorists can maintain Òlegitimacy in the world community while covertly sponsoring subversion and terror to achieve their goals.Ó Even if the state-sponsor is known to have assisted a terrorist attack, it is increasingly difficult to prove that it was committed on behalf of the state-sponsor.

In a recent lecture, Dr. William Graham, Director of National Security Research, Inc., alluded to the belief that a terrorist organization wishing to remain anonymous could float a tanker one hundred miles off the coast of Los Angeles and launch a ballistic missile armed with NBC agents into the city with a potential death toll exceeding several hundred thousand lives. The benefit of anonymous or silent terrorism is the potential for plausible deniability. State-sponsors are rarely willing to risk their very existence, and are therefore, likely to remain anonymous when using NBC terrorism as a form of their national policy or agenda.

NBC Terrorism and State-Sponsors

While assessing the NBC threat potential of a traditional state-sponsor of terrorism, it is important to look at the disposition of the state and whether its behavior is indicative of the propensity for NBC terrorism. The following section will look at the countries determined by the State Department to be state-sponsors of terrorist operations and their disposition towards NBC usage. This section will look into ties to terrorist operations that each country has fostered over the years and discuss any inclination to use terrorist groups in pursuit of foreign policy.

Cuba

The strategic importance of Cuba in relation to North, Central, and South America was acknowledged during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba is only ninety miles South of the southern coast of Florida. Transit time from Cuba for delivery vehicles such as boats, planes, and ballistic missiles is brief. Missiles launched from Cuba could arrive at a target somewhere within middle America or the west coast under fourteen minutes in comparison to the thirty two minutes it takes for Soviet missiles coming over the poles. Today, terrorists could use Cuba to launch NBC campaigns against the United States from either sea or air platforms.

The geographic location of Cuba represents critical strategic positioning in relation to the Western Hemisphere. Countries such as the FSU, with no advanced bases in the Western Hemisphere, could gain certain strategic parity with the United States if they were able to develop terrorist operations within Cuba. For these reasons, Cuba is an ideal staging point for terrorist operations against North, Central, and South America. The use of Cuba by a formidable terrorist organization would pose a clear and present danger to U.S. national security interests.

The Cuban government, although very much limited in action since the fall of the Soviet Union, is immersed in a grand strategy to combat ÒAmerican imperialismÓ through armed revolutionary groups. For the most part, the Cuban government has been a Òconspicuous supporter of insurgency movements, particularly in Latin America and Africa.Ó This support has included sanctuary for terrorists; the supply of arms; weapons and tactical training; ideological indoctrination; and the use of military advisors and troops.

In terms of NBC threats, the current infrastructure within Cuba is deteriorating and has been for some time. With this in mind, Cuba cannot be considered capable of developing nuclear related materials including a nuclear weapon. Such an undertaking is far too demanding for a country with limited access to various resources. The highest probability for Cuban-sponsored NBC terrorism depends on whether any residual weapons have been left in place since the fall of the Soviet Union.

However, Cuban CBW capabilities cannot be discounted. Cuba has been very dependent upon its agricultural strengths in the past and has an equipment intensive agrarian architecture. The dual-use nature of such equipment designated for pesticide dispersal and the like may enable Cuban-based terrorists to weaponize CBW for use in terrorist operations anywhere in the Americas.

Furthermore, Castro could proliferate CBW to various terrorist groups with interests similar to his foreign policy objectives. Cuba has extended its resources to many terrorist organizations espousing an anti-Western ideology. Terrorist sponsorship in the past has included organizations in favor of Marxist-like regimes such as the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR), Monteneros, Ejercito Revolucionario de Pueblo (ERP), Salvadoran Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) and the Columbian Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). The threat of nuclear terrorism emanating from Cuba can be assessed as low probability while chemical and biological terrorism can be assigned a medium threat potential based on CubaÕs ability to produce BC weapons, anti-western ideology and foreign policy, and use of terrorism in pursuit of political objectives.

Iran

There is no shortage of terrorist organizations or countries opposed to Western influence in the Middle East. Currently, Iran is the most active terrorist state in the world. Iran has developed NBC acquisition programs and is currently a chemical weapon power and suspected biological weapons power. Officials have reason to believe Iranians have received various NBC research and development capabilities from the Soviet Union as a result of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the press in May 1995 that Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Iranian agents have scoured the FSU searching for nuclear materials, technologies, and scientists, and Iran unsuccessfully approached a plant in Kazakhstan in 1992 for a substantial quantity of enriched uranium.

Iranian officials have approached unemployed Russian scientists who made biological weapons for the FSU, offering as much as five thousand dollars a month to people who earn far less than that a year. During the Iran-Iraq War, however, as Iraqi chemical weapons (CW) use became more frequent and more effective, and as the international community failed to respond to IraqÕs use of chemical weapons, the Iranians began to condone CBW use and apparently began using chemical artillery rounds captured from Iraq. As the war continued, Iran developed its own chemical weapons capability. By the end of the war, Iran had embarked on the production of biological weapons (BW) and had begun pursuing nuclear weapons.

Currently, Iran is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons and has been doing so since 1984. During this same time, Tehran has produced several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking agents--a weaponsÕ stockpile meant to support national foreign policy. Iran has the capability to deliver chemical bombs against targets such as airfields, vessels at sea, population centers, ports, oil installations across the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

If foreign assistance were provided, [Tehran] could produce a [nuclear] weapon by the end of the decade. Tehran is devoting significant resources to its nuclear program. Foreign suppliers, including Russia and China, are key sources of necessary technologies not only for IranÕs nuclear program but also for its other NBC capabilities.

Tehran has openly planned for the use of terrorist operations against Western populations. The Iranians view NBC weapons as weapons of terror, methods offering area-denial applicability, and a means of destabilizing adversaries. Nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices would disrupt U.S. access to key ports and air bases just as would biological weapons, and could wreak havoc among civilian populations.

U.S. and European officials believe Iran currently sponsors numerous anti-Western terrorist organizations predominantly active in Western Europe and the Middle East. Iran initiated terrorist campaigns during the Iran-Iraq War as part of a broader strategy to deter Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states from supporting the Iraqi cause. In the past, Iran has sponsored numerous Islamic terrorist organizations espousing anti-Western ideology. Examples of IranÕs terrorist organizations are: Hezbollah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal Organization, Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan and Al-Harakan al-Islamiya, all of which are determined to establish an Arab state in the Middle East. Moreover, Iran promoted external terror operations such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, Dawa, and the Islamic Jihad in Hejaz.

Tehran has been most supportive of the Middle East terrorist organization, Hezbollah, a radical ShiÕite organization founded in 1978 and devoted to the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state and the destruction of all non-Islamic institutions in the Middle East. Hezbollah is largely influenced by the ideals of the Islamic revolution and supported by Iran. The majority of HezbollahÕs weapons such as ex-Soviet AT-3 anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and anti-tank missiles, come from Iran. However, Hezbollah also receives support from Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria.

A threat assessment of the Iranian terrorist network may indicate the potential for Iranian government to become a possible NBC weapons outlet for its state-sponsored terrorist organizations. Iran should be considered a Òhigh threatÓ in terms of potential use of NBC terrorism because of its widespread support for international terrorism against Western governments, stockpile of BC weapons, aggressive nuclear weapons acquisition program, and its continued use of international terrorism as a means of achieving foreign policy.

Iraq

Iraq, under the control of Saddam Hussein since 1978, has been one of the foremost state-sponsors of international terrorism. In the past, Iraq has provided substantial support for the Palestinian cause, including sanctuary for terrorists belonging to Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal groups.

In the past, Iraq has previously attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction. On 7 June 1981, IraqÕs nuclear plant, Osirak, which would have had nuclear weapons potential, was assertively disarmed by Israeli sorties at Tuwaitha. Since then, there is mounting evidence that Iraq may be Òassembling a secret plutonium reactor to generate plutonium, an alternate nuclear weapons material at a site just west of Baghdad called al-Ubur.Ó

Western government officials contend, Òif Iraq had access to nuclear material, it could produce a workable nuclear weapon within one year.Ó Iraq has been able to acquire chemical and biological weapons through illegal purchases and research and development--undoubtedly with Russian contribution. Saddam has demonstrated his regimeÕs inclination toward the use of NBC terrorism. His most acknowledged act of state terrorism involved the use of nerve gas to kill thousands of innocent citizens belonging to IraqÕs Kurdish minority.

It is clear from United Nations (UN) Weapons Inspectors that Sadaam Hussein was able to research, develop, and stockpile chemical and biological weapons prior to and following the Gulf War of 1991. Following U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections, Òvital new informationÓ was uncovered regarding the nature of IraqÕs CBW program. It was discovered that despite UN resolutions, Iraq had been able to conceal its chemical and biological warfare programs. Before the 1991 Gulf War, Baghdad flight-tested a remote controlled fighter designed to disperse biological weapons. Prior to that, Iraq had used chemical weapons with great success against Iranian forces in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq resorted to using mustard gas and other chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and its Kurdish allies.

IraqÕs CW program began in May 1985 with the nerve agent VX. In support of the CW program, Iraq produced several precursor chemicals expressly for the development of VX; sixty-five metric tons of chlorine, two hundred plus tons each of phophorous pentasulfides and disopropylamine, which would have combined to produce more than five hundred tons of VX. Iran also produced a true binary sarin-filled artillery shell, 122mm rockets and aerial bombs, including chemical warheads for the Al Husayn ballistic missile.

IraqÕs BW program, which began in 1974, was also successful. Tens of thousands of liters of such agents as Òanthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, and gas gangreneÓ were produced and stockpiled. Standard artillery shells, warheads, aircraft, aerosolizers, and rockets were weaponized to carry CBW agents for the purposes of war and terrorist operations.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein continues to use terrorist groups and state operatives to carry out his national agenda through terrorist campaigns in the Middle East and Western Europe.

Immediately before the outbreak of the Gulf War there were reported to be more than 1,500 terrorists assembled in Baghdad. Hussein promised throughout the crisis and the ensuing war to unleash a global terror campaign against those arrayed against him.

Iraq is in possession of chemical and biological weapons and may not be too distant from acquiring crude nuclear weapons. In the past, Hussein has used chemical weapons on those he considers to be his opposition, including Iraqi citizens. Due to HusseinÕs use of international terrorists in pursuit of foreign policy, aggressive nuclear acquisition program, and stockpile of CBW, Iraq may be considered a Òhigh threatÓ for the use of NBC terrorism against U.S. security interests.

Libya

In 1969, Colonel Muammar Qadaffi took power in a military coup and closed American and British military bases in Libyan territory and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya. By 1972, a series of largely inoperative Libyan-American agreements were formally terminated, and the size of United States diplomatic representation in Libya was significantly reduced. After the 1969 coup, the U.S.-Libyan relationship dissolved. U.S. officials parted ways because LibyaÕs foreign policies openly supported international terrorism and subversion against moderate Arab and African governments. LibyaÕs pro-terrorism policies would later prompt the United States to adopt economic sanctions against Libya in 1986, including a total ban on trade with Libya.

An important discovery was made in 1988 regarding LibyaÕs NBC capabilities. At that time, Libya was discovered to be in the process of constructing a chemical weapons plant, the largest such facility in the third world. Reports indicate France had provided Colonel Qaddafi with more than one ton of the nerve agent Tabun (GA). This development would, of course, represent a significant threat to U.S. security interests. The production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in conjunction with pro-terrorism foreign policy represents a significant threat to civilized societies everywhere. Qaddafi has indicated his active endorsement of state-sponsored terrorism and is reportedly sponsoring as many as thirty insurgent and terrorist groups around the world. Examples of significant Libyan-supported organizations are: ANO, ASALA, the Japanese Red Army, M-19, MRTA, Abu Nidal Organization, Popular Struggle Front, and the PFLP-GC. In fact, the ANO maintains its headquarters in Libya, where their leader, Sabri al-Banna resides. Libyan-sponsored NBC terrorism should be assessed as a high threat to U.S. security interests based on Libyan support for and propensity to use international terrorism and their resolve to develop and use NBC weaponry. Libya, at one time, threatened to strike the United States with a nuclear weapon if they had the ballistic missile capability to do so. Colonel Qaddafi, who once described the atomic bomb as a Òmeans of terrorizing humanity,Ó is known to have been in the market for a nuclear weapon and has been reported to looking to contract terrorists to steal a nuclear weapon in pursuit of foreign policy.

North Korea

North Korea, an alleged member of the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons community is considered a rogue state with overt hostility towards the United States. North Korean defense spending exceeds six billion dollars a year; roughly 25 percent of North KoreaÕs gross domestic product--the highest such defense spending ratio in the world. A great deal of this money goes to the production of chemical and biological weapons and training enabling the North Korean military to operate in contaminated conditions. Pyongyang has expressed continuously that North Korea must possess NBC agents in order to defend itself from external influences, even to reunite the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has stated its intentions to use NBC weapons in times of adversity, if prompted, and has maintained production and stockpiles of NBC weapons over the years.

In addition, North Korea has been characterized as a state-sponsor of terrorism for some time. The most recognized incident involving North Korean terrorism is the bombing on 29 November 1987 of Korean Air Lines flight 858, in which 158 people were killed. Other acts of North Korean terrorism involved various assassination attempts against N. Korean officials. Recent communiqués coming out of Pyongyang indicate North Korea would not be above the use of NBC weapons in terrorist operations designed to promote the unification of the Korean peninsula. North Korea has sufficient motivation, the propensity to cause mass destruction, and NBC capabilities that warrant the classification of North Korea as a "high threat.Ó

Syria

Syria was placed on the first terrorism list as far back as 1979. It is generally believed among western governments that Syria has a long history of using terrorists to advance its own interests. Syria has sponsored numerous terrorist operations against Western-aligned forces and provides support for many major terrorist organizations from within its soil. Syria is suspected of possessing both chemical and biological weapons to buttress its foreign policy objectives in addition to terrorist operations. Furthermore, Syria appears to be engaged in aggressive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, possibly for terrorist operations.

In the past, the Syrian government has targeted Western governments and allies with terrorist attacks in the Middle East. According to the U.S. State Department, Syrian personnel were directly involved in terrorist operations from the mid-1970s until 1983. From the mid-80Õs on, the Syrian government began to use non-Syrian personnel in their terrorist organizations. The most recognized of these is the Abu Nidal Organization. However, the Syrians supported other organizations such as the PFLP-SC, the PFLP-GC, and SaÕIqa.

Syria has extensive involvement in the international terrorist community. As a means of achieving foreign policy, Syria has relied on the results of terrorist operations against western ideologies. For this reason in addition to suspected chemical and biological weapons, and an aggressive nuclear weapons acquisition program, Syria can be assessed as a Òhighly probableÓ threat of sponsoring NBC terrorism against its adversaries, possibly U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East.

Conclusion

The increasing availability of NBC technologies may be creating an environment in which otherwise obscure terrorist organizations, in addition to the more familiar terrorists, may be attempting to acquire NBC capabilities. Government officials can look to loosely affiliated, non-state, and state-sponsored terrorist groups as likely sources of NBC terrorism. Due to access to additional resources, NBC terror weapons are likely to be supplied by state-sponsors, though these weapons could come from other terrorist groups as well. State-sponsored terrorists are well connected, possess crucial resources that will enable the research and development of NBC weapons in addition to the means to disseminate agents and escape culpability for such attacks. The State Department has listed several countries as state sponsors of terrorism that warrant economic sanctions that may inhibit the acquisition of NBC weaponry among other things. These countries have a long history of sponsoring terrorism against western societies that may soon invoke methods of mass destruction if allowed to progress. Additional measures are necessary in order to maintain the security environment and to prevent the acquisition of NBC weapons by terrorist groups.

To date, terroristsÕ modus operandi have utilized predominantly conventional weapons. Rural and urban terrorist groups, some highly structured and connected (e.g., Hezbollah) and others loosely organized, have utilized a wide range of tactics during the last two decades, including arson, bombings, kidnappings, torture, hijackings, assorted attacks on various facilities, and assassinations. Explosives and small arms, such as pistols, rifles, and submachine guns and more sophisticated weapons (including antitank rockets and ground-to-air missiles), have made up the terrorist arsenal until recently. Government officials fear terrorists are beginning to view NBC weapons as more attractive than conventional weapons for reasons based on their unique characteristics.

Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons have a range of destructive potential like no other. NBC weapons can do many things in addition to destroying property, contaminating the target area, or killing its victims. The degree of lethality and destruction is the primary component associated with the threat of NBC weapons and the primary reason for NBC weapons may be attractive to terrorists. The following section will discuss the characteristics of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Nuclear Weapons

By acquiring a pre-assembled nuclear weapon, terrorists could sidetrack most time, financial, technological, and assembly constraints. Therefore, the least difficult means for a terrorist organization to acquire nuclear capability would be to steal or purchase a pre-assembled nuclear weapon, if this were possible in the future. Nuclear weapons may also be provided to a terrorist organization by a state sponsor in pursuit of foreign policy. Nuclear weapons may become available as a result of the fragmented former Soviet Union, and the possibly loose control over its massive stockpile. Another option would be to research and develop a nuclear weapon suitable for terrorist operations. However, this method would be exponentially more difficult because of the numerous technological and logistical demands inherent in a nuclear weapons production program. These difficulties are addressed in the discussion of homemade nuclear weapons later in this chapter.

Government officials fear Russia does not have the resources to account for all the nuclear weapons inherited in the 1991 Soviet collapse.

According to Ministry of Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov, the Soviet nuclear weapons complex grew rather steadily until it peaked in 1986 at 45,000 warheads and then declined more than 20 percent to 32,000 warheads by May 1993. An official CIA estimate given in May 1992 placed the stockpile of the former Soviet Union at thirty thousand nuclear weapons with an uncertainty of plus or minus five thousand.

Nuclear weapons that would be ideal for terrorists would be small in size and easily transportable, but these are also the most sophisticated devices. For example, according to one report the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) intelligence agency may have acquired more than a hundred small nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as suitcase nukes, each weighing less than 35kg that were never included in any post-Cold War inventory of Russian weapons. Former Soviet national security adviser Alexander Lebed told U.S. congressmen these portable weapons were ideal for terrorists and further alleged that many of these suitcase nukes could not be accounted for. These allegations were corroborated by a top Russian scientist before a U.S. congressional committee in 1997. Government officials fear, if these suitcase nukes do indeed exist, that these nuclear munitions may have or will end up in the hands of terrorists via underground trafficking or state-sponsors.

UNT [unconventional nuclear terrorism] is real in a technical sense, not expensive in money or materials compared with many military nuclear systems, and not prohibitively difficult to execute. Our examination of targets and of various means of placing explosives at them in unconventional ways has convinced us that we are vulnerable and could be hurt very badly by an attack of this type. This in itself is sufficient to demand that serious attention be given to the UNT and to ways to guard against it or make it more difficult to execute.

Other nuclear weapons were made by states to be human portable, concealable, or even launchable from the back of a jeep. Examples of human portable nuclear weapons are the 8-inch and 155-mm artillery projectiles weighing approximately 264 pounds and 128 pounds when armed. They deliver a yield ranging from five to ten Kt and one sub kiloton respectively. Some nuclear weapons are actually very compact and easy to transport, even backpack-portable. The U.S. stockpile developed a nuclear munition called ÒSpecial Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) that weighed approximately 58.6 lbs. and delivered a yield between .01 and 1 Kt. In addition, many modern weapons have been designed to minimize weight and volume to facilitate delivery by ballistic missiles. Various nuclear weapons could be carried by two to three people, smuggled or delivered in the back of a small truck, boat, or even trunk of a car. Similar weapons proliferating or stolen from Russia would be very difficult to track and very easy to conceal for terrorist operations. Nuclear weapons may be attractive to terrorists for their distinct characteristics in a nuclear explosion: blast, heat, radiation, electromagnetic pulse, and possibly lingering radioactivity that could make an area uninhabitable. Regardless of how attractive nuclear weapons may or may not be to terrorists, there are certain constraints that must be overcome prior to any nuclear terror operation. These constraints are discussed later in Chapter Four.

Threat to Nuclear Facilities

In the last decade, officials of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have become increasingly convinced that terrorists might attack a nuclear facility either to gain Òpublicity for themselves and their cause, to create a barricade-and-hostage situation involving facility employees for the purpose of blackmail, to steal strategic nuclear material for their own use or for a patron state, or to sabotage or destroy nuclear weapons or an energy facility itself.Ó Nuclear facilities could be taken hostage, sabotaged, or bombed with conventional or unconventional methods for a variety of reasons. It is feared that a truck bomb, for example, could get in proximity to a nuclear reactor and cause an explosion that might compromise the structural integrity of the nuclear facility, acting as a catalyst and resulting in massive explosion and dissemination of radioactive material into the atmosphere. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986 demonstrated the structural vulnerability of some reactors.

Although there is no record that a nuclear weapons facility has been attacked in CONUS, there is circumstantial evidence that points to underground interests in such attacks.

In November 1984, police and federal agents raided a Cleveland safehouse used by the radical leftist Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit and found the name of a nuclear weapons research laboratory on a list of potential targets. In April 1984, a previously unknown group, the Radical Nuclear Group, called for the use of Òterrorist violenceÓ against nuclear facilities.

Potential for successful truck bomb attacks against nuclear facilities surfaced following the terrorist bombings of the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, bombings of Al Khobar Towers, World Trade Center bombing, and the Oklahoma City Federal Building. In most of these instances, a large truck bomb evaded counter-measures (with the exception of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center that were civilian facilities and not guarded) and detonated with a significant yield in proximity to the targeted buildings, which in turn compromised the structural integrity of those buildings. It may be conceivable that if a similar truck bomb could evade security measures and be detonated near a reactor such as the truck bombs at Al Khobar and the Marine barracks, then the reactor could be destroyed prompting the release of radioactive debris into the atmosphere. The radioactive debris would likely irradiate everything in the path of the radioactive plume, which could travel for miles.

As previously discussed, there is evidence of threatened attacks on commercial energy facilities. In March 1984, the leader of the Puerto Rican terrorist organization, the FALN, accompanied by three Mexican members of a radical group, visited the Atomic Weapons Museum in Albuquerqe, New Mexico in attempt to develop a plan of attack. The FALN had repeatedly threatened to attack a nuclear reactor in the United States with conventional weapons. In 1980, eleven members of the same terrorist organization, FALN, armed with small arms and explosives, were arrested in Evanston, Illinois, only twenty miles from a nuclear power plant at Zions, Illinois. At that time, members of the FALN were staging their gear before commencing an attack against the nuclear facility.

Fissile Material Threat--Radioactive Dispersal Device

From 1949 to the dissolution of the Empire, the Soviet Union produced well over fifty thousand nuclear bombs ranging in destructive yield, some of which are presumably now being dismantled according to various arms control agreements. The process of dismantling these weapons and

maintaining the fissile material safely is creating stockpiles of bomb-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

In the FSU, there were until recently nearly thirty thousand nuclear warheads, mostly in Russia and all intended to be consolidated there. Estimates of the Russian stockpile of weapons-grade materials exceed twelve hundred tons of uranium and 150 tons of plutonium. Ukraine recently had about one hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium and no plutonium, and Kazakhstan has approximately three hundred kilograms of HEU and perhaps one hundred kilograms of plutonium.

The concerns that terrorist organizations may be trying to gain access to fissile material for the purposes of nuclear weapons or radiological weapons are not new. In fact, nuclear terrorism was the subject of academic consideration as early as 1946 and was studied extensively in the 1960s. The advent of nuclear or RDD weapons in terrorist camps poses a security risk to the global security environment.

Although the threat of a nuclear attack involving hundreds or perhaps thousands of weapons from the former Soviet Union has diminished, another threat has arisen: the potential acquisition of nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons by states hostile to the United States or by terrorists intent on staging incidents harmful to U.S. interests.

A radiological dispersal device, which is symbolic of the fissile material threat, is defined by the Department of Defense as any explosive device, including any weapon or equipment other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it (through a conventional explosion) to cause destruction, fear, chaos, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material. Death or incapacitation results from either the explosive blast or from overexposure to radioactive particles, causing the human body to absorb a lethal amount of

radiation measure in radiation absorbed doses (RADs). According to a recent Department of Defense (DoD) report, the RDD threat is significant in terms of three distinct areas: the blast and fragmentation effects from the conventional explosive; the radiation exposure from the radioactive material used; and the fear and panic that would follow its use among the target group and population.

As with all other forms of NBC weapons, it is possible that RDDs may be employed in a way that causes numerous casualties, thereby overwhelming emergency responders, medical facilities, and law enforcement abilities. RDDs could Òcause physical disruption, interruption of economic activity, post-incident clean up, and psychological trauma to a work force and populace.Ó Experts contend that if a simple radiological device had been used in conjunction with the World Trade Center explosive, large areas of lower Manhattan would still be uninhabitable.

Generally speaking, almost any radioactive material can be used to construct an RDD, including fission products, spent fuel from nuclear reactors, such as medical, industrial, and research waste. Ideally, the most radioactive of fissile material would be used as the active

ingredient in the RDD Òpit.Ó Examples of viable RDD pits

are non-weapons grade fissile material such as cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60. These materials are much more accessible than weapons grade fissile material. For this reason, an RDD is more likely to be used than a nuclear weapon, depending on the results the terrorists wish to achieve.

Disadvantages of RDDs over nuclear weapons involve the use of a great deal of radioactive material in order to irradiate a smaller area in addition to more explosive material to spread the radioactive materials further. If working with radioactive waste, which is obviously different than fissile material, the handlers are more likely to become inadvertently contaminated by the radiation since radioactive waste is highly contaminable. Conversely, RDDs would likely have a significant impact on the target population. An uninformed society may contribute to the terroristÕs objectives because they are more likely to initiate widespread panic and flight away from the target area. Unless the public has a basic understanding of NBC terrorism, any use of RDDs is likely to invoke the fear of nuclear war.

The idea that handling radioactive fissile material is dangerous is not completely accurate. In fact, fissile material is not as unhealthy as generally thought, depending on the half-life and radioactivity of the fissile material. Due to the low level of radioactivity, both HEU and plutonium can be handled safely without inordinate safety measures. As long as these materials are not directly ingested, one can handle them directly with little exposure to radiation.

[Plutonium] is radioactive, emitting alpha particles, but these particles are unable to penetrate even the thinnest of materials, including paper and human skin. A person could indeed carry plutonium in a pocket and suffer no ill effects. Plutonium poses grave health risks if inhaled or ingested, but there is little risk of this so long as the plutonium is not allowed to oxidize; weapon components are normally clad with metal to prevent this. One could hold such a component in oneÕs hand for any length of time with no

risk of adverse health consequences. A
smuggler does not have to be suicidal to carry plutonium out of Russia.

The CIA's former director, John Deutch, warned that even radioactive waste, when used with a conventional explosive, can become a mass casualty weapon in an urban environment. An April 1996 DoD report concluded that Òmost terrorist groups do not have the financial and technical resources to acquire nuclear weapons but could gather materials to make radiological dispersion devices and some biological and chemical agents.Ó

The first example of nuclear terrorism in the post-Cold War era occurred in November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed a package of radioactive material in a Moscow park. Chechen separatists placed a thirty-pound box containing an undisclosed amount of cesium-137 at the entrance of the park. The perpetrators intentionally omitted explosives that, if used to detonate the box, would have spread radioactive material throughout the park, contaminating the blast area for some time. Groups such as Aum Shinrikyo and the Chechens are known to have pursued development of RDDs. According to various reports, Iranian agents are known to have tried to buy radioactive nuclear material originating from the former Soviet Union for use of RDDs.

The effects of an RDD weapon depend largely on the ability of the explosive to disperse radioactive debris, amounts of radioactive agent, radioactivity of the isotopes, and the amount of explosive used to detonate and disperse the nuclear material. This understanding was recently detailed by James Ford from the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Mr. Ford provided the following example:

Compare the effects of two different RDDs detonated at the Washington Monument with one hundred pounds of high explosives. One device, a man-pack RDD, contains five thousand curies of cobalt-60 (Co-60); the second device, a truck delivered RDD, carrying 50 kilograms of bundled, not ground, one-year-old spent fuel rods.

An RDD constructed using Co-60 would produce a maximum dosage at the point of detonation of twelve rem (Roentgen Man Equivalent), resulting in no radiation related deaths. In marked contrast, the RDD made from spent reactor fuel would result in a maximum exposure of 3,064 rem (six times the lethal dosage). The detonation could produce a circle of lethal dosage extending about a kilometer to the Washington waterfront, and a significant amount of radioactive material would remain at the detonation site.

The use of any RDD would have a tremendous impact on the target population in terms of both psychological and political reactions. The stigma surrounding the use of nuclear weapons of any kind is likely to strike a significant level of fear in any country that has been targeted with an RDD. Therefore, a terroristÕs objectives are likely to be met, particularly if those objective were to create Òpanic, strike fear, to disrupt (or impede) military operations, or to bring public pressure on political leaders to change a course of action.Ó The use of an RDD, or any other agent in NBC terrorism for that matter, would contribute to the ÒfrictionÓ of war, possibly complicating the target countryÕs foreign policy at hand.

Homemade Nuclear Weapon

For some time, government officials have feared that terrorists may one day be able to produce their own nuclear weapon. A study on the effects of nuclear war by the Office of Technology Assessment described the threat of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon as the following:

A terrorist group using stolen or diverted fission material, having general technical competence but lacking direct weapon design experience, could probably build a weapon up to several kilotons. This weapon would be large and heavy, certainly not the often discussed Òsuitcase bomb,Ó so is likely to be transported in a van or small truck, with threatened detonation either in the street or the parking garage of a building.

One of the obstacles to developing nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes is the cumbersome technological demands. The most significant constraint to developing a homemade nuclear weapon is the ability to produce or obtain plutonium or highly enriched uranium followed by a workable nuclear gun assembly. If these obstacles were surmounted, the possibility that terrorists could develop a crude nuclear device is far more plausible.

In a study by the Office of Technology Assessment, officials concluded that a very small terrorist group without closed-source data could design a basic nuclear explosive device that would range in yields of sub-kiloton to ten-kiloton explosions.

The ranges of nuclear effects from a low-yield explosion in the confined space of an urban environment will differ significantly from large yield effects, but in ways that are very difficult to estimate. Thus, the numbers of people and areas of buildings affected are very uncertain. However, it appears that, with the exception of streets directly exposed to the weapon, lethal ranges to people will be smaller than anticipated and dominated by the blast-induced collapse of nearby buildings.

To be sure, there is an abundance of weapons-grade fissile material in the world that officials worry may fall into the hands of terrorists. The United States alone has exported about twenty four metric tons of highly enriched uranium containing about seventeen tons of uranium 235 to over forty countries. According to statistics in 1987, the nuclear powers had between them some two hundred tons of plutonium and one thousand tons of highly enriched uranium stored and available for their weapons. According to physicist David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C., there are more than seventeen hundred tons of HEU and eleven hundred tons of plutonium in the world. Only 22 percent of the plutonium is under military control or military protection, as the case may be, while the rest is spent fuel from reactors or plutonium already separated from that spent fuel.

There are many items that a terrorist organization must acquire in order to develop a nuclear weapon. They are:

· Weapons-usable fissile material;
· high explosives;
· related high explosives technology;
· a workable design for a nuclear explosive device; and the
· means to engineer the metallurgical design.

Fissile material provides the core for the nuclear reaction. The fissile material contains the nuclei that will split in the nuclear chain reaction. A series of rapidly multiplying fissions is a nuclear chain reaction, which releases tremendous heat and energy. The two most practical isotopes for these fissions are uranium 235 (U-235) and plutonium (Pu-239). Plutonium-239, produced solely for reactor fuel and nuclear weapons, can be used as the fissile material for a nuclear explosive. P-239 does not occur naturally in the environment unlike U-235. Therefore, it must be created in nuclear reactors when a U-238 atom absorbs a neutron. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council (NDRC), a nuclear explosion of low yield can be reached with as little as 2.2 pounds of plutonium or 5.5 pounds of HEU in a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. However, a significant nuclear explosion requires at least ten to twenty pounds of plutonium or thirty to fifty pounds of HEU. The most simple gun-type weapon can produce a fifteen to twenty kiloton yield with a little over one hundred pounds of HEU. Terrorist organizations are not likely to be able to build a nuclear reactor due to the obvious lack of resources.

Non-state actors, unable to predict accurately the yield of their weapon, are extremely vulnerable to Òdesign and execution problems leading to a ÔfizzleÕ yield anywhere between zero and one to two kilotons.Ó

There is a great deal of debate on whether or not independent terrorists could build a nuclear weapon(s). Some state-sponsors have been involved in nuclear acquisition programs for years and have yet to produce nuclear weapons. The debate assumes terrorists, acting independently or as state-sponsors, can either purchase or develop nuclear weapons using the plethora of financial, technical, and international resources available to them. Critics argue that indigenous nuclear weapons development is unlikely due to the innate constraints within nuclear programs.

Theodore Taylor, a retired U.S. nuclear weapons designer who also served as the deputy director of Los Alamos, believes a single individual working alone could develop a nuclear weapon, given access to enough HEU or P-239. Taylor, who built both the largest and smallest nuclear weapons, believes that a nuclear bomb could be constructed without industrial-grade machine tools, as well. Another weapons specialist points out that many of the necessary components for a nuclear device are on a Òwatch-listÓ and are limited in access. However, this expert concedes that while the threat of someone building a nuclear bomb is rather low, Òit isnÕt nonexistent.Ó

Conversely, J. Carson Mark, former head of nuclear-weapons development at Los Alamos, doesnÕt think a singular individual could build a bomb unless that person could master several disciplines. According to Mark, it would take a team of specialists about a year. The experts required for such an undertaking would be a nuclear physicist, a mechanical engineer, a chemist, an explosive expert, a mathematician, and others.

Authors Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer contend nuclear terror weapons are easier to build than military-class nuclear weapons in the following assertion:

Weapons for military use are needed in large numbers, must be deliverable by normal military means, must be effective against properly equipped military forces on the battlefield, must be rugged and reliable, and must have adequate shelf life and predictable effects. These requirements increase the cost and difficulty of acquiring weapons of mass destruction for military use. In contrast, weapons of mass destruction intended for covert use can be produced inefficiently and in small quantities. They can be delivered by non-military means, such as by boat or by truck, making possible the use of weapons, including improvised nuclear weapons, that are too large and unwieldy to be delivered in combat. Similarly, backpack-sized chemical or biological weapons, too small, improvised, and fragile to have an impact on a battlefield or against soldiers equipped for chemical and biological defense, could nonetheless be devastating against some civilian targets. Shelf life and reliability must be adequate for the intended use, but just-in-time agent production would be suitable for many kinds of attacks, largely eliminating shelf-life constraints. Finally, while covert attackers would want predictable weapons effects, they would generally require less precision than a military commander needs on the battlefield.

Chemical and Biological Terror Weapons

Historical Perspective of CBW Warfare

Despite what many people may think about the nature of chemical and biological weapons--that these weapons have no place in warfare--the opposite has been the case. History presents many examples of the use of CBW weapons. The use of gas as a weapon of war dates far back in time. ÒToxic fumesÓ were used in India as long ago as 2000 B.C. The first known use of biological warfare in armed conflict can be dated back to 1346, at Kaffa (now Fedossia, Ukraine) where bodies of Tartar soldiers who succumbed to plague were catapulted over the walls of the besieged city. Sparta reportedly used wood saturated with pitch and sulfur placed under the walls of its enemies to incapacitate them. In 1591, Germans burned stink bombs containing various chemicals to disrupt enemy forces. World War I represented a turning point as both the Germans and Allies became aware of the effectiveness of chemical weapons on the battlefield. The French Army had effectively employed tear gas, phosgene, arsenic, chloroform, and cyanogen chloride (a blood agent) against the Germans. The British also used phosgene and chloropicrin to stem German attacks. German forces used explosive shells containing lung irritants, chlorine gas, various vomiting agents, and mustard gas. More recently, chemical weapons have been used in such conflicts as the Vietnam War, the Yemen Civil War of 1963-1967, and the Iran-Iraq War.

The world is no stranger to the adverse affects of chemical weapons. There were over 1.25 million gas casualties during World War I. Of those casualties, over 93 percent survived, although some 12 percent suffered some degree of permanent injury. Recently, chemical weapons were used in the Iran-Iraq War, which was soon followed by the Aum Shinrikyo subway attack and World Trade Center bombing. In March 1988, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ordered the chemical bombing of his own citizens--Kurdish Iraqis in the North. A final assessment indicated five thousand Iraqis lost their lives to blood and nerve agents. To be sure, the Òchemical genieÓ has been unleashed.

Over two thousand years ago, Greeks and Romans used the corpses of victims of infectious diseases to contaminate their adversaries drinking supplies, as well as Òscorched earthÓ tactics to create an uninhabitable environment. The most modern example of biological weapons use in war is the use by Japanese soldiers on the Chinese around 1935. The Japanese tested such agents as anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, cholera, dysentery, plague, small pox, and typhus on Chinese prisoners. ÒJapanese would use biological weapons again in 1942 when they would retreat from Chinese forces, leaving cholera, dysentery, typhoid, plague, anthrax, and paratyphoid in their wake.Ó In both examples, the Chinese suffered heavy losses to the Japanese BW operations.

Historical Precedence of Chemical and Biological Terrorism

In the past and undoubtedly in the future, the threat of chemical and biological terrorism will remain in the back of the minds of government officials, and military planners. To be sure, chemical and biological weapons are still being actively pursued by various rogue states that sponsor terrorism against western governments. Recent examples of BC operations are a testament to ongoing CBW acquisition programs.

First, in February 1996, German police confiscated from a neo-Nazi group a coded diskette that contained information on how to produce the chemical agent mustard gas. Second, Tajik opposition members laced champagne with cyanide at a New YearÕs celebration in January 1995, killing six Russian soldiers and the wife of another, and sickening several revelers. Third, press reports indicated the PKK (Kurdistan WorkerÕs Party) in southwest Turkey poisoned Turkish water supplies with cyanide. Next, the terrorists convicted in the World Trade Center bombing confessed to using sodium cyanide in the bombing. The most recent incident was the Tokyo subway attack in which the nerve agent sarin was used by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995. In Oregon 1997, federal agents apprehended James Dalton Bell, a chemist who developed botulinum toxin and sarin for the purposes of assassinating various local government officials. In Ohio 1995, Larry Wayne Harris used a fake letterhead to obtain three vials of the Yersinia pestis bacteria, which causes bubonic plague. Harris, a microbiologist and white supremacist, was working in connection with the hate group, Aryan Nation, to develop a biological terror capability. In Minnesota 1992, four members of the Minnesota Patriots Council, a local militia, planned to assassinate law enforcement officials with ricin, a toxin derived from castor beans. They were apprehended before carrying out attacks on government officials and federal law enforcement agents. The men had enough ricin to kill 125 people.

This brief history of chemical and biological terrorism does not imply these are the only BC terror occurrences. As with most statistics, there may have been additional BC terror attacks that were not accounted for, not reported, or mistaken for natural occurrences.

Setting an Example: Aum Shinrikyo

Terrorist attacks utilizing NBC weapons have become a reality. It is feared that Aum Shinrikyo has crossed the threshold and set an example for future terrorist operations that will loosen any restraint terrorists may have had previously. The Aum Shinrikyo cult, led by Shoko Asahara, established an elaborate research and development facility for both chemical and biological weapons. The cult had purchased a forty-eight thousand-acre range in Australia to test biological agents on livestock. The cult sent members to Africa to obtain samples of the lethal Ebola virus; and it built two major biological research centers, one in Tokyo and the other at the base of Mt.

Fuji. Aum Shinrikyo had.plxanned to attack Washington, D.C., and New York following their four unsuccessful attempts at biological terrorism in Tokyo. Shoko Asahara asserted, ÒIf we are going to start a war, it will be with the United States.Ó The following is a chronological list of CBW attacks that Aum Shinrikyo has been involved in.

· In April 1990, the Aum Shinrikyo cult outfitted three vehicles to disseminate botulinum toxin. One vehicle was driven through central Tokyo, spraying the toxin, with the JapanÕs parliament, the Diet, the main target. Another vehicle reportedly was directed against two targets: the town of Yokohama and the Yokosuka naval base, the U.S. NavyÕs most important facility in the east Pacific. The third vehicle allegedly was used in the area of the Narita International Airport, one of JapanÕs most important airports.

· In early June 1993, the cult attempted to disrupt the planned wedding of Prince Naruhito, JapanÕs Crown Prince, by spreading botulinum toxin in downtown Tokyo using a specially equipped automobile.

· In late June 1993, the cult unsuccessfully attempted to spread anthrax in Tokyo using a sprayer system on the roof of an Aum-owned building in east Tokyo.

· Sometime in July 1993, an attempt was made to contaminate the area around the Diet in central Tokyo using a truck modified to disseminate anthrax.

· Later in July 1993, another attempt was made to disseminate anthrax in the area around the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. A truck-based system was used in this operation as well.

· On 15 March 1995, Aum cult members planted in the Tokyo subway three briefcases designed to release botulinum toxin. Apparently the terrorist assigned to the release was morally constrained and substituted a non-toxin substance. The failure of this attack led the cult to use sarin in its 20 March 1995 subway attack.

Characteristics of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical Weapons

A United Nations report from 1969 defines chemical warfare agents as Òlethal chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on humans, animals and plantsÉÓ For the purposes of this thesis, only chemical agents that are likely to be weaponized and deployed against human targets will be discussed.

In order to understand the debate over the implications of CBW terrorism, it is important to understand the nature of chemical and biological agents. It is the characteristics of CBWs and their effects on humans that have generated international concern regarding the use of such weapons in terrorist operations and warfare. There are several categories of chemical weapons according to the working definition previously listed. They are:

· Nerve Agents;
· Blistering Agents;
· Blood Agents; and
· Pulmonary or Choking Agents.

In general, chemical agents vary in their nature, composition, lethality, and form, though most CW agents are liquid in form. Some chemical agents can initiate Òsevere, even fatal, bodily reactions in humans almost immediately.Ó Other agents may take as long as several hours to begin to affect the victim or target.

Nerve agents (military-class or G-series nerve agents are tabun, sarin, VX or V-series nerve agents, GF, and soman) were originally developed by German scientists during the 1930s as insecticides and eventually redesigned into chemical weapons by the Nazi military. As noted in JaneÕs Chem-Bio Handbook, Ònerve agents are chemicals that disrupt the mechanism by which nerves communicate with the organs they stimulate.Ó G-Series nerve agents were developed in the 1930s to cause Òparalysis of the respiratory musculature and subsequent death, in sufficient concentration.Ó V-series nerve agents such as VE, VG, VM, VS, and VX were developed in the 1950s to quell the military need for more toxic and more persistent agents that present a greater skin hazard to the enemy. V-series nerve agents are used for long-term contamination of territory or facilities. Today, many economically developed countries (EDCs) possess chemical weapons (CW) or the ability to produce them. Many third world countries are actively pursuing CW programs.

Military nerve agents are chemicals that interfere with the transmission of the message from nerves to the brain. The Ònerve is normal while the nerve transmission to the brain is damaged. The organ gets the wrong message, and begins to function incorrectly. This causes excessive activity in muscles, glands, and the like.Ó Depending upon how a person absorbed the nerve agent, the symptoms will vary. Inhaled nerve agents induce symptoms that range from Òflu-like conditions to loss of consciousness, convulsions, paralysis, failed breathing and heart functions. Effects will occur within a few seconds to a minute.Ó Epidermal contact with liquid nerve agent will induce Ònausea, vomiting, loss of consciousness, convulsions, failed breathing, and paralysis. Effects will occur within thirty minutes to eighteen hours.Ó

Blistering agents (mustard, Lewisite, and phosgene oxime) are effective terrorist weapons because they are intended to cause incapacitation rather than death. These agents were used effectively against ground troops during World War I. Blistering agents may be an effective alternative to lethal chemical agents if terrorists desire large numbers of injuries in place of large numbers of fatalities.

Mustard agents are chemical weapons that quickly Òpenetrate the skin and mucous membranes, change to another substance and react with enzymes, proteins, and DNA.Ó The victim will usually be unaware of a mustard agent because there are no immediate effects. The mustard agent then causes Òcellular deathÓ much like that of radiation poisoning. The effects are Òblisters, second-drownings, and temporary blindness.Ó Lewsite and phosgene oxime both begin to cause severe pain and tissue damage upon contact. ÒCellular damage would be similar to mustard agents while other symptoms worsen as time passes.Ó

Blood agents comprise several elements of the nerve agent arsenal. One effective blood agent is found in two different forms within the military CW arsenal: hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride. The chemical and physical effects of these two agents are very similar. The classification, Òblood agents,Ó is a misnomer since these agents do not cause effects or have other activity in the blood. The bodyÕs blood flow simply carries the agent(s) to the organs, as other agents are carried.

Cyanide works by contacting and poisoning blood cells. The poisoned blood cells can no longer absorb oxygen so they suffocate. Most effects of cyanide poisoning are those incurred by a lack of oxygen to the brain. As with all chemical weapons, effects of cyanide vary depending on the amount absorbed by the victim. ÒSmall to medium amounts cause dizziness, nausea, and a feeling of weakness. Large amounts of exposure to cyanide will result in a loss of consciousness, convulsions, failed breathing and death.Ó Effects will occur within seconds and death within ten minutes. Interesting to note is the presence of cyanide can be detected by the Òbitter smell of almonds.Ó These compounds are not really suited for use on a large number of people, so their primary role would most likely be in assassinations similar to the use of ricin by Bulgarian intelligence operatives in the Òumbrella murderÓ of Bulgarian dissident Gregori Markov. He died two days after a ricin tipped bullet was discharged into his body with a ÒloadedÓ umbrella.

Pulmonary or choking agents, or lung agents, were the agents used the most in WWI but have lost much of their utility due to the advent of nerve agents. These agents are commonplace in the industrial marketplace and therefore less difficult for terrorists to obtain. Pulmonary agents are chemicals that Òdamage the membranes in the lung that separate the air sac from the capillary.Ó As a result, Òplasma from the damaged tissue leaks into the airsac, filling with fluid and preventing air from entering.Ó A person with this type of poisoning does not get enough oxygen and dies from suffocation similar to drowning. This is also called Òdry land drowning.Ó

Biological Weapons

Biological weapons are defined as munitions or other delivery systems, such as spray tanks, filled with biological agents of warfare--living organisms, whatever their nature, or Òmaterials derived from them--that are intended to cause disease or death among humans, animals, and/or plants and that depend for their effect on their ability to multiply in the organism attacked.Ó Toxins are Òchemical substances produced by biological systems but are not themselves living.Ó The Arms Control Disarmament Agency defines biological weapons as Òdisease-causing microorganisms (e.g., bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, and fungi) and toxins (poisonous chemicals synthesized by living organisms), which could be used against humans, crops, or livestock to cause massive casualties or economic damage as a means of warfare or terrorism.Ó Biological weapons can be something as unexpected as anthrax spores disseminated from a low flying crop duster, or the use of an umbrella with a ricin-poisoned tip. They can be crude devices or technologically advanced and engineered agents.

Biological agents can be divided into five separate categories that are described in detail in Table 2. The classes are as follows:

· Bacteria;
· Rickettsiae;
· Viruses;
· Fungi; and
· Toxins.

Table 2.--Biological Agent Categories

BW Agent	Agent Description
Bacteria	Bacteria are single-celled organisms that are the causative agents of anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia, plague, and numerous other diseases. They vary considerably in infectivity and lethality.
Rickettsiae	Microorganisms are organisms that resemble bacteria in form and structure but differ in that they are intracellular parasites that can produce inside animal cells. Examples of Rickettsiae diseases that might be used for BW include typhus, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, and Q Fever.
Viruses	Intracellular parasites that are about 100 times smaller than bacteria. They can infect humans, crops, or domestic animals. A virus that might be used for BW is Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis. VEE virus causes a highly infectious disease that incapacitates but rarely kills. A virusÕs strength can be altered to increase its efficiency. A particularly powerful strain of an endemic pathogen could simply be blamed on a chance natural mutation.
Fungi	Can cause severe disease in humans, such as coccidioidmycosis (valley fever) and histoplasmosis. Moreover, fungal diseases are devastating to plants and might be used to destroy stable crops and cause widespread hunger and economic hardship. Examples of plant fungal pathogens include rice blast, cereal rust and potato blight.
Toxins	A poisonous substance made by a living system or a synthetic analogue of a naturally occurring poison. Bacteria, fungi, marine organisms, plants, insects, spiders, and other animals manufacture an enormous variety of toxins.

Source: Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, 32-35.

Biological agents, on an equal-weight basis, are the most lethal substances known to humankind. According to a 1997 U.S. Department of Defense report on NBC proliferation, the Òmost lethal biological toxins are hundreds to thousands of times more lethal per unit than the most lethal chemical warfare agents.Ó Depending on the desired results, terrorists may decide to use certain biological agents to target people, animals, crops, avenues of approach, using a variety of means of delivery, from aerial bombs and spray tanks to ballistic missile warheads.

It is important to note that when considering the characteristics of NBC weapons, it is not necessary, depending upon the terroristÕs objectives, to kill large numbers of people. In fact, the most important characteristic for various terrorist operations may be that mass amounts of casualties are induced, rather than fatalities. Generally speaking, it may be an equally effective tactic to disable a target as it would be to kill the target. In either case, the target population will witness the effects of a BW attack and respond out of fear and panic, not wanting to die or become ill. It is unlikely that a target population will be able to determine whether or not the biological agent used against them will be lethal and is likely to assume that the agent could be lethal and panic just the same.

NBC weapons possess several characteristics that may make one agent more attractive over another. Examples of the characteristics that separate NBC weapons from other weapons include the following: infectivity virulence, toxicity, pathogenicity, incubation period, transmissibility, lethality, and stability.

· Infectivity of an agent describes the ease in which a biological weapon organism can begin to overtake the target species. ÒPathogens with high infectivity cause disease with relatively few organisms, while those with low infectivity require large numbers.Ó

· Toxicity is the relative amount of agent needed to cause detrimental effects such as illness or incapacitation in the target.

· Pathogenicity reflects the capability of a biological agent to cause disease in a target host once the appropriate number of microorganisms penetrates the body to begin incapacitation.

· Incubation period is the time between exposure and ingestion and the appearance of symptoms in the target. This time period is affected by many variables, including the Òinitial dose, virulence, method of ingestion, rate of replication, and immune system factors.Ó

· Transmissibility is the method of transmission of a particular biological agent to the target. The most effective agents are transferred by aerosolized particles. They may also be transferred via physical contact, and liquid ingestion.

· Lethality is the ease in which an agent can cause incapacitation, even death.

· Stability refers to the stability of an agent during manufacture, delivery, and storage. Biological agents, since they are living organisms, are vulnerable to environmental changes. Various factors can affect the longevity and lethality of a biological agent such as exposure to ultraviolet light, heat, cold, wind, and water.

Agents such as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and Ebola are prime examples of biological agents that would be attractive to terrorists seeking to cause mass death and casualties. They are naturally occurring and extremely lethal. Although chemical agents are generally cheaper, easier to use, and more confinable than most biological agents, few of them, except for nerve agents, have, according to a World Health Organization report, Òa casualty-producing potential comparable to that of biological agents.Ó Anthrax, in particular, is an attractive biological weapon because it is a very persistent agent. Anthrax spores can survive elements that typically kill other biological agents--ultraviolet light, heat, and water.

Biological weapons have unique characteristics in comparison with other weapons. They have the Òcapacity to deprive an enemy of basic resources such as food and water, and disrupt essential services.Ó BWs cannot be detected until the agent has been disseminated nor Òare there any recognizable signals to the human senses.Ó Some biological agents may long incubation periods that would provide a delay and allow for escape without detection. The nature of biological weapons is such that an attack might be misidentified as a natural outbreak since all biological agents are naturally occurring substances. This may provide state-sponsors and terrorist organizations with the ability to retain plausible deniability. Furthermore, biological agents may be used to target a broad range of targets such as crops, infrastructures, people, domestic livestock, and civil locations.

On the basis of the above characteristics, it is possible to determine a list of biological agents that may be weaponized. Many naturally occurring biological agents have been weaponized by various countries in the past and are likely to be weaponized by rogues for the future. Based on the factors mentioned above, there are several biological agents that may be encountered by a first-responder following an act of terrorism. For a complete list of likely biological weapons, see table 4 in appendix.

Methods of NBC Entry

The length of American borders including the 2000 mile border with Mexico, East and West coasts, and the Canadian boundary present a serious problem for security personnel in their attempts to restrict the illegal entry of NBC weapons into the United States. Historically, American borders have been open to the masses seeking a better way of life. The volume of Òpeople, narcotics, and commodities that flow through U.S. borders, largely undetected, is staggering.Ó To compound the situation, AmericaÕs borders are extremely porous.

There are 301 ports of entry and fewer than ten thousand customs inspectors, that is, roughly thirty inspectors per port of entry, none of whom are trained or equipped to detect [NBC] materials. Each day, roughly 1.25 million people arrive in the United States. Each day, some 1.36 billion kilograms of cargo from abroad arrive by sea at U.S. ports and 4.66 million kilograms arrive by air. Fewer than 5 percent of the entries into the United States physically inspected, and then only after they arrived
at ports in or near major U.S. cities. Given the size of the daily inflow of people and material into the United States, the U.S. Customs Service cannot prevent the entry of fissile material and other weapon components.

NBC weapons may arrive through a variety of delivery vehicles. NBC-touting terrorists may find entry routes similar to those of illegal aliens or drug traffickers to be attractive access points into the United States while enroute to a targeted population center.

Potential access points for terrorists looking to smuggle an NBC weapon into the United States include seaports, airports, off-road transport, border roads, and associated cargo transport vehicles such as cargo containers, which are rarely inspected. Some experts speculate that:

Rogue states intent on striking the continental United States would prefer smuggled bombs over traditional

delivery systems (e.g., missiles or combat aircraft) for their low cost and high probability of success.

NBC Terrorist Dissemination

There are a wide variety of methods that can be used to deliver NBC weapons on a target population or infrastructure. For example, NBC weapons can be:

Shipped by sea and exploded in a harbor, or driven by a truck to any location in CONUS. [NBC] weapons could be flown into the United States in private aircraft or smuggled across the border on foot. A criminal terrorist group could even ship a weapon into the United States in pieces small enough and light enough to go by Federal Express, UPS, or even the postal service.

Delivery vehicles for common CBW munitions include artillery shells, aerial bombs, spray tanks, missiles, rockets, grenades, and mines. Chemical weapons are designed to convert a payload of bulk agent into an aerosol of Òmicroscopic droplets or particles or into a spray of larger droplets that will either be absorbed by the skin or lungs.Ó CBW agents are weaponized by applying an explosive force to a liquid agent, Òpart of the agent will remain liquid, part will be aerosolized, and part will evaporate to form a vapor, all of which are means to inflict casualties on human targets.Ó The majority of these munitions are Òintended to provide an appropriately sized aerosol (one to seven microns) that will remain airborne for ingestion or contact and close to the ground (within six to ten feet).Ó The objective of dissemination is to create circumstances in which chemical or biological agents will be suspended in the air where it will be readily Òinhaled, or to contaminate and degrade human performance due to the necessity of wearing of prohibitive clothing.Ó

A knowledgeable terrorist could acquire existing NBC military munitions in pursuit of terrorist operations. The NBC agent could be removed from these munitions and used to fill other delivery vehicles more suitable to terrorist operations and surreptitious delivery. An example of a military NBC delivery vehicle that could be stripped of its NBC agent is the artillery projectile. American artillery systems are capable of firing NBC-tipped projectiles such as the M-109, M-110, and M-198 155-mm projectile, 105-mm projectile, and an 8-inch projectile. The Russians possess the 122-mm D-30, 152-mm 2S19, and the 203-mm 2S7. The amount of payload terrorists could withdraw from these artillery rounds ranges from 6 pounds of agent up to approximately 347.5 lbs. of nerve agent. On the average, these projectiles weigh between forty-four pounds and 197 pounds and contain between three and fifteen pounds of agent, depending on their size.

The most effective means of delivering biological-chemical (BC) agents to large populations is via aerosol clouds. As clouds, the chemical or biological agents are much more ingestible (including inhalation and absorption through the skin) by perspective targets, which can be either humans or animals or both. Cloud dispersal can be accomplished by commercial delivery systems that are readily available in private industry. Although generally not considered to be as effective as military dispersal methods, civilian systems are effective channels for the dispersal of CBW. Commercial crop dusting planes or helicopters would be efficient delivery systems for CBW over a target area.

Civilian CBW dispersal sources have an advantage over most military means in terms of ability to deliver large quantities of CBW agent. Military chemical or biological-tipped projectiles contain somewhere (on average) between six to fifteen pounds of agent. However, civilian sources such as spray tanks contain somewhere between one hundred to seven hundred pounds of agent. Simple pesticide sprayers found in local hardware stores are a very effective and efficient means of delivery.

There are other methods of disseminating chemical agents that do not require heavy equipment or airborne launch points. Simple aerosol generators, such as underarm deodorant spray cans, are allegedly efficient in deploying chemical and biological agents. Terrorists may be particularly interested in aerosol generators mounted on the bed of a vehicle or small watercraft, where they can disseminate a line-source of agent upwind of a city, a business center, or other populated area.

Biological agents, in terms of dispersal methods, can be disseminated either in liquid form, dried organisms, or toxin. Delivery methods for chemical agents are very similar to BW delivery methods except for unique equipment that disperses dry-form biological agents. Most of the equipment is available in industrial societies, international markets, and is dual-use in nature.

Terrorists are not likely to acquire ballistic missiles or the associated technologies due to technical, operational, and financial constraints associated with ballistic missile delivery systems. Terrorists can load certain NBC devices into a van or truck and deliver it to its target, in much the same manner as terrorists prepared to bomb the World Trade Center in New York City or at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. However, ballistic missiles cannot be completely dismissed. There are certain advantages to using ballistic missiles that may supercede other delivery methods. Both ballistic and cruise missiles have been known to easily penetrate air defenses and are more likely to reach their target once launched (depending on the design and accuracy of the missile). These factors make missiles more survivable than manned aircraft.

However, ballistic missiles may not be ideal for chemical and biological delivery due to the physical characteristics of each agent. For example, CW warheads delivered via ballistic missiles pose some complex engineering problems. Liquid agents moving around within a warhead will cause the missile to veer significantly off course, possibly missing its target. Also, chemical agents can be destroyed in the detonation of the warhead upon reaching its target. Biological agents delivered via ballistic missiles may be killed or significantly weakened by high stresses caused by gravitational forces and heat generated by the acceleration and re-entry of ballistic missiles.

NBC Dissemination Considerations

Traditional nuclear weapons do not require any specific meteorological conditions to be effective as is

required by chemical and biological dissemination. A nuclear weapon, provided its design is capable of delivering critical mass and not Òdudding,Ó will deliver a sizeable yield. One possible consideration is when to detonate nuclear weapons. If mass destruction and high death tolls are desired, then NBC terrorism may be anticipated when a population center is likely to be most active. Conversely, if a high death toll is not necessarily required, operations may be best suited for a nocturnal detonation time when fewer civilians are likely to be at Ôground zeroÕ or in proximity to the blast area. RDDs on the other hand, require certain meteorological conditions to be most effective, namely a wind speed around five to fifteen miles per hour, depending on the amount of irradiation required by the terrorists.

The ideal conditions with which to launch chemical attacks are similar to the desired conditions for a biological attack. According to experts in NBC warfare at the Nonproliferation Center at the National Defense University, the key to producing the desired effects, assuming the goal is to cause large-scale contamination and subsequent medical illnesses, is to Ògenerate an aerosol or stable cloud [fogs and smokes] of suspended microscopic droplets, each containing from one to thousands of bacterial or virus particles. There are several factors that can affect a CBW attack aside from the CBW agentÕs level of persistency in adverse atmospheric conditions. These factors are:

Temperature

· Higher air temperatures may incite the evaporation of aerosol particles, decreasing their size and ability to enter lungs. Conversely, colder temperatures will stagnate the evaporation of agents.

Humidity

· Extensive humidity may lead to the enlargement of aerosol particles thereby reducing the ability to absorb CW agents in the lungs. High temperature and high humidity form agreeable target conditions due to the openness of pores on human bodies.

Precipitation

· Light rain disperses and spreads CW while diluting the agent and speeding up the evaporation process. As expected, heavy rain washes CBW agents into the ground. Snow increases the persistence of CW as it freezes the evaporation rate of CW agents.

Wind Speed

· Chemical clouds are most effective when winds are steady and less than seven knots per hour but not so slow as to prevent the spread of CW completely.

Nature of Buildings and Terrain

· Hilly vegetated areas offer greater turbulence to the chemical cloud since there are so many obstacles to obstruct the cloud drift.

· Agents may persist longer in an urban environment than in an open environment since buildings, and the like, are usually more porous than the vegetation.

NBC Targets

Terrorists using NBC weapons might target both combatants and noncombatants either in the adversaryÕs country or around the world. Target selection is a complex coordination of the nature of the NBC weapon to be used, meteorological conditions affecting target dissemination, the method in which the attack is to be carried out, and the desired results.

In recent years, terrorists have expanded their choice of targets. Targets do not necessarily have any connection to the terroristsÕ objective, other than the desire to cause disruption or destruction.

In 1980 and 1981, [conventional] terrorists attacked business firms and corporate executives, journalists, factories, diplomats and embassies, pipelines, refineries and reactors, airlines and ships, mailboxes and medical buildings, tourist offices and tourists, exiles and expatriates, churches, synagogues, temples, prelates and priests, nuns and the Pope, hotels and telephone booths, movie theaters and restaurants, school children and small infants.

Arguably, NBC terrorists are likely to target populations or assets that are vital to their adversaryÕs essential functions or are highly regarded among the populace. Depending on the desired results, there may be specific targets a terrorist organization may be inclined to attack. For example, cities such as New York, Washington, Boston, and Philadelphia represent prime targets, not only because of their dense populations, but also because of their Òsymbolic significance to American history.Ó When asked about the plausibility of an Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attack in the United States anytime soon. Dr. Henry Cooper, Former SDIO and Chief Arms Negotiator, responded Ò[Chemical and/or biological terrorism] is very plausible and highly likely. In all likelihood, New York or Washington, D.C. may see the next Aum Shinrikyo type attack.Ó

Government officials believe potential targets of nuclear terror include: population centers or popular attractions; Òhard or soft military targets and key political, military command-and-control centers; major troop and armor concentrations; dispersal areas; logistics centers; air bases; ports, as well as key infrastructure installations such as oil and power facilities, desalination plants, and nuclear energy plants.Ó

In the rubric of conventional terrorism, businesses and citizens have been targeted more frequently than diplomatic, government, or military facilities. In 1993, 70 percent of all international terrorist attacks were against business targets. There were nearly three hundred attacks such as the highest number of attacks since statistics regarding terrorism began being collected.

Other officials point out that NBC weapons can be employed against any targets--political leaders, religious figures and institutions, businessmen, U.S. installations abroad, federal facilities in CONUS, various critical infrastructures, sporting events, shopping malls, or an entire city. Terrorists may seek to attack public events that draw an unusually large crowd. Biological or chemical weapons can be used for attacks on crops, fuels, machinery, food, water, medicine, or even whole cities. For example, two U.S. minesweepers traveling in the San Francisco Bay, aerosolized harmless bacteria and released it into the air as a test. Virtually all the residents of San Francisco ingested at least five thousand particles of the bacteria. If the agent had been a real bio weapon, Ò75 percent of those people would have inhaled five times as much agent as needed to induce disease in the victim.Ó

Likely Scenarios for CBW Terrorism

The circumstances under which chemical and biological terrorism might be employed are limited only to the capabilities and imagination of the intending terrorists. The following two scenarios will illustrate the

potential effectiveness of weapons under different circumstances.

The date is late spring 2000 and internal violence in Russia has erupted into another civil war following the death of President Boris Yeltsin. Opportunities for a peace agreement in the Middle East are obsolete. Iraq, now emboldened by Russian and Ukrainian hard-liners, retains Mujahedin or Holy Fighters from Osama Bin LadenÕs network, the Mujahedin Brigades, to commit an act of mass destruction against Israel and the United States under the guise of silent terrorism. New York City is the target, the financial center of the world and home to millions of Jewish-Americans. A small fishing boat sails around Manhattan Island, starting at the entrance to the East River. To avoid suspicion, the vessel has the external trappings of a commercial boat normally present in these waters. At a speed of three knots up the river, into the wind, dry particles of respirable anthrax spores, had been released at a rate of two kilograms per hour. A grayish-overcast day was chosen, so that the advantages of a stable atmosphere are obtained. By conservative estimate, more than 400,000 people die within forty-eight hours. After the attack, the fishing boat returns to the open sea where the occupants scuttled it in over three hundred feet of water. Manhattan and its surroundings are contaminated and may have to be evacuated. The United States must respond, but against whom and how?

In late 1999, Mujahedin from IranÕs Hezbollah strike with a vengeance inside the United States a couple of weeks prior to Iranian attacks on Iraq. Ten milligrams of botulinum toxin are injected into bulk milk in a commercial processing plant after it has been pasteurized. Each carton of milk or subsequent portion of a dairy product like ice cream or coffee creamer, contains thousands of fatal doses. The target plant is a supplier to a vendor serving the Senate dining room. When the toxin takes effect, the victimsÕ experience crippling nausea, vomiting, cramps, double vision, and muscular paralysis. Casualties number two thousand to four thousand with at least 50 percent of them dying.

Various comparison studies between nuclear and biological weapons have been completed in the past regarding potential terrorist scenarios. In 1993, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) completed a study in which the likely effects of nuclear and biological attacks were compared. The target area ranged from three thousand to ten thousand people per square kilometer (just less than one half mile). According to the study, a 12.5 kilotons (KT) nuclear weapon would, upon detonation, create a blast area of approximately three square miles and leave twenty three thousand to eighty thousand people dead. On an overcast day or night with light wind, biological weapon carrying sixty-five lbs. of anthrax spores would result in thirty thousand to 100,000 fatalities and casualties within a cigar-shaped plume covering an area of 3.85 sq. miles.

Conclusion

The potential lethality of NBC weapons has been proved throughout the history of warfare and the use of nuclear weapons since World War II. Building or stealing an NBC weapon is a difficult, complex, risky, often expensive task, but the basic technical requirements for building NBC weapons are established and remaining steadfast. Due to the unique characteristics of each of the NBC weapons, NBC terrorism has a great ÔequalizingÕ effect on terrorist operations. NBC weapons come in a vast variety, spanning a wide range of lethal variability and destruction. They can be delivered by ballistic missile, food, weaponized umbrellas, trucks, boats, airplanes, and even from person to person. They can be difficult to weaponize and disseminate, yet can also be less difficult to acquire, depending upon the resolve of the terrorist seeking NBC capabilities. They can kill instantaneously or over the course of months, rendering population centers or travel impassible to those without the appropriate safety gear. There may be great utility for terrorists in weapons that are able to cause mass destruction and/or disruption in a single dissemination or detonation. With these characteristics in mind, terrorists can be expected to pursue NBC weapons as a means of bridging the gap between U.S. and allied military superiority on the battlefield and inadequate homeland defenses.

Why NBC Weapons May or May Not be Attractive Tools for Terrorists

Now that there has been an understanding established regarding the nature of NBC weapons, it is important to determine whether and in what circumstances these weapons are not attractive to terrorists.

First, CBW start-up and production costs are considered to be significantly more affordable than nuclear or even some conventional weapons. In terms of cost, terrorists may find CBWs and RDDs relatively inexpensive to produce, store, and disseminate. Experts claim that a terrorist could develop a significant supply of CBW in a room measuring fifteen feet by fifteen feet for just under

$10,000. For this reason, chemical and biological

weapons have been labeled the Òpoor manÕs atomic bomb.Ó ÒWhereas a nuclear weapons research and development program may cost over hundreds of millions of dollars, Type A botulinum toxin, which is more deadly than nerve gas, could be produced for about $400 per kilogram.Ó A group of BC experts appearing before a United Nations panel in 1969 estimated Òfor a large-scale operation against a civilian population, casualties might cost about $2000 per square kilometer with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with nerve-gas weapons, and $1 with biological weapons.Ó Although building a major chemical weapons program can be expensive, a small arsenal may be developed without accruing significant expenses. Most biological agents can be produced relatively inexpensively and replicate themselves while being cultured so the need to stockpile BW is not always necessary.

Second, chemical and biological agents can be developed without significant chance of detection because these weapons do not release a detectable signature until after dissemination. Ò[CBW] offers no easily discriminated, unambiguous signature.Ó Detecting a clandestine CBW program is extremely difficult and thus the risks of being caught might be seen as low-end. All the equipment necessary for CBW terrorism can be used for legitimate purposes. Currently, biological weapons are unlike nuclear weapons in that nuclear weapons are more detectable due to the identifiable infrastructures and resources that accompany such programs. BC weapons may be disseminated without attracting much attention unless conventional explosives are used to aid in the dispersal and degree of destruction.

The effects of a biological terrorist attack might not be detected within twenty-four hours. However, chemical attacks are likely to be noticed almost immediately, depending upon the agent, whereas nuclear weapons provide no time delays once detonated. BC weapons can be developed and tested prior to the operation, without significant chance of detection. Aum Shinrikyo was able to test both biological and chemical weapons on farm animals in Australia prior to their application of biological and chemical weapons in Japan. Press reports claim that examination of some thirty sheep carcasses at an abandoned Aum site in Australia revealed the presence of various chemical and biological agents.

Conversely, the development of a terrorist nuclear device is more unreliable. Terrorists are not likely to have an opportunity to test a nuclear weapon or RDD based on the increased chance of detection due to the unique signature resulting from detonation. Without testing such weapons, one is likely to know whether or not a nuclear terror attack would deliver any substantive yield.

Chemical and biological weapons can be produced without much technical difficulty and in a relatively short amount of time. Chemical and biological weapons are technically simple to manufacture in comparison with the demands of nuclear weapons production. Facilities necessary for CBW production are relatively simple to provide. ÒA one hundred ton/yr chemical weapons plant may fit into a space as small as forty feet by forty feet. In 1989, Ohio Senator John Glenn observed that:

A facility the size of a large room could turn out very substantial amounts, tons even, of nerve gas or biological weapons. To make these weapons, a small kitchen would do.

Biological weapons can be produced with less technical difficulty than chemical weapons. The same principles applied to brewing oneÕs own beers are applied to biological agent production. Allegedly, someone with a masterÕs degree in biochemistry has the technical understanding and experience needed to undertake the production of most CBW agents. Dr. Gideon Rose, Deputy Director of National Security Studies and Olin Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons might tempt ambitious terrorists. He goes further saying:

Chemical weapons suitable for mass casualty attacks can be acquired by virtually any state and by non-state actors with moderate technical skills. Certain very deadly chemical warfare agents can quite literally be manufactured in a kitchen or basement in quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks...

Information on the manufacture of various chemical and biological weapons such as nerve agents, mustard gas, lysergic acid (otherwise known as LSD), and herbicides is available in various scientific texts and on the Internet. The Department of Defense apparently declassified a Òcookbook,Ó if you will, for the development of VX, the most potent nerve agent.

Dissemination of CBW is not insuperable even when considering some of the technical challenges associated with CBW dispersal. Due to the dual-use nature of chemical and biological agents, production, storage, and dissemination equipment might be obtained without arousing much suspicion. Rogue states may mass-produce and stockpile various herbicides, nerve agents, and biological agents within their own industrial infrastructure prior to distributing CBW agents to terrorist groups. Thirty years ago, a series of tests by the U.S. ArmyÕs Chemical Corps determined CBW equipment can be acquired and assembled within the parameters of an ordinary citizen.

These tests demonstrated--to the extent possible with the technology then available--that biological agents could be disseminated as an aerosol cloud and infect a large area with potentially lethal infective dosesÉ

For example, according to a report on ÒThe Chemical and Biological Weapons ThreatÓ by the Nonproliferation Center, Iraq developed a spray tank from civilian supplies that can be attached to either a piloted fighter or to a remotely piloted aircraft that can be guided to the target area. The tank was designed to spray up to two thousand liters of biological agent on a target. In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo cult possessed a Russian helicopter and two drone airplanes that, with modifications, are capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons.

Only a relatively small amount of BC agent may be necessary in order to produce large numbers of casualties in the target population. The defining element of NBC terrorism is that only a small amount of agent or number of NBC munitions is needed to cause disproportionate casualties, destruction, or both--depending upon various factors such as environmental conditions and persistence of the agent being used. Senator John Glenn of Ohio noted

that an ounce of biological agent in a half-gallon of growth medium could produce enough material to Òsicken or kill perhaps as much as 95 percent of a population the size of Washington, D.C.Ó The lethal amount of anthrax for a human being amounts to one billionth of a gram, the size of a speck of dust. Furthermore, according to the Office of Technology Assessment, a release of one hundred kilograms of anthrax bacteria could result in three million deaths. The Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Betts, recently commented,

Nuclear arms have great killing capacity but are hard to get; chemical weapons are easy to get but lack such killing capacity; biological agents have both qualities.

In terms of effectiveness, biological agents possess a distinct characteristic that distinguishes then from other

weapons of potentially mass destruction. Generally, biological agents will have an incubation period ranging anywhere from minutes to a couple of months that precede the onset of the agentÕs physical effects. Anthrax has an incubation period that lasts from one to four days; botulinum toxin, from one to twelve hours followed by death within twenty four to forty eight hours; and Ebola virus has an incubation period of two to twenty one days. This span of time from point of terrorist attack to first signs of illness allows a terrorist organization time to escape or stage additional operations.

Next, humans are particularly vulnerable to biological or chemical attack. Humans are dependent upon fresh air and water for their survival. Chemical and biological agents can, due to their microscopic size and persistency, be transferred through filtration systems and climate control systems. Even the shelter underneath the White House and the command centers in the Pentagon, which have air and water filtration systems, have reportedly failed simulated studies and mock BC attacks by special Òblack hatÓ military teams.

NBC weapons can be disseminated over a sizeable area. Their effects can, depending upon the amount of agent used and meteorological conditions, range from a few casualties to perhaps thousands. An army general who was involved in both U.S. chemical and biological warfare operations noted that Òchemical agents will cover only tens of square miles, but biological agents can blanket hundreds of thousands of square miles. ÒA country that feels a need for that type of capability could easily view a biological warfare program as the most cost-effective and lowest-risk solution to the requirement.Ó

The equipment required for the production, stockpiling, and dissemination of BC weapons are both dual-use technology and easy to acquire in an industrial society. Civilian chemical industries all over the world are engaged in production, processing, and consumption of a number of dual-use chemicals for various purposes. The dual-use technology used to develop CBW is also used to create pesticides, detergents, pharmaceuticals, and a host of other biotechnology products. ÒEven toxins have legitimate medical applications, and any country with an advanced medical industry has legitimate reasons for working on them.Ó According to Neil Livingstone and and Joseph DouglasÕs CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, a study by the BDM Corporation found that the essential requirements for manufacturing a sufficient biological weapon program include the following:

· One microbiologist with knowledge of disease processes;
· One engineer;
· One vegetative bacterial pathogen;
· An equipped microbiology laboratory;
· A bottle production plant;
· A sterilizer capacity for the bottle production plant;
· Sufficient shop space for BC storage and development equipment; and
· Assorted BC production, storage, and dissemination equipment.

The equipment required for BC production does not have to be extensive or highly advanced. Simple fermenters or industrial-strength chemicals will suffice. Many biological samples have been obtained legally and illegally from countless research laboratories in the United States and abroad. They may also be produced by people knowledgeable in the production of biological agents in such places as basements using simple fermenters such as alcohol brewery kits. It has been suggested that a terrorist in the United States, using a forged research permit and paying approximately $35, could probably make a mail-order purchase of anthrax.

Nuclear weapons are attractive primarily for their effects but also for their psychological impact on targeted societies. The first noticeable characteristics of a nuclear explosion are the flash of light and heat, which make up some 35 percent of the explosionÕs energy release. This is because the thermal radiation travels at just below the speed of light, being deflected off particles in the atmosphere, since the flash of light and heat precedes the blast wave by several seconds. Following a blast, temperatures in excess of one million degrees sweep out in the cloud and may last up to several seconds, depending upon the size of the explosion. The blast forces air away from ground zero, producing sudden changes in air pressure that can crush objects in its path, and high winds that can move objects suddenly or knock them down. In general, buildings are destroyed by the overpressure while people and smaller objects are destroyed by the winds. The severity of the overpressure depends upon the size of the explosion and the surrounding topography.

Targeted areas are scoured with prompt radiation (neutrons and gamma rays emitted within the first minute after detonation) immediately following a nuclear explosion. Additional radiation exposure may occur via fallout if radioactive particles are blown skyward following a nuclear explosion. Soon after the explosion, radioactive particles will begin to return to the ground. Many of these particles will be blown downwind in a plume that may contaminate many surrounding regions, depending on the meteorological conditions. People exposed to enough of the returning particles will die or become ill, depending upon the amount of radiation absorbed.

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a by-product of a nuclear explosion, is an electromagnetic surge wave similar to radio waves that is absorbed in the air or ground. Electrical or electronic systems near the blast absorb an EMP pulse and either suffer physical damage to an electronic component (such as a short or burnout) or will be temporarily disrupted, requiring some maintenance to restore full operation.

In Leonard ColeÕs The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare, he explains that terrorists are discouraged from using NBC weapons by a wide variety of constraints. NBC weapons are not readily available; therefore, terrorists will have less understanding and experience with such weapons. In the next section, there will be a discussion of the various constraints against the use of NBC agents in terrorist operations.

Constraints against NBC Acquisition and Deployment

Government officials have been concerned since the 1970s that terrorists may seek NBC weapons to cause mass

destruction. Before terrorists can deploy NBC weapons, they must first overcome numerous constraints aimed at preventing the illegal acquisition of NBC weapons. These constraints, as many authors will contend, are the primary reason that many terrorists have not yet escalated to NBC weapons. The following section will discuss the nature of the constraints that many government officials and NBC experts feel are weakening.

Due to the characteristics associated with NBC weapons, this form of terrorism is constrained by several political, technical, and financial factors. The first constraint involves the technical complexities associated with developing and weaponizing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This is most obvious in the case of nuclear munitions. To produce a nuclear weapon, a terrorist regime must successfully acquire a sufficient quantity of Òweapons-grade fissile material, high explosives, and related explosives technology, and a workable design for a nuclear explosive device.Ó However, materials and technologies needed to assemble a nuclear bomb are restricted by international agreements and national laws to prevent proliferation of NBC materials.

Terrorists have a large number of constraints that must be surmounted in order to reach Òcritical massÓ for a nuclear explosion. Among others, terrorists must develop an explosive design or gun and trigger device in order to reach the Òcritical massÓ stage leading to a nuclear explosion. This requires that the device be specifically engineered to be able to generate a Òsimultaneous trigger of detonators, which in turn set off the high explosive surrounding the fissile material.Ó The technological and engineering demands of this stage are intensive and costly. Due to the innate obstacles related to the development of a nuclear weapon, it is unlikely that non-state terrorists will have the expertise, technology, materials, and funds to develop their own nuclear weapon(s). However, non-state or loosely affiliated terrorists must not be discounted.

Arguably, the most significant constraint has been terroristsÕ lack of ability of acquire NBC agents, such as fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the past, fissile material has proved very difficult to obtain. However, the break up of the Soviet Union has weakened this constraint. Terry Hawkins, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and International Security Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory stated, ÒIf a terrorist group or rogue state gets hold of such material from smugglers, they solve the single most difficult problem in building a [NBC] bomb.Ó Radioactive waste, weapons-grade fissile material, and nuclear weapons, which may be used for nuclear terrorism, may be more accessible. The world market has been drastically affected by the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. Official records indicate there have been numerous reported cases of attempted nuclear smuggling of fissile material. For a chronological list of smuggling incidents from 1993 to 1996, please see table 3 in appendix. To put this into historical perspective, more fissile material is known to have been stolen from the former Soviet Union than the United States managed to produce in the first three years of the Manhattan Project.

Government officials contend NBC-related technologies and production information threaten to spread from the FSU. Various websites located on the Internet provide informative reference material needed to manufacture an assortment of lethal BC weapons and dispersal methods. Senate investigators reported in March 1996 that it took only one-half hour on the Internet to find instructions on manufacturing sarin.

Arguably, an additional constraint to the use of NBC weapons by terrorists is the expectation of an overwhelming retaliation for the use of NBC terrorism, whether from the target nation, the international arena, specific allies of the target nation, or all of the above. In the past, it has been assumed that the use of NBC in any circumstance will bring an extraordinary effort on behalf of the targeted nation to eliminate the terrorist group responsible for the attack. Since NBC terrorism is likely to cause a large amount of death and destruction among noncombatants, an immediate loss of support and legitimacy for the terrorist organization is expected. This concept of ÒbacklashÓ therefore represents a constraint on the use of NBC weapons. Presumably, any use of NBC weapons for the purposes of terrorism would be met with maximum force as an obligatory response of most economically developed countries in order to deter any future use of NBC.

However, the recent trend in terrorism indicates the concept of backlash may be less of a constraint than originally thought. Significant terrorist attacks without any subsequent admissions of guilt have become more frequent in the last decade. The United States has recently witnessed several significant terrorist attacks in which no group has claimed responsibility and government officials are unable to assign culpability immediately following the attack. Therefore, these events have passed without open retaliation. For example, events such as the recent terrorist bombing that shook the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta; the bombing of the Air Force barracks Khobar Towers in Al Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and the recent bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa all suggest an impetus towards anonymous terrorism because terrorists groups are not claiming responsibility for their attacks. Culpability is likely to be determined following an attack by the targeted nation. This emerging phenomenon, Òsilent terrorismÓ may be an attempt to create a sense of instability and vulnerability amongst their adversaries. Furthermore, non-state, religiously oriented groups arguably have been displaying behavior that seems to indicate a lack of need for media assistance to articulate their cause as the Òintended audience is their own cell-constituency and God.Ó

By not claiming responsibility for the event, non-state groups may actually be able to do more damage to the selected target and, at the same time, escape retaliation. The fact that no one group has stepped forward to claim responsibility for the bombing against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia has, at a minimum, caused difficulties between the U.S. and her economic allies and heightened tensions between the Islamic countries of Libya, Iran, Sudan, and Syria vis-à-vis the United States. The change in the characterization of terrorism may be indicative of a new era, one in which the traditional, ÒconstrainedÓ terrorist of the twentieth century is supplanted by the ultra-violent Òpost-modernÓ of the twenty-first century.

Arguably, the backlash constraint has been significantly undermined by the Iran-Iraq War. Some critics contend that any use of CW will involve a significant retaliation from coalition forces. However, the actions taken by the United Nations and its members or rather not taken during the Iran-Iraq War indicate otherwise. Both Iran and Iraq were parties to the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical or bacteriological agents in war. However, Iraq began to use chemical weapons on a limited basis in 1982 against Iranian forces. During the course of the War, however, Iraq stepped up its chemical weapons use to such a point that Òblistered skin and burnt lungs from mustard gas; choking, frothing, and agonizing death from nerve agents--all had become commonplace on the battlefield.Ó

Any concept of backlash was undermined by the unanswered chemical weapons that the Iraqis employed against Iranian soldiers. This message was noted in full by developing countries looking to develop NBC weapons. Terrorists watching for a response from the international community regarding IraqÕs illegal use of chemical weapons may have been encouraged to develop their own NBC weapons by the lethargic international response.

The effectiveness of conventional terrorism weapons may be sufficient to make terrorists uninterested in unconventional means. Noting the effectiveness of the bombings at the Marine Barracks in Beirut, the Oklahoma City Federal Building, the World Trade Center, Khobar Towers, and the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, terrorists may believe that their ends are sufficiently met without crossing into the realm of NBC. Conventional weapons have been known to cause significant damage when used in mass quantities, which may meet the needs of terrorists seeking to cause widespread destruction.

It has been argued that the only types of terrorists likely to use NBC weapons are irrational or mentally disturbed and that they are unlikely to be able to acquire NBC weapons. This seems tautological: If terrorists do use NBC weapons, by definition, they are irrational. They may, irrational or not, however, be smart, determined, well financed and organized. Osama Bin Laden, allegedly a high-ranking member of terrorist organizations such as the Mujahedin Brigades and al-Jihad, escalated his anti-Western efforts by attempting to purchase unconventional weapons of mass destruction, citing a self-proclaimed religious duty to do so. In a recent interview, Bin Laden did not deny American allegations that he was trying to purchase chemical weapons and fissile material for nuclear weapons, instead saying it is not a crime to acquire such weapons. By many universal standards, anyone who welcomes the opportunity to kill defenseless and noncombatant men, women, and children with NBC weapons is irrational at best. However, Osama Bin Laden has effectively used conventional weapons of mass destruction against noncombatants. To

date, Bin Laden is responsible for the death or wounding of nearly two thousand men, women, and children

by conventional methods.

Next, often times the most controversial constraint to the use of NBC terrorism is that terrorist leaders or state sponsors may possess moral objections to their use. This seems counter-intuitive given the nature of terrorism and the propensity for terrorist organizations to kill noncombatants. According to Dr. Gideon Rose, Deputy Director of the National Security Studies at Harvard University, Òterrorists are morally constrained from using weapons of mass destruction.Ó To say that terrorists are morally constrained from committing acts of mass destruction is dubious even if we were discussing only the traditional phenomenon of terrorism. However, emerging trends in terrorism indicate otherwise. Terrorists seem to be overcoming any moral inhibitions that may have prevented them from killing large numbers of noncombatant men, women, and children. Osama Bin Laden said in a recent interview:

We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa. The fatwa includes all that share or take part in killing of Muslims, assaulting holy places, or those who help the Jews occupy Muslim land.

Traditionally, groups such as the Hezbollah, PLO, Hamas and others have shown minimal regard for the number of combatant and noncombatant lives lost in attacks. Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad operatives have made effective use of suicide bombers in busy population centers. Conversely, the behavior of relatively obscure terrorist organizations such as Aum Shinrikyo; Osama Bin Laden and Mujahedin Brigades; and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord indicate inhibitions that previously discouraged the potential for NBC terrorism may be diminishing.

Timothy McVeigh killed 268 men, women, children, and babies. Aum Shinrikyo injured fifty-five hundred people. The World Trade Center bombing killed twelve and injured more than one thousand people. The Khobar Towers bombing killed nineteen soldiers and injured several hundreds others. The embassy bombings in Africa killed 250 and caused four thousand injuries. These attacks are indicative of morally uninhibited terrorism.

In the United States, terrorist groups are beginning to develop infrastructures and resources that will enable their ability to develop and wage international terrorism, specifically NBC terror. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright commented on last summerÕs embassy bombings, ÒWhat is new is the emergence of terrorist coalitions that do not answer fully to any government, that operate across national borders and have access to advanced technology.Ó Terrorist organizations have expanded their operations to CONUS because personal freedoms are paramount in America. Liberties are far more restricted in the Middle East. ÒIn many countries, the government must approve all organizations; unofficial groups being illegal, their leaders may be arrested and jailed. Movement within the country and abroad are closely watched.Ó The U.S. Constitution and U.S. laws provide a plethora of personal freedoms and protection for terrorist affiliations from Òstate intrusivenessÓ in areas such as religion, speech, peaceful assembly, the right to bear arms; and protection against unreasonable search and seizures. As a result of these connections, terrorist organizations can establish networks that are obscure and able to:

· Develop financial resources;
· Facilitate military or para-military training for members;
· Provide advanced education opportunities for members; and
· Facilitate the procurement of weapons, material and NBC related technologies.

Some authors contend that the threat of NBC terrorism is being exaggerated based on the fact that there have not been many NBC attacks yet. It is true to say there have not been a large number of NBC terror attacks. However, NBC weapons and associated technologies are not yet as omnipresent as conventional explosives. Therefore, NBC terrorism cannot be expected to occur as frequently as conventional terrorism. The threshold regarding chemical terrorism was only recently crossed with Aum Shinrikyo. Since then, additional attempts have been made using chemical weapons in terrorism. Logic dictates that as NBC weapons proliferate to state-sponsors and terrorist groups, then the rate and severity of terror attacks will increase.

Consequences of an NBC Attack

The consequences of an NBC attack include physical and psychological effects that can be measured from the point of deployment to several years hence. The initial impact of NBC use is likely to be physical destruction, multiple or mass casualties, or both. Other possible repercussions may affect the national and/or international economy, Òor the nationÕs strategic position in world affairs, and perhaps even for its ability to sustain itself as a strong democracy.Ó If multiple NBC agents are deployed in an organized campaign, the effects associated with NBC agents will be compounded. In an article by Richard Falkenrath, there are several anticipated consequences resulting from NBC terrorism.

First, assuming a population center is targeted, the most obvious affect of an NBC attack would be large casualties. As previously discussed, the Aum Shinrikyo attacks had a significant impact on the targeted populace. These attacks successfully overwhelmed the local emergency services and paralyzed various critical infrastructures such as transportation, law enforcement, and medical facilities. If Aum Shinrikyo had been more proficient with its delivery methods, the estimated death and injury toll could have climbed into the tens of thousands. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in a metropolis could potentially kill several thousand people. A radiological weapon, depending on the amount of explosive used to disperse radioactive material, could kill from several to several hundred people and contaminate a target area for a period of time.

Second, a successful NBC terrorist attack could contaminate a large area. Depending on the type of weapon used, the area immediately affected by the attack could be rendered uninhabitable for extended periods of time, requiring a cumbersome clean-up operation. NBC agents could also contaminate the atmosphere and, depending on the environmental conditions, could spread contaminants down wind. Long term exposure to NBC agents could elevate disease rates among humans, animals, crops, and quality of life for a large population.

Third, following an NBC attack against a civilian population, widespread panic would likely destabilize the population. After the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, many more people reported to hospitals claiming to be injured than were actually injured by the effects of the blast. With mass casualty NBC terrorism, hospitals are likely to be overwhelmed by people fearing contamination or infection. Moreover, the detonation of NBC weapons is likely to initiate a mass exodus of panicked civilians exiting the target area.

Fourth, degraded response capabilities are likely to be another result of an NBC terror attack. Emergency services in the United States are not outfitted with the necessary emergency-response equipment or NBC-related training required to respond proficiently to widescale use of NBC agents. First-responders are likely to become casualties to NBC attacks while subsequent assistance may not be able to respond due to inadequate capabilities.

In the latest Annual Report to Congress, several inadequacies pertaining to U.S. emergency response were listed. First, the DoD currently lacks a large number of FDA-licensed vaccines against BW threat agents. Therefore, civilian emergency responders lack many necessary vaccines. Second, the effects on humans resulting from the exposure to Òlow doses of chemical agents, particularly nerve agents, are not clearly understood; and lastly, the residual effects from NBC agents have not clearly been evaluated, therefore, there is a high probability that interactions will result in markedly increased numbers of casualties.Ó

Sixth, an NBC attack can cause major economic damage to the target nation. A large attack or series of attacks can affect the national economy, perhaps even Òprecipitating a recession through loss of confidence in the market or companies that may or may not be directly affected.Ó An attack could Òtrigger a run on international financial markets, especially if the target has economic significance.Ó The loss of plant and productivity from even a Òsingle, moderately damaging NBC attack can amount to millions or billions of dollars.Ó

Lastly, an NBC attack can undermine the strategic position of the target state. The United States could be deterred from entering a regional crisis in which its national interests were threatened.

Key institutions and political leaders might be attacked directly, or military forces and force-projection capabilities might be damaged, in an effort to prevent an effective military response. An international military coalition might collapse, or an essential ally might request the withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory, under threat of NBC attack.

Conclusion

The acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by a terrorist organization is not only feasible, it is likely. As previously discussed, various domestic groups and international terrorists have already acquired and used chemical and biological weapons in their terror campaigns. CBWs are affordable, manageable, and less difficult to develop than traditional nuclear weapons, and can be disseminated covertly. However, nuclear weapons offer certain features that may be more desirable to certain terrorists depending upon their objectives. In the past, the development and use of NBC weapons have been constrained by a variety of technical, political, and moral considerations. If these constraints are significantly weakened, NBC terrorism is more likely to be utilized by terrorists. The consequences for such an attack would be significant regarding domestic and international U.S. security interests.

Current U.S. Policy towards NBC Terrorism

In the last decade, international terrorism has been the focus of a great deal of media attention. The trend in terrorism towards greater destruction and higher death tolls has had significant influence in conveying the destructive nature of terrorism through television sets around the world.

Beginning with the terrorist attacks on Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich at the 1972 Olympics, images of terrorism began to generate concern that such an atrocity could occur in the United States. With the previous sections identifying the nature of NBC terror and likely perpetrators, this next section will look at specific policies to deter, counter, and restrict the effectiveness of NBC terrorism. This thesis will conclude with policy recommendations designed to buttress existing counter-NBC-terror efforts.

Government officials have made concerted efforts to begin to deal with international terrorism against American facilities and citizens at home and abroad. Arguably, these efforts have proved somewhat successful. Countering the terrorist threat is a high priority for the United States that has evolved into a three-part counter-terrorist policy.

(1) Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.

Government officials have learned that when terrorists are remotely successful, then other terrorists begin to see where they might be successful in future attacks making concessions to terrorists may have effectively deterred terrorists in the past. However, the United States is now seeing a new form of terrorism where there are no demands being made and violence is simply being perpetrated in protest of U.S. foreign policy abroad.

(2) Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.

This has involved increased arrest and conviction rates for terrorists, even stricter sentences for terrorist attacks. Several trials and convictions of international terrorists, including those of Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos the Jackal), Ramzi Yousef, and Mir Aimal Kansi, occurred in 1997. The terrorists who planned and helped carry out the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing were convicted of the crime in New York. A jury found the terrorist who murdered two CIA employees outside CIA headquarters in January 1993 guilty in Virginia. A highly publicized judgement in Berlin demonstrated in open court that the Government of Iran follows a deliberate policy of "liquidatingÓ its political opponents abroad. ÒCarlos the JackalÓ was convicted in Paris of three murders committed nearly twenty-three years ago. A terrorist who attempted to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, by launching rockets into the complex was found guilty by a jury in Washington, DC.

(3) Isolate and apply pressure to states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior.

To adhere to this policy directive, the Department of State has determined that any state-sponsors of terrorism should be held accountable. Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, notorious state-sponsors of terrorism, are subject to bilateral and multilateral sanctions that are to remain in place until they can prove they no longer sponsor terrorist activities.

This three-point policy approach to counter-terrorism has attempted to minimize conventional methods of terrorism. However, international terrorism is evolving into a new phenomenon where demands are no longer being stated during terrorist acts. In place of stated demands, terrorists are now seeking to cause mass destruction in an attempt to influence foreign policy and seem to be less interested in making traditional demands for ransom, prisoner releases, and the like. The current trend indicates that terrorists with religious, ethnic, or political extremist motivations are especially likely to attempt to inflict mass casualties on Americans or U.S. facilities in order to influence U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Terrorists attempting to inflict mass casualties are likely to try to retain anonymity to such a degree that absolute culpability cannot be assigned, making immediate retaliation less probable. U.S. policy such as the three-point approach must evolve in accordance with new aspects of terrorism such as silent terrorism and the use of NBC weapons.

In July 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive Thirty-Nine (PDD-39) on terrorism. PDD-39 asserts it is the position of the President that:

The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists.

This directive has been joined by PDD-62, which established the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. This office was designed to oversee such areas as counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for NBC terrorism.

As a result of the Clinton administrationÕs contentions that the nation has Òno higher priorityÓ than preventing NBC terrorism, Congress has reciprocated with the creation of new laws, support, and legislation totaling more than a billion dollars. More than forty federal agencies have roles in combating terrorism. The counter-terrorism architecture is detailed in table 6 of the appendix.

Among the big winners is the Pentagon, which is getting $52 million to train local officials to cope with chemical, nuclear, and biological attacks. Other agencies have set up units by NEST, the U.S. Department of EnergyÕs Nuclear Emergency Search Team, begun in the 1970s to thwart nuclear extortionists. The FBI has added DEST, its new Domestic Emergency Support Team, and the State Department now runs FEST, the Foreign Emergency Support Team. The Public Health Service is busily planning MMSTs, or Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams, for one hundred cities. And on Energy Department drawing boards are plans for BEST, a Biological Emergency Search Team, and CEST, its chemical counterpart.

Counter-NBC Terrorism Acts

As previously discussed in chapter two, Secretary of State Madeline Albright formally acknowledged several terrorist organizations that represent a significant threat to the security of the United States. Under a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the State Department designated thirty terrorist groups as foreign terrorist organizations. This act also makes it illegal for U.S. institutions and citizens to provide funds or other forms of material support to such groups. The law also requires U.S. financial institutions to block the funds of those groups from passing through U.S. infrastructures and to report the blocking action to the Department of Treasury.

The Biological Weapons Antiterrorism Act of 1989 criminalized development, possession, manufacture or transfer of BW for Òuse as a weapon.Ó There have been two noteworthy incidents in which arrests were made under the guidelines of the Act.

In April 1993, Canadian border police confiscated 130 grams of ricin from Thomas Lavy, an Arkansas resident with reported links to right-wing extremists, as he attempted to enter the United States. Lavy was arrested by the FBI according to criminal code established by the 1989 act. However, he was never tried because he hanged himself in his cell shortly after arraignment.

In August 1994, Douglas Allen Baker and Leroy Charles Wheeler--both associated with the Minnesota Patriots Council, a right-wing militia group--were Òarrested for possession of ricin and planning to murder law enforcement personnel; their intended delivery technique was to smear the toxin on the doorknobs of their intended victims.Ó

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment

Actions are being taken to develop Òeffective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists.Ó

Three years ago, the Senate passed the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment. This amendment focuses on the threat to the United States from NBC attack, NBC terrorism, and the inadequate level of domestic preparedness against the threat. This act directed the Department of Defense, in conjunction with other federal agencies, to manage a training and equipment program in 120 cities over a five-year period. This amendment is meant to provide a series of defensive measures through training and equipment to stop the diversion or use of NBC weapons.

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment was divided into three main elements in order to counter the threat of NBC terrorism and NBC attacks. The first part was designed to increase U.S. domestic preparedness in response to NBC attack and NBC terrorism. The law directs the president to take immediate action to Òenhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction,Ó and Òto provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the national and the local level.Ó

The second element consists of a package of increases to the administrationÕs funding requests for a select set of financial programs aimed at reducing the risk of fissile material theft and diversion in the FSU. This funding has been directed towards RussiaÕs inherited nuclear weapons complex so that security measures can be enhanced to make nuclear leakage more difficult. However, it appears these financial supplements have been used by Russian officials to further nuclear weapons research and development. Washington bureaucrats have decided to provide financial aid to the Russians as a means of suppressing their propensity to sell NBC weapons and technology to rogue nations. The Clinton administrationÕs overall effort to counter NBC terrorism has been inadequate. The current fraction of the Defense Department budget devoted to chemical and biological defense is about .2 percent (around $500 million) while funding to combat nuclear terrorism comes mostly from the Department of Energy.

Congress increased funding of the DOEÕs material protection, control, and accounting program to $112.5 million; its nuclear smuggling program to $8.6 million; its plutonium disposition program to $10 million; and the joint Energy-Defense plutonium-production reactor core conversion program to $13.5 million. The Customs Service was given $9 million to enhance its international cooperation program for detecting nuclear smuggling.

The final section mandated the establishment of a Ònational coordinator for nonproliferation matters.Ó This was intended to be an intermediate position between the national security advisor and the senior directors on the National Security Council staff. However, this appointment received a great deal of resistance from the White House and the position was subsequently assigned to Òthe deputy national security advisor as the national coordinator without enacting the reforms sought by Congress.Ó

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment went further than most counter-terrorism policy by delegating domestic responsibility for NBC terror to the National Guard. In March 1998, the DoD gave the Guard an expanded domestic role in counter-terrorism involving NBC weapons. The DoDÕs fiscal year 1999 budget request includes money to field ten 22-member Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams to respond to CBW attacks. The Secretary of Defense commented,

This new initiative will be the cornerstone of our strategy for preparing AmericaÕs defense against the possible use of weapons of mass destruction.

It remains to be seen whether the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment will have a successful impact in addressing the problem of NBC terrorist attack. Regardless, the number and severity of recent WMD terrorist attacks indicate further efforts are required if the United States expects to reduce NBC terror threats facing it and its security interests.

Despite government efforts to curb the proliferation of NBC weapons from rogue nations to terrorists, proliferation is still a significant problem. NBC weapons may be available to terrorists. Why? Because Russia is

still selling valuable technology and hardware to interested buyers. Russia is still researching and developing new nuclear weapons technology and churning out HEU and plutonium. The Russians are currently profiting from weaknesses in U.S. foreign policy regarding NBC proliferation because they continue to proliferate NBC technologies.

New efforts may be required to stem the tide of NBC proliferation from Russia. Without a restructuring of our foreign policy to curb NBC proliferation, the Russians will continue to produce and proliferate NBC weapons. A more strict, verifiable, and enforceable foreign policy regarding NBC proliferation is needed if NBC weapons are going to be kept away from terrorist hands intent on using them against U.S. security interests.

The United States must take a more active role in

restricting the flow of NBC materials that represent a

clear and present danger to U.S. security interests by enforcing current legislation. The United States must engage in policy that assigns culpability to countries that have proliferated weapons used in NBC terror operations. Culpable nations may be placed on an international NBC proliferant list with the United Nations or NATO that subjects them to punitive measures such as sanctions or interdiction efforts. Following the example in the U.S. criminal justice system, whoever provides a perpetrator with a firearm when they know that person intends to use it maliciously, then the supplier is considered an accomplice, and thus guilty, for aiding and abetting the criminal. As a result, the supplier is held responsible for its contribution to the crime if evidence is sufficient to identify culpability, negating plausible deniability on behalf of the proliferant nation. This is a plausible course of action to take against possible future proliferators such as Russia, China, or North Korea, which have been guilty in the past of arming state-sponsors with NBC technologies. Reciprocity for such deviancy can be applied in accordance with traditional measures such as sanctions, embargoes, the severance of political ties, covert action, and possibly, assertive disarmament.

Domestic Preparedness Initiative

President Clinton and his administration called for recommendations preparing an emergency response capability throughout the United States to terrorist NBC attack. These recommendations were part of an analytical look at federal and state levels of response capability.

The Domestic Preparedness Initiative was to assess the American ability to absorb a NBC attack. In addition, this bill provides funding for the DoD to enhance the capability of federal, state, and local emergency responders in incidents involving nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. There were several specific issues considered in the analysis. They are:

· Assess the types and characteristics of nuclear, biological, and chemical threats;

· identify inadequate training, equipment and other requirements for first-responders;

· identify NBC warfare information, expertise and equipment that can be adapted to civilian application; and

· present a detailed plan for DoD assistance in equipping, training and providing other necessary assistance for first-responders to such incidents.

In terms of domestic defense, the militaryÕs ability to assist state and local officials in coping with bioterrorism on U.S. soil is inadequate. As Colonel David Franz, deputy commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, testified recently before Congress,

We have, generally, fewer tools and less information to protect citizens from terrorism than we have had to protect a defined military force from the classical biological warfare agents.

Under the umbrella of the Domestic Preparedness Initiative (DPI), the DoD is establishing several areas that may aid in containing the effects of an NBC attack. The DPI includes a nationwide support plan with an initial focus on twenty-seven cities. A help-line for both emergency and non-emergency situations involving NBC weapons will be established in order to provide vital information and technical expertise regarding NBC contamination. Strike teams and their support infrastructure will be established to respond to medical consequence management issues related to NBC terrorism. A BC Quick Response Force has been activated for rapid deployment to detect, neutralize, contain, dismantle, and dispose of NBC weapons. Existing federal agencies are expected to strengthen their capabilities to respond to NBC terrorism, as well as local emergency responder capabilities.

A quick perusal of the efforts listed above shows the current administration is atleast beginning to prepare Americans to deal with an NBC attack. If NBC terror attacks are successful, other terrorists might feel there is utility in such attacks and react accordingly. However, that is a bet on which no administration should wager American lives.

Chemical Weapons Convention

On 29 April 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) entered into effect with President Clinton leading the way for the United States. According to President Clinton:

The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its members have committed themselves to totally eliminating chemical weapons stocks and production facilities, prohibiting chemical weapons-related activities, banning assistance for such
activities and restricting trade with non-Parties in certain relevant chemicals.

Under the CWC, each party agrees never, under any circumstances, to:

· Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

· use chemical weapons;

· engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapons; and

· assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

In addition, signatories have agreed to adhere to all accordances of the treaty including:

· Destroy the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control;

· destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party; and

· destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

The CWC was expected to prevent chemical weapons from proliferating from rogue states to terrorist groups. President ClintonÕs endorsement of the CWC has created numerous security issues involving the flexibility and credibility of U.S. deterrent forces. The CWC dubiously suggests that the United States will be safer if it destroys its offensive chemical deterrent based on ÔassumedÕ reciprocal arms control. In addition, the United States must also relinquish its non-lethal CW military capability, which in the past has been used to save civilian and military lives.

Throughout the history of chemical arms control, countries such as Iraq and Russia have continually violated treaty protocol. These violations may be related to three flaws within the nature of CW agreements. The first is that it is unlikely a treaty can be effectively verified with todayÕs verification regimes and lack of access to chemical sources. The second is that many potential proliferants have declined to sign the treaty. The third is the absence of credible sanctions to deter and punish users of chemical weapons.

The recent use of chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan is stark evidence that international compliance with any NBC treaty is unlikely. In 1980, approximately twelve countries possessed chemical weapons. Since then, Òmore than twenty-five countries are now suspected of having chemical weapons or the ability to use them,Ó observed John D. Holum, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in 1994.

A review of CWC signatories reveals that most of the CWC countries are not CW powers. Moreover, most of the states that represent potential terrorist threats to the United States are not signatories. Countries such as Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, Egypt, Libya, Serbia, and China are still in pursuit of chemical weapons programs and have not signed the CWC agreement. Furthermore, the CWC does not provide access to non-member countries that are in pursuit of CW programs.

Arms control agreements such as the CWC and those like it cannot prevent proliferation and may not have much effect on it at all. There are four technical reasons in addition to fundamental reasons why the CWC is unlikely to work.

· While several chemical agents are complex in nature, other potential CBW agents can be made with technology that is simple and readily available.

· Export controls fail because most precursor chemicals and weapons-related equipment are applicable to civil or weapons uses. Phosphorus oxychloride, for example, is a chemical used in tabun, a nerve agent, and in a variety of legitimate chemical industry processes and products including organic synthesis, plasticizers, gasoline additives, hydraulic fluids, insecticides, seminconductor-grade silicon, and flame retardants.

· Equipment that is used for the production of CW agents may also be used for the production of various pharmaceutical materials. It would be difficult to deny the possession of such equipment due to its use in producing medicines. The same can be said about various herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers.

· The large number of potential suppliers of chemicals and processing equipment is an additional weak point in supply limitations. Chemical weapons technology and equipment is relatively easy to develop and acquire from various sources. Consequently, future export controls are likely to become futile because third world countries will likely be able to make their own CW agents.

Biological Weapons Convention

In an effort to prevent massive stockpiling, to further research and development of offensive biological weapons, and to curtail the potential for such biological weapons to end up in the hands of rogue nations and international terrorists, the United States along with 160 other states has signed the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons (BWC) by 1996. The BWC was the first treaty to ban an entire class of weapons.

The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins of certain types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. The BWC also prohibits the weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for offensive purposes or in armed conflict. It also requires that each State party destroy, or divert to peaceful purposes, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. Each signatory also agrees not to transfer any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery to any recipient and not to assist, encourage, or induce any member or non-member to manufacture or otherwise acquire such organisms or equipment for non-peaceful purposes. In order to be deemed in violation of the BWC, a member or non-member must have a certain volume of prophylactic, protective, or other biological agents that cannot be justified for peaceful purposes.

Although the BWC has good intentions and is designed in part to prevent the spread and use of biological weapons and associated technologies to state-sponsors and terrorists, the treaty is fundamentally flawed. It lacks measures to provide confidence in compliance and an effective verification regime in case of doubts about compliance, and it lacks signatories that are the cause of concern regarding biological terrorism.

The BWC is a toothless treaty. It lacks the necessary enforcement measures to detect and deny biological weapons programs and proliferation. To date, the BWC has amounted to little more than a Òpaper tigerÓ with very little credibility in the international arena. By 1995, seventeen countries had been named as biological weapons suspects. Portions of these countries are considered state sponsors of terrorism--Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea. The Department of Defense reported to Congress in 1994 that instability in Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia as likely to encourage more nations to develop biological and chemical warfare capabilities.

Recommendations

The U.S. government is not adequately prepared in terms of policy and countermeasures to deal with NBC terror. U.S. policies for combating terrorism are mostly reactive rather than proactive. Examples of traditional responses to terrorism include: Òdiplomacy and international cooperation and constructive engagement, economic sanctions, demarches, covert action, protective security measures, and military force.Ó If emerging trends in terrorism towards mass destruction and anonymous terrorism continue, then new responses to terrorism may be warranted. These response need to have a greater impact on efforts designed to stem the tide of proliferation and on efforts to deal with terrorists who are able to acquire NBC weapons. Policy realignment may be necessary to effectively negate emerging NBC terrorist threats. The following policy recommendations attempt to buttress weak NBC terrorism policies while capitalizing upon existing policy strengths.

Recommendation: Address public education issues related to the threat of NBC terrorism.

The average American does not spend time educating his or herself as to the dangers of NBC terrorism, medical responses, and general effects of NBC weapons. Therefore, government officials should take it upon themselves to educate the general populace on the nature of NBC terrorism. NBC terrorism may have less impact on an educated population because the populace will be familiar with potential threats and effects, thus reducing the level of panic and chaos following an NBC attack. Choosing not to educate U.S. citizens on terrorist tactics and strategies keeps the public vulnerable not only to terrorist attack, but also to terrorist propaganda. While speaking at a press conference in November 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen alluded to the need for an educated populace when he Òheld aloft a five-pound bag of sugar to dramatize how little anthrax would be needed to inflict mass casualties in a city like Washington, D.C.Ó

The goal of any education campaign should be to heighten the publicÕs awareness rather than raise the publicÕs level of fear. There are many different mediums available to accomplish this goal including public service announcements on television and radio, information pamphlets in the mail, Internet awareness sites, televised discussions, political debates, and public discussions. These mediums should explain in a brief, sustained and carefully modulated fashion, the U.S. counter-terrorism policy, the nature of the NBC terrorist threat, and how to respond as civilians if attacked.

Some public officials have already begun efforts to educate U.S. citizens. In 1996, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana began a series of campaign commercials in Iowa and New Hampshire regarding the implications of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear terrorism was the subject of four television advertisements. One advertisement presented a group of terrorists threatening to blow up three American cities with nuclear weapons they acquired from the former Soviet Union. The theme depicted a nuclear terrorist operation conducted with actual nuclear weapons. During the operation, the FBI discovered one of three weapons destined for an American city. The advertisements place an emphasis on developing the ability to repel and absorb, if necessary, an NBC attack against U.S. security interests, specifically the continental United States. Senator Lugar concluded the commercial by saying,

Starting now, the contest for the presidency must change. All of us in the race promise to balance the budget, cut taxes, shrink government. And with a
Republican Congress, any of us will do this. But the president never gets to that agenda if American isnÕt secure.

As mentioned earlier, it would be prudent to educate the public regarding the threat of NBC terror, current civilian vulnerabilities, and actions being taken to protect CONUS and U.S. security interests abroad. However, educators should be cautioned in these processes so that U.S. vulnerabilities regarding NBC and conventional terrorism are not publicized. Awareness programs should be organized to arouse concerns regarding NBC terror but not lead to hysteria or panic. Certainly, future policy needs to address what information is important and what is unnecessary to disseminate. ÒFor the public must be able to hold officials accountable, take part in the debate over the use of resources to combat these threats and, ultimately, respond to possible attacks in a productive way.Ó

Recommendation: Do not place faith in Òfeel-goodÓ arms control.

Arms control does not work, nor does it effectively protect U.S. interests. U.S. policymakers should expect that arms control agreements will continue to be violated until agreements dealing with NBC weapons can be verified and enforced. Historically, arms control has been effective only when there is no real threat, when all relevant states share the goal to begin with, or are otherwise deterred from weapons programs. Dr. William Van Cleave asserted, ÒWhen there is a real threat--a determination to acquire weapons--arms control does not work.Ó The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions are examples of ineffective arms control.

The most consistent pattern regarding NBC arms control and international agreements seems to be the continued violations of arms control by rogue nations in pursuit of nationalist objectives. NBC arms control agreements such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions appear to be an attempt to write international norms into effect. However, such agreements seem to be no more binding than cultural norms because when violated, international organizations are often unable to do anything of value in terms of punitive measures. Furthermore, these agreements are likely to undermine U.S. deterrence if proliferant nations go unchecked and are allowed to arm terrorists with NBC weapons or associated technologies.

It would behoove current and future administrations to refrain from committing to arms control agreements that may inadvertently destabilize the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces when these agreements continue to be violated or are not agreed to by the nations that are cause for concern. That is not to say the U.S. position should be to withdraw from or refrain from discussing NBC-related arms control, only that U.S. officials should not vest interests in arms control that is one-sided, inadequate, and unverifiable.

Recommendation: Integrate new policy measures that buttress U.S. deterrent forces and counter-terrorism policies.

As previously discussed, the current U.S. international counter-terrorism policy framework is sanction-oriented, and has traditionally sought to pin responsibility on state-sponsors. Regarding the nature of NBC terrorism, some policy realignment may be required.

To counter a modern terrorist threat involving the use of NBC weapons by state-sponsored terrorists and non-state terrorists, U.S. policymakers should consider a combination of assured destruction and flexible response. A policy of assured destruction that incorporates aspects of flexible response may create the capability and protocol to destroy terrorist infrastructures and eliminate terrorist personnel to such a degree that it would represent intolerable punishment and thus be an effective deterrent.

Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or its allies must first consider the consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.

Furthermore, an assured destruction capability in tune with a flexible response may deter state-sponsored NBC terrorism by threatening either conventional or unconventional retaliation for any act of NBC aggression, which would be construed as an act of war. The use of NBC weapons would be left as an ambiguous option of response depending upon the severity of state-sponsored terrorist attacks.

Upcoming administrations should pursue the research, development, and modernization of existing NBC weapons to support the credibility of U.S. deterrence against state-sponsored terrorism and to ensure NBC response teams have the knowledge of weapons that are likely to be used, including new agents that have not previously been developed. An effective deterrence will involve the development and deployment of the national capability to deny state or non-state terrorists advantages from the use of NBC weapons while retaining a flexible response for any acts of aggression. A modern and fully capable NBC arsenal is considered essential to a credible U.S. deterrence against NBC terrorism. Since such an arsenal does not currently exist, new efforts should be made to modernize the U.S. NBC arsenal in pursuit of a credible deterrence.

Having eliminated the option to respond in-kind to state-sponsored NBC terrorism, U.S. officials may be sending unintended messages to perpetrators. If a state-sponsor believes the United States would not use NBC weapons in a retaliatory strike against a state-sponsor, then state sponsors and terrorists may be more inclined to use NBC weapons against the United States or its allies if they believe that a military response may be conventional in nature.

New or reopened diplomatic channels can be cultivated in order to apply and reapply pressure to terror sponsoring organizations or countries. In past incidents of international terrorism by non-state groups, implementing a policy response of Òconstructive engagement was complicated by the lack of existing channels and mutually accepted roles of conduct between governments and the terrorists.Ó The seriousness of potential losses regarding NBC terror provides the extra incentives to create the channels of operations that may prevent NBC terror from occurring or reoccurring.

A policy of Òassertive disarmament,Ó as a vital supplement of assured destruction and flexible response, may be necessary to seek out and deter or stop state-sponsors and terrorist organizations that are mounting NBC terror operations. Assertive disarmament will be the ÒteethÓ in U.S. deterrence and the policy tool needed to meet the threats posed by NBC terror.

Assertive disarmament, a term to describe the use of military action after unsuccessful efforts to dissuade or prevent an adversary from seeking nuclear weapons, was first used in the context of the nuclear weapons program of the PRC back in 1968. The authors stated:

By Ôassertive disarmamentÕ we do not mean the species of aggressive acts usually referred to as preventive war. We mean solely a precise, surgical disruption of ChinaÕs present capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Recent arguments regarding assertive disarmament were discussed in the article, ÒSwift Military Action Can Prevent Proliferation.Ó In this article, the author Dr. William R. Van Cleave states that Òmilitary action should be considered as a selective means to control nuclear proliferation when other means [have] failed.Ó

By citing precedence for assertive disarmament in the 7 June 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak and allied sorties on Iraqi NBC facilities during the Gulf War, the author asserts that conventional military strikes against enemy nuclear weapons facilities can be highly effective in removing an NBC threat and preventing proliferation. Dr. Van Cleave goes on to say that not only will the targeted nationÕs weapons facilities be destroyed, but neighboring nations will feel less threatened and have less incentive to seek nuclear weapons as a defense.

A policy of assertive disarmament would be an effective countermeasure and deterrence to NBC terrorism in regard to U.S. security interests. If intelligence reports are able to indicate state-sponsored terrorists or non-state terrorists have acquired NBC weapons, U.S. forces may pre-empt NBC terror operations by destroying the NBC weapons, weapons facilities, and terrorist bases. By doing so, U.S. policymakers strengthen U.S. deterrence by demonstrating to other terrorists what to expect as an American response to NBC terrorism.

Recently, U.S. cruise missiles destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan suspected of developing chemical weapons for terrorist operations supporting Osama Bin LadenÕs terrorist infrastructure. This is an example of assertive disarmament policy in support of counter-NBC terrorism efforts designed to negate an NBC threat before affecting U.S. interests. If terrorists are aware of the United States probable response to attempts to acquire NBC weapons, then terrorists are more likely to be deterred.

Government officials should consider taking assertive disarmament one step further. According to the United NationÕs charter, the United States has an inherent right to protect itself from aggressors of any nature. Therefore, policy makers should maintain the ability to use military forces to attack strategic targets in countries that proliferate weapons and give general support to terrorists. Recently, the Clinton administration alluded to potential policy that may be taking a more proactive stance towards terrorists threatening U.S. security interests. Richard Clarke, President ClintonÕs coordinator for counter-terrorism, recently said in an interview, ÒWe may not just go in and strike against a terrorist facility; we may choose to strike the facilities of the host country, if that host country is a knowing, cooperative sanctuary.Ó

Within international law, such as Article 51 of the UN Charter, the United States may legitimately exercise policies such as assertive disarmament designed to preserve the safety and security of U.S. interests. Acting in self defense, the United States may be justified in initiating covert and overt direct military action against state-sponsors of terrorism. The day the United States launched the cruise missiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, President Clinton stated, ÒCountries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens.Ó Article 51 of the United NationÕs Charter specifically says:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility under the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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Recommendation: Restrict the civil liberties of suspected terrorists.

The United States is a virtual Òmelting potÓ for terrorists and their sympathizers, especially well-financed groups with a high capacity for violence.

More than fifty-five foreign terrorist groups are active on U.S. soil; engaged in training, intelligence collection, fund raising, gun running, and simply rest and relaxation. This countryÕs borders are perhaps the most porous in the world, and in the United States there are no nightly hotel cards, as in France and many other nations, which are sent to the police to track the movements of foreigners.

Efforts should be made to restrict the civil liberties of persons legitimately suspected of being terrorists. Known or suspected international terrorists should not be allowed to enter or seek residency in the United States. Foreigners from terror-sponsoring countries should be subject to higher scrutiny when applying for residency in the United States. In the seven years since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, nearly eleven thousand visas have been issued to students from state-sponsors of terrorism--including Ò503 Iraqis, 5,154 Iranians, 113 Libyans, 3,227 Syrians, 1,604 Sudanese, 103 Cubans, and 129 North Koreans.Ó Terrorist leaders should not be allowed to travel with passports from the United States or other Western countries. Critics call for the revoking of citizenship of terrorist leaders or their operatives, even if they are discovered to be terrorists after they were granted citizenship. One foreign student, a Jordanian named Eyad Ismoil, entered the United States in 1989 on a student visa and disappeared shortly thereafter. In 1993, he resurfaced with Ramzi Yousef to bomb the World Trade Center.

Terrorist organizations should not be allowed to establish support infrastructures within the United States. As stated previously, there are approximately fifty-five terrorist groups operating from satellite bases within the United States. These bases are surreptitiously used as training facilities and as a means of funneling money to terrorists in the Middle East and other areas. Fund raising activities that support terrorist operations in any way should be outlawed and foreign groups that engage in such activities should be expelled from the country.

Recommendation: Further develop first-responderÕs capabilities to respond to acts of NBC terrorism.

As a result of the nerve gas attack by the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group, government officials have determined that American citizens are especially threatened by NBC terrorism in CONUS. There is a significant push to improve the quality of emergency response to NBC attacks in cities across the United States. Government officials are beginning to pay a great deal of attention to the United StatesÕ ability to absorb NBC terror attacks. As Leslie Rodrigues of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute notes:

Chemical and biological terrorism can strike at any time in the heartland of America well out of the immediate reach of highly trained (military) strike units. The victims of such an attack would assuredly meet a catastrophic demise as untrained and uncoordinated local and state emergence response teams attempting to ameliorate the horrible fate of these victims quite possibly become victims themselves. Preparing first responders, bolstering local, state, and federal coordination, and defining a national strategy to confront a domestic chemical and biological terrorist attack are (not) insurmountable challenges so long as time, attention, and resources are devoted towards these ends. Doing so entails a major commitment by the Executive branch, Congress, and many others, but the costs of inaction are too horrible to contemplate.

Emergency first-responders are considered primarily responsible for minimizing the impact of NBC terrorist attacks on Americans. That being the case, it may be prudent to develop further the capabilities of local law enforcement, medical personnel, and disaster services to minimize the effects of NBC weapons. The Center for Disease Control, the Red Cross, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency could be mandated to develop specific contingency plans in the event that it would become Ònecessary to treat and/or quarantine significant portions of the population.Ó It would be wise to mandate Ònational requirements for stockpiling medical supplies that would be necessary in the event a significant NBC attack occurred.Ó For example, the current stock of smallpox vaccine Òwould protect only six or seven million people, while there is no extant capacity to manufacture a new vaccine.Ó The first-responders will make up the initial phase of domestic response and will undoubtedly have the greatest impact in detecting the presence of a CBW agent and treating victims during their Ògolden hour.Ó For this reason, it is essential first-responders receive the appropriate training that will enable them to identify the presence of NBC contamination and have the necessary equipment to respond to similar attacks. It would behoove U.S. officials who hold the responsibility of improving disaster response capabilities to focus more training and equipment on these first-responders. By improving NBC domestic preparedness, policy makers may be able to minimize the effects of NBC terrorism and warfare on U.S. civilian and military forces.

Recommendation: Improve cooperation between military, federal and local law enforcement agencies responsible for responding to NBC terrorist attacks.

Improving first-respondersÕ ability to absorb NBC terrorist attacks is crucial in order to manage losses and prevent further destruction. However, improving U.S. abilities to manage NBC crises and their consequences in addition to effective retaliatory capabilities will depend on the ability of federal agencies and military services to cooperate effectively with one another. In past training exercises such as Operation Mirage Gold, several interrelated problems have arisen that highlight the weaknesses of federal and military crisis response capabilities.

Lack of appropriate training and communication with other agencies can leave individual agency representatives ill-equipped to play a constructive role; poor advance planning and coordination leave roles, goals, and missions to be sorted out under crisis conditions, resulting in confusion, delays, and errors; ignorance about established roles and goals adds to these problems; interagency and intergovernmental rivalries impede cooperation, as well as the advance planning that could ease cooperation; and genuine conflicts between priorities have not been sorted out at the national level, and result in conflicts between agencies and levels of government that have differing objectives.

Mirage Gold was a simulated nuclear terrorist threat that was held in New Orleans to test the mettle of federal agencies response capabilities in October 1994. Official observers documented Òinherent conflict between the law enforcement and the emergency assistance missions,Ó in addition to an array of Òserious deficiencies in the involved agenciesÕ preparation for actual NBC incidents, particularly on the part of the FBI.Ó

In order to create an efficient counter-terrorism capability, the associated federal and military resources must be streamlined. Based on the effects of Operation Mirage Gold, it appears that the most effective way to minimize the deficiencies among federal and military counter-terror operations is to conduct regular Òfull-field exercises in realistic, challenging NBC scenarios, with independent observers to help record and analyze the results.Ó As weaknesses are identified, efforts can be made to reconfigure the crisis response architecture or realign priorities so interaction problems are alleviated before a real crisis arises. ÒFrequent exercises are an extremely important tool for improving the ability of disparate agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to cooperate effectively.Ó

Between the federal government and U.S. military branches, there is significant counter-terrorism architecture already in existence. For this reason, it is not necessary to create additional counter-terrorism agencies. Government officials must learn to exploit fully the capabilities that are currently in place. The existing architecture has sufficient resources to combat NBC terror as long as the military branches, federal agencies, and local law enforcement are able to perfect their crisis response capabilities.

NBC terrorism is uniquely tied to national security, law enforcement, and public health capabilities. The absence of inter-cooperation and centralized focus has created Ògaps in the overall counter-terrorism architecture.Ó Future efforts should attempt to bridge these gaps and bring together civilian and military intelligence to form a meticulous and comprehensive intelligence architecture.

Recommendation: Improve intelligence operations and capabilities so they are commensurate with the nature of NBC terrorism.

International cooperation in such intelligence-related areas as law enforcement, customs control, and intelligence activities is an important tool in combating international terrorism. The current intelligence-gathering agencies and techniques being employed need to be improved. U.S. officials depend on Òintelligence as the first line of defense against terrorism but gathering intelligence on terrorists is extremely arduous.Ó

The critical intelligence used to combat terror operations depends largely on human resources--covert agents, undercover cops, informants, and the like. Long before satellites and communications intercepts existed, there were covert operatives or spies that served as the main tools to intelligence gathering. A well-placed spy can provide crucial information regarding an adversaryÕs intentions, nuances, opposition, and motivations. Due to the surreptitious nature of terrorism, the acquisition of timely and reliable intelligence is essential if progress is expected to be made in the counter-terror field. With new flashpoints and sources of terrorism emerging throughout the world, additional resources should be allocated to areas that are responsible for human intelligence to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations.

International cooperation and multi-national sharing of information could be improved to establish an umbrella of protection and intelligence regarding NBC terrorism. Broader and more innovative measures may be considered in order to counter terrorist methods, which do not play by standard rules of engagement. The intelligence role in preventing NBC terrorism is complicated by state-sponsored terrorists and non-state actors, concealed weapons development, and unconventional deployments, all of which are hard to monitor and pre-empt.

Intelligence agencies may also want to consider utilizing more open resources found in the general public among reputable mediums. Although the credibility of some open sources may be suspect, some credible intelligence may be acquired from open source information. For example, private civil rights groups, such as the Anti-Defamation League and Klanwatch, maintain extensive files on extremist groups in the United States that include information on their foreign contacts. It was an open-source analyst working outside the government that predicted the Aum Shinrikyo subway attack. Future intelligence operations should be expanded to involve more open-source intelligence to monitor extremists, millennialists, and religious groups interested in acquiring NBC weapons.

Recommendation: Enhance current capabilities to detect the movement, storage, and production of NBC weapons and associated production materials.

Currently, there is no reliable technology available that allows the tracking of NBC weapons as they are being developed, weaponized, stored, or transported to and from targets or production areas. It is possible to detect these weapons once they have been disseminated. Post attack detection systems are not likely to prevent an NBC terror attack from occurring. Post attack detectors should be placed throughout the United States and at U.S. security interests abroad to identify a CBW attack as soon as possible. These detectors will also help determine the characteristics of the agents that have been used and the severity of an attack. Coinciding with anti-terrorism efforts, the DoD was recently planning on deploying a system of biological agent detectors at select U.S. military bases in South Korea and the Middle East. Similar efforts should be made to U.S. citizens within CONUS as well.

Despite ongoing efforts, the ability to detect NBC agents is inadequate. Truly effective counter-NBC terrorism operations require the technical capability to detect NBC operations as they are unfolding, not while Òexchanging business cards at the site of an attack.Ó Pre-attack detection methods will improve U.S. capabilities to track and trace NBC materials and weapons before they can pose a threat to U.S. interests. By increasing physical security and detection methods, these types of defenses may create an environment in which it is more difficult to carry out NBC attacks against the populace, possibly deterring terrorists from using CBW weapons.

Economically developed countries, such as the United States, are vulnerable to terrorist attack with NBC weapons and the potential for an NBC attack is more probable than commonly assumed--and growing. With the example set forth by the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack and recurring low profile CBW domestic terror attacks, current trends in terrorism, and weakening constraints against NBC capability, NBC terrorism is likely to have a more significant impact on future U.S. security interests.

Increased concern regarding the potential for NBC terrorism is warranted. There are many contributing factors to NBC terrorism such as the inadequate degree of security surrounding CBW weapons, nuclear weapons, weapons grade fissile material, and radioactive waste at various nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet Union. The surplus of Russian NBC weapons cannot be fully accounted for. Technology associated with the production of NBC weapons has proliferated to countries known to sponsor terrorism. Government officials believe the list of actors capable of using NBC terrorism is growing as terrorist groups are becoming capable of NBC acquisition and use, interested in causing mass casualties, and wanting to use NBC weapons for this purpose.

There is a strong probability that mass casualty NBC terror operations will be experienced in the next decade and trends in terrorism indicate the probability may be growing. The threat is relative to the ease with which NBC terror weapons may be acquired by terrorist organizations. If existing constraints continue to weaken, NBC terrorism is more likely to have a significant impact on U.S. national security. Furthermore, the success of one mass casualty NBC attack in the continental United States is likely to have profound consequences for U.S. interests. Aside from the onset of death and destruction, a mass casualty attack will have additional repercussions in the form of economic damage, environmental contamination, and possible loss of strategic position. If these attacks are successful against U.S. security interests, the United States should be prepared to absorb subsequent attacks by terrorists who previously felt they had a low-probability of success.

There are several reasons a terrorist organization might utilize NBC terror. Most obvious is perhaps the asymmetrical power relation that exists between third world countries and the United States. The United States is the most powerful nation in the world. Given this disparate power relationship, certain terrorist organizations or state-sponsors are likely to feel ÒsilentÓ NBC terrorism is an effective means of attacking U.S. security interests without risking subsequent annihilation. In the book, The Changing Role of Information Warfare, David Arquila describes the attractiveness of NBC terrorism as the following:

First, it appeals a s a weapon of the weak--a shadowy way to wage war by attacking asymmetrically to harm and try to defeat an ostensibly superior force. This has had particular appeal to ethno-nationalists, racist militias, religious fundamentalists, and other minorities who cannot match the military formations and firepower of their Òoppressors.Ó

Terrorists might also be attracted to NBC weapons due to the immense lethality inherent in the NBC agents or the potential for covert delivery of NBC weapons. Furthermore, chemical and biological weapons are inexpensive, difficult to detect, and easy to develop using simple machinery available in most industrial societies.

It may be impossible to determine which terrorist group will be most likely to initiate NBC terrorism. However, it can be assumed that the most significant NBC threats are likely to emerge from state-sponsored, non-state, or loosely affiliated terrorists with interests inimical to the United States. Although the State Department has created a list of state-sponsors and terrorist organizations that pose the highest terror threats to U.S. interests, this list is not exhaustive and NBC terrorism is not limited to these singled-out terrorist organizations or state-sponsors. In addition to these groups is the ÒNth terroristÓ who is also a potential source of NBC terrorism. For example, the Aum Shinrikyo cult was a relatively obscure terrorist group that developed and used chemical and biological agents for terrorist operations and was also attempting to obtain HEU from the Russians for a low-grade nuclear weapon.

Non-state violence appears to be growing more lethal: mass casualty terrorist attacks are becoming more frequent and the percentage of terrorist attacks that result in fatalities is increasing. The disincentives to NBC terrorism will continue to exist, but at the same time the number of terrorist organizations that might switch to NBC terrorism will continue to grow. These facts, in conjunction with the implications of one successful NBC attack in CONUS or against U.S. forces overseas, are the basis for the belief that the risk of NBC terrorism against the United States is rising, and that at present it is underestimated by U.S. leaders and government officials.

Technical constraints to NBC terrorism are difficult, but they are much less difficult than they were fifty years ago. More people are obtaining physics, biological and chemical engineering degrees today than ever before. The number of people in the United States receiving degrees in science and engineering fields more than doubled between 1966 and 1994. Education data on other countries indicate the same patterns. The level of knowledge available in high school and college courses is increasing from the level that was available decades ago. For example, the Òphysics that the Manhattan Project scientists discovered to make nuclear weapons possible is now standard curriculum for young physicists and engineers.Ó

In order to deter and respond to NBC terrorists effectively, future administrations should have a comprehensive national strategy for addressing NBC terrorism. Official policy for deterring NBC terrorism should include an enforceable counter-proliferation posture, military options involving assertive disarmament, continuous profiling of potential adversaries, tailoring U.S. military capabilities to specific threats, enhancing NBC domestic preparedness and intelligence operations, and strengthening alliances to deter regional proliferators from utilizing NBC terrorism. A deterrence strategy that would best accommodate American security interests involves a national strategy designed to respond flexibly to

terrorist threats as well as assertively disarm terrorist organizations with NBC weapons. This strategy would enhance U.S. abilities to deter, detect, and deny terrorists seeking to use NBC weapons against U.S. security interests. These policies are likely to deter terrorists by demonstrating the United States will act to defend its interests by any means necessary to prevent the acquisition and use of NBC weapons by terrorist organizations.

In general, there is no formula or fail-safe method to determine which agent will be used by terrorists. Due to the characteristics of each agent and terroristsÕ objectives, there are several factors that will determine the attractiveness of each NBC agent. Also, terroristÕs objectives vary and may not call for mass casualty attacks. Terrorists will decide to use either nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons based on the type of target, desired level of death and destruction, location, meteorological conditions, defenses against its NBC attack, ease of dissemination or detonation, susceptibility to detection and failure, intended results, and estimated repercussions for the attack(s).

Terrorism is not a problem that can be eliminated, but we hope it can be effectively restrained--an enduring task that will require superior intelligence, improved physical security, effective response in conjunction with effective policy, and an appropriate public attitude. As the DoD has indicated, terrorism is more than just the bomb and gun. It is a political and religious entity, often involving war between the two. The issue is further complicated when NBC weapons enter into the mix. An informed public, superior intelligence, deterrence and defense forces, assertive disarmament, modernized military forces, and an assured response are necessary to preserve U.S. security interests, deter terrorists, as well as save American lives. How well the United States steps up to meet this threat will determine the extent of the damage on U.S. security interests if and when NBC terrorism becomes a reality.

The probability of a terrorist sponsored NBC attack against U.S. territory, forces, or an ally is higher than commonly assumed, and the priorities of U.S. national security strategy should be realigned accordingly. NBC terrorism undermines AmericaÕs goals for the expansion of democracy, since terrorism relies on force to coerce the will of the people.

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Murphy, Kim. ÒRogue NationÕ or Terrorist Poses Serious Nuclear Threat, Perry Says; In Cairo, the Defense Secretary Expresses Fear that Weapons-control Programs in the Middle East Could be Unraveling.Ó Los Angeles Times 09 January 1995: A4.

ÒThe NBC Threat in 2025: Concepts and Strategies for Adversarial Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.Ó Center for Counterproliferation Research. Washington: National Defense University, February 1997.

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Peterson, Erik. World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh Seminar by The Duquesne Club. ÒFraming U.S. Foreign and Security Policies for the 21^st Century." December 1995: 1-8.

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Powell, Bill and Melinda Liu. ÒIf You Really Want to Worry, Think Loose Nukes.Ó Newsweek. Volume 131. Issue 21. (25 May 1998). 33.

Preston, Richard. ÒThe Bioweaponeers.Ó The New Yorker. 09 March 1998.

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Roos, John G. ÒThe Ultimate Nightmare.Ó Armed Forces Journal International October 1995: 67-68+

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ÒSuitcase Nukes.Ó MacLeanÕs. Volume 110. Issue 41. 13 October 1997. 40.

Sullivan, Brian. ÒInternational Organized Crime: A Growing National Security Threat.Ó Strategic Forum. Number 74. (May 1996). 1-6.

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ÒThe Ultimate NightmareÑSooner than Most People Expect, the United States May Face the Danger of Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Terrorism.Ó Armed Forces Journal International October 1995: 67+.

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Vegar, Jose. ÒTerrorismÕs New Breed: Are TodayÕs Terrorists More likely to use Chemical or Biological Weapons?Ó Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Volume 54. Issue 2. March/April 1998. 50-56.

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Whitney, Craig R. ÒPlutonium for Sale. Call 1-800-Terror.Ó New York Times 21 August 1994: 1+.

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Wright, Robin. ÒPresident Says He will Ban Trade with Iran.Ó Los Angeles Times 01 May 1995: A1.

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Zimmerman, Tim and Douglas Pasternak. ÒCritical Mass.Ó U.S. News and World Report. 17 April 1995: 39-44.

Internet

Center for Defense and International Security Studies. ÒDevils Brew in Details: Nuclear Weapons.Ó Last updated 29 January 1999. Available online at: www.cdiss.org/nw.htm (01 March 1999).

ÒChemical Weapons Treaty Takes Effect Without Russia.Ó CNN World News. 29 April 1997. <http://cnn.com/WORLD/9704/29/briefs.am/chemical.treaty/index.html>

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United Nations, ÒArticle 51: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,Ó United Nations Department of Public Information, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997). Also see UN Website at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm

United States. Department of the Army. Army Public Affairs Report--Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction. 01 May 1997. Information taken from U.S. Army News Release at: http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/May1997/r19970506wmdprep.html, (20 April 1998).

________. Department of Defense. Counterproliferation: Chemical-Biological Defense Annual Report. 24 February 1998. Available online at: www.acq.osd.mil/cp/cprc97.htm.

________. Message of the Secretary of Defense. Defense Link. 27 February 1998. <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/toc.html>

________. Testimony by Gordon C. Oehler 27 March 1996. ÒThe Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction.Ó CIA Publications. Available online at: www.odci.gov/cia/public/affairs/speeches/archives/1996/go_testimony_032796.htm (09 April 1998).

________. White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39. 21 June 1998. Office of the Press Secretary. Available at <http:www.fas.org/irg/offdocs/pdd39.htm>

ÒU.S. Takes Precautions against Chemical Terrorism at Home.Ó CNN U.S. News http://cnn.com/US/9802/15/chem.bio.training/index.html

Lectures

Cooper, Henry. ÒMissile Defense from SDI to ???Ó Lecture. Soutwest Missouri State University. 4 March 1999.

Crouch, J.D. ÒCuban Missile Crisis.Ó Lecture on International Security Politics. Southwest Missouri State University. Department of Defense & Strategic Studies, 02 December 1998.

Falkenrath, Richard. ÒTerrorism.Ó Lecture series at Southwest Missouri State University. 26 March 1999.

Graham, William. ÒNational Missile Defense.Ó Lecture. Defense & Strategic Studies. Southwest Missouri State University. 15 October 1998.

Rose, Gideon. ÒTerrorism.Ó Lecture series at Southwest Missouri State University. 29 January 1999.

Government Documents

United States. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington: GPO, 1994.

________. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington: GPO, 1995.

________. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington: GPO, 1996.

________. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington: GPO, 1997.

________. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington: GPO, 1998.

________. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ÒFact Sheet: Biological Weapons Convention: The Special Conference and Beyond.Ó Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 9 August 1994.

________. Central Intelligence Agency. ÒThe Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat.Ó Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998.

________. David Franz. U.S. Army, testimony before Joint Committee on Judiciary and Intelligence, U.S. Senate. 105^th Congress. 2^nd Session. 04 March 1998.

________. Defense Intelligence Agency. ÒWhat Does the Intelligence Community Know About Bin Laden?Ó Lecture. 10 July 1998.

________. Department of the Army. Chemical Warfare: Deterrence Through Strength. Washington: GPO, 1984.

________. Department of Defense Report to Congress. ÒDomestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.Ó Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1997.

________. Department of Health & Human Services. Proceedings of the Seminar on Responding to the Consequences of Chemical and Biological Terrorism. Bethesda: Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, 1996.

________. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Awareness of National Security Issues and Response: National Security Threat List. Washington: GPO, 1997.

________. Department of State. ÒCurrent Trends in Global Terrorism: Address: Address to the American Society for Industrial Security.Ó U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Volume 5. Issue 25. Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 7 June 1994.

________. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1996.

________. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1997.

________. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1998.

________. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1999.

________. Department of State. ÒReport of the Accountability Review Records: Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998.Ó Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 07 August 1998.

_______. Federal Emergency Management Agency, ÒAppendix A, Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan,Ó Federal Response Plan, FEMA 229, Chg. 11, April 1995.

________. Freeh, Louis J.. ÒThreats to US National Security.Ó Statements made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Washington, DC: 28 January 1998.

________. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights. U.S. Security Policy Towards Rogue regimes: Hearings, 28 July and 14 September 1993: 1994.

________. House. Committee on International Relations. North Korean Military and Nuclear Proliferation Threat: Evaluation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework: Joint Hearing, 23 February 1995, before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific. 104^th Congress, 1^st Session, 1995.

________. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense. U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Information Declassified. Reference Number: Number 024-96, Washington: GPO, 1996.

________. Office of the Press Secretary. ÒFact Sheet Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62.Ó Annapolis: Government Printing Office, 22 May 1998.

________. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. May 1994.

________. Office of Technology Assessment. The Effects of Nuclear War. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979.

________. Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

________. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures. Washington: GPO, 1997.

________. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Intelligence Briefing on Smuggling of Nuclear Material and the Role of International Crime Organizations, and on the Proliferation of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles: Hearing, 31 January 1995. 104^th Cong., 1^st sess., 1995.

________. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Threat of North Korean Nuclear Proliferation: Hearings, 25 November 1991-06 February 1992. 102^nd Cong., 1^st and 2^nd sess., S. hearing 102-635: 1991-1992.

________. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 104^th Cong., 1^st sess., 31 October and 01 November 1995.

________. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 104^th Congress, 2^nd sess., 13, 20, 22, and 27 March 1996.

________. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. Nuclear Terms: A Glossary. Oak Ridge: Technical Information Center, 1964.

---

Table Page

7. Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Events . . . . . .325

8. Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339

9. Non-State Actors, Mass Casualties, and
NBC Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .344

10. Responsibility for Counter-Terrorism . . . . . . .345

Table 3.--Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Events

Date of Event

17 March	Tanzanian police arrested one individual last week and seized a container of radioactive cesium.
9 March	Romanian police announced on 8 March that they are holding two individuals for attempting to sell stolen radioactive material, according to press reports. A police spokesman announced that two had in their possession 82 kg of radioactive material including low enriched uranium. Officials also reportedly found secret documents stolen from the Research and Design Center for Radioactive Metals.
4 March	UPDATE (12 February): According to press reports, Lithuanian officials have determined that the 100 kg of radioactive material seized last month from an armed gang is uranium-238. This material was stolen from a company responsible for maintenance at the nearby Ignalina nuclear power plant.
23 February	According to press reports, the Belarus Committee for State Security (KGB) seized five kilograms of cesium-133. The radioactive metal reportedly was sealed in glass containers. Belarus authorities are investigating the incident, according to press.
12 February	Lithuanian authorities announced they had arrested seven people and seized nearly 100 kg of radioactive material, according to press reports. The material, believed to be uranium, will undergo further tests to ascertain its makeup and origin. It was emitting 14,000 microroentgens per hour. Some reports stated the material was a component of a nuclear fuel assembly, which has been missing from the nearby Ignalina nuclear power plant for several years. The Ignalina plant manager claims the seized material is not nuclear fuel or equipment used at his facility.
1 February	Swiss federal prosecutors announced on 1 February the arrest of a Swiss citizen of Turkish descent for attempting to sell a sample of "slightly-enriched" uranium in Switzerland, according to press. Swiss authorities stated the individual claimed the sample was part of a larger cache still in Turkey. Turkish police using information from their Swiss counterparts, then arrested eight people and seized 1.128 kg of similar material. Press reports indicate the uranium was similar to that used in nuclear power plant fuel rods. Swiss authorities reportedly are conducting tests to determine the uranium's country of origin.
25 January	According to press reports, German authorities have charged a merchant and his lawyer with crimes stemming from their attempt to sell radioactive cesium to another merchant who was a police informant. The cesium reportedly was transported to Germany from Zaire on board a commercial airliner.
21 January	UPDATE (7 November 95): The German parliamentary commission investigating the 1994 plutonium smuggling incident, reportedly has uncovered German government documents indicating that the three smugglers offered to supply 11 kilograms of Russian-origin, weapons-grade plutonium, which they claimed was enough to build three nuclear weapons, according to press reports.
18 January	According to press reports, German authorities have charged a merchant and his lawyer with crimes stemming from their attempt to sell radioactive cesium-137 smuggled from Zaire to another merchant who was a police informant. The cesium reportedly was transported to Germany from Zaire on board a commercial airliner.
17 January	A Palestinian in Dubai, UAE has offered to sell three kilograms of reportedly Russian-origin red mercury to a Lebanese-American businessman, according to US diplomatic reporting.

28 December	According to press reports, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested nine members of a criminal organization in Novosibirsk and seized a quantity of radioactive material. The material was identified in press reports as "enriched" uranium-235. The material had been transported to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakstan. The ultimate destination may have been South Korea, accord ing to press reports.
2 December	UPDATE (9 Nov 95): According to Italian press reports, Italian prosecutors have arrested an individual, Roger D'Onofrio, with reported links to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian-American Mafia as part of their investigation of smuggling radioactive materials, money-laundering and arms trafficking. D'Onofrio, 72, reportedly has dual Italian and U.S. citizenship and retired from the CIA only two years ago. The ring he is alleged to have been part of is said to have been active from the early 1990s up to this year. Italian investigators reportedly suspect that D'Onofrio is the mastermind behind an international ring which laundered dirty money and smuggled gold, weapons, and radioactive material. His name also appears in another investigation into an arms smuggling operation between Italy and the Middle East, according to press reports. D'Onofrio was taken into preventive custody on charges of money laundering and acting as a broker in illegal currency dealing. According to press, the prosecutors had so far ascertained money laundering for over 2.5 billion dollars on behalf of secret service and organized crime sources with diplomats, the ruling families in Kuwait, Morocco and Zambia, bankers, prelates and others.
1 December	UPDATE (23 Novembers): According to US diplomats in Moscow, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) delivered an official statement to US officials regarding the radioactive material discovered in Izmailov park on 23 November. The container, which held cesium-137, posed no public health threat. Radiation levels of the cesium were between 10 to more than 50 millicurrie. The radioactive material may have been used as an instrument calibration source used in flaw detection equipment.
30 November	A former Greenpeace president revealed the organization had been offered a nuclear warhead by a disgruntled former Soviet officer keen to highlight lax security, according to press accounts. The former Greenpeace official stated in a recently published book that a Soviet officer with access to nuclear weapons offered Greenpeace an 800-kg nuclear Scud warhead for public display in Berlin. The offer was made shortly before 7 September 1991.
29 November	Russian security officials have recovered four containers with radioactive cesium, stolen from an industrial plant in the Urals and arrested the thieves, according to press reports. Federal Security Service (FSB) officers found the 90-kilogram (198-pound) containers in a shaft of an old mine, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. One of the alleged thieves, the Bakal mining plant's electrical engineer, had initially kept them at his vegetable garden but moved them to a safer place after the theft had been discovered, claimed security officials. Two officials of a local penitentiary were his accomplices, they further alleged. Each container held a capsule with cesium 137, a radioactive isotope used in geological research, as well as in medicine. The containers were similar to the one allegedly planted by Chechen rebels in a Moscow park.
23 November	Acting on a tip from Chechen separatist leader Basayev, Russian television reporters discovered a 32-kg container--reportedly holding cesium-137--in a Moscow park. The container was reportedly removed and turned over to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). FSB officials stated an official investigation was underway and no further comments would be made until the inquiry was completed, according to press reports. Television reports quote a highly placed FSB officer as stating, unofficially, that the object was a piece of a hospital x-ray machine. Basayev claimed earlier this month that several containers of radioactive material attached to explosive devices had been planted in Russia. In a television interview aired on 15 October, Russian Interior minister Kulikov stated the Chechen separatist leader, Basayev, might have radioactive waste or radioisotopes taken from the Budyonnovsk hospital seized by Chechen rebels last spring.
23 November	UPDATE (7 Nov 95): A German court sentenced Adolph Jaekle, a German businessman, to 5 1/2 years in prison for smuggling weapons grade plutonium into the country, according to press reports. Investigators made the first in a series of contraband plutonium seizures in Germany when they raided Jaekle's home, in the southern town of Tengen in May 1994, and found a lead cylinder containing 6.15 grams of plutonium 239. Jaekle had.plxeaded not guilty to the plutonium charge, arguing that he did not know what the substance was.
11 November	Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officials arrested two Lithuanian citizens in Smolensk for smuggling 10 kgs of "uranium-238" into Russia, according to Russian television reports. Three Russians also were arrested for attempting to sell the uranium. Both the Lithuanians and the Russians claimed that poverty had induced them to attempt to traffic smuggled nuclear materials. According to press accounts, Russian authorities stressed the material was not weapons grade and had no commercial or industrial uses.
9 November	Italian prosecutors reportedly have asked Spanish authorities for permission to question the Archbishop of Barcelona about his role in an international criminal syndicate involved in smuggling radioactive materials, according to Italian press accounts. Accusations against the Archbishop arose after Italian officials tapped a telephone conversation in which the Archbishop was named as playing a leading role in the criminal enterprise. Both the Archbishop and the Vatican have vehemently denied the accusations. The Spanish Justice ministry has characterized the Italian request as "not very well thought out." The Italian investigation grew out on an earlier probe into money laundering operations which reportedly uncovered information that a criminal enterprise involving a self-professed Italian intelligence official, was attempting to sell 7.5 kg osmium for $63,000 per gram, according to Italian press accounts.
7 November	During a search of a car at the Polish-Czech border, Polish Border Guards discovered 11 cigarette pack-size containers filled with strontium-90, according to press accounts. This incident is the first case in 1995 involving smuggling radioactive material through Poland.
7 November	UPDATE (10 Aug 94): Adolf Jaekle, accused of smuggling Russian-origin plutonium following a May 1994 raid on his home, denied any involvement in nuclear smuggling, according to press reports. Jaekle insisted the container of plutonium was planted at his home and the container was not the same one he took from a Swiss associate for metal reprocessing.
7 November	Iranian press reports indicate the Iranian law enforcement authorities have arrested five Iranians and seized nine packets of uranium in Tehran and two other cities. No details were released regarding amount of material or whether it was enriched or not.
25 October	The cleaning staff at Moscow's Sheremetyevo 2 airport found a small lead container packed with radioactive substances in the men's restrooms, according to press reports. Experts reportedly are attempting to determine the exact composition of the three sources of ionizing radiation found in the container. The speculation, in the Russian press, was that a nuclear smuggler lost his nerve and abandoned the material during an aborted smuggling attempt.
19 October	UPDATE (10 Aug 94): According to a 19 October article in Der Stern, nuclear weapons smugglers involved in transporting Russian-origin plutonium into Germany in August 1994 have stored eight to ten kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium in Berlin. The article also implicates highly placed Russians in the smuggling activity.
14 October	Russian mafia figures reportedly were behind the 1993 theft of radioactive beryllium from a Russian nuclear laboratory and the failed attempt to sell the material in the West, according to press reports. The theft, which was widely reported in 1993, was seized by police in Lithuania and remains today in the bank vault where it was first discovered. According to press, the smugglers were preparing to sell the beryllium to an Austrian middleman who in turn had a mystery buyer who reportedly was willing to pay as much as $24 million for the material. The buyer, although never identified, was said to be Korean. Beryllium, which is used in missile guidance systems, is a highly efficient neutron reflector, according to public statements by nuclear scientists.
10 October	Russian authorities claim there have been no identified incidents in which weapons-grade radioactive material has been smuggled out of Russia, according to press reports. In a press conference, Russian General Terekhov of the Interior Ministry, stated that of the 16 cases involving theft of radioactive materials, none could have been used to make nuclear weapons. He also ruled out any involvement by Russian organized criminal organizations in the thefts. The general claimed the thefts were spontaneous actions by individuals working at nuclear facilities. The Russian officials concluded the press conference by stating there is no black-market in nuclear materials.
1 September	According to press reports, Bulgarian police had broken an international nuclear smuggling ring composed of Russians and Ukrainians. Police spokesmen, declining to disclose details said only that the materials seized were of strategic value and included rare metals. The arrests were the culmination of a year-long undercover operation. Senior policy officials commented they were still investigating the final destination of the materials, some of which were radioactive.
15 June	Press reports indicate that so far in 1995 Romanian authorities have seized 24 Kgs of uranium powder and tablets and 1994 they arrested 24 people for involvement in nuclear smuggling and seized 10.35 Kgs of uranium powder and tablets. From 1989 to 1993, the Romanians reportedly broke up five gangs, arrested 50 people, and seized 230 Kgs of nuclear material.
13 April	Slovak police culminated a long investigation with the discovery of 18.39 kg of nuclear material, 17.5 kg of which apparently is U-238, in a car stopped near Poprad in eastern Slovakia. Altogether, three Hungarians, four Slovaks, and two Ukrainians were arrested. This gang was connected to three other nuclear material smuggling incidents.
5 April	Four brass containers weighing 2 kilos each containing radioactive americium-241 and cesium-137 were stolen from a storeroom of isotopes in Wroclaw, Poland.
4 April	Press reports that 6-kg of U-235, U-238, radium, and palladium were found in a Kiev apartment. Occupants were ex-army, a lieutenant colonel and a warrant officer, and the material reportedly came from Russia.
2 April	Documents recovered by Japanese police in the investigation of Aum Shinrikyo involvement in the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack reportedly indicated that the terrorists were collecting information on uranium enrichment and laser beam technologies. A spokesman for Russia's prestigious nuclear physics laboratory, Kurchatov Institute, acknowledged that at least one Aum Shinrikyo follower was working at the institute.
14 March	Polish police in Bielska-Biala province arrested a man for possession of uranium.
8 March	Italian police arrested one Nicola Todesco for murder in a plutonium smuggling case gone awry when the murder victim did not have the money to pay for a quantity of plutonium smuggled out of Bulgaria. Todesco claimed he threw 5g of plutonium into the Adige river, but no trace of it was found after an extensive search. (Comment: Although an official Italian spokesman believed the plutonium was "enriched for military use," it had not been analyzed and may be another scam involving 'plutonium screws' from smoke detectors.
25 January	According to Talinn news broadcasts, Lithuanian border police, using U.S.-supplied stationary radiation detectors, seized two tons of radioactive wolfram hidden in a secret compartment in a truck trailer. (The "wolfram" is tungsten, which has a short half-life, and probably was "infected" by a radioactive contaminant.) The incident occurred at the Lithuanian-Belarus border, and the truck's owner and two other men were arrested. A similar incident occurred a week earlier at another border post but no details are available.

---------- 1994 ----------

14 December	Czech police seized 2.72 kg of material--later identified as 87.7 percent enriched U-235--in Prague; this is the largest recorded seizure of such material. Police arrested a Czech nuclear physicist and two citizens of the Former Soviet Union. The uranium apparently came from the FSU and was to be smuggled to Western Europe.
10 December	Press reporting indicates Hungarian border guards seized 1.7 kg of uranium and arrested four Slovak citizens. The material (depleted uranium and reactor fuel grade) reportedly was concealed in a fruit jar and was to be smuggled into Austria.
6 December	In a long article in Pravda, it was reported that three staffers of the Institute of Nuclear Physics were convicted of stealing 4.5 kg of uranium.
10 November	Press reporting indicates Hungarian police discovered 26 kg of radioactive material in the trunk of a car. Three suspects were subsequently arrested.
November	Press reporting indicates German police seized 1 milligram of cesium-137 in early November and arrested two suspects.
19 October	Press reporting indicates Turkish police arrested an Azeri national trying to sell 750g of uranium.
17 October	Press reporting indicates Russian authorities seized 27 kg of U-238, an unknown quantity of U-235 and detained 12 members of a criminal gang.
October	Press reporting indicates that in mid-October, four Indian villagers were arrested attempting to sell 2.5 kg of yellowcake, i.e. uranium extracted from ore.
13 October	Press reporting indicates Bulgarian officials seized four lead capsules suspected of containing radioactive material. The capsules were found on a bus enroute to Turkey and police detained the two bus drivers.
10 October	Press reporting indicates Romanian authorities arrested seven people and seized 7 kg of uranium and an unidentified quantity of strontium or cesium.
01 October	Press reporting indicates Romanian police arrested four people trying to sell over 4 kg of U-235 and U-238.
October	Press reporting dated 26 October indicates Russian authorities arrested three men trying to pass 67 kg of U-238 to unidentified individuals in the city of Pskov.
28 September	Press reporting indicates that a container with radioactive substances was found on a street in Tallinn.
28 September	Romanian authorities arrested several individuals who were attempting to sell 4.55 kg of uranium tetrachloride (61.9 percent uranium) for $25 thousand per kg, according to press reports
28 September	Press reporting indicates Slovak officials arrested four Slovaks trying to smuggle almost 1 kg of U-235 (judged not to be weapons-grade) into Hungary.
26 September	Press reporting indicates the discovery of a glass flask containing unspecified "weak radioactive material" at the Wetzlar railroad station in Germany.
September	A Pole tried to sell 1 kg of U-235/238 in Germany. A German court subsequently sentenced him to two and a half years in prison for trading in radioactive uranium.
11 September	Press reports indicate German police arrested a Zairian national attempting to smuggle 850 g of uraninite into Germany.
07 September	Press reports indicate Russian police arrested three people in Glazov trying to sell 100 kg of U-238.
05 September	Press reports indicate Bulgarian authorities arrested six Bulgarians and seized 19 containers of radioactive material.
30 August	Press reports indicate thieves broke into a chemical plant in Tambov and stole 4.5 g of cesium 137.
29 August	Press reports indicate Hungarian police arrested two men and seized 4.4 kg of material believed to be fuel rods from a reactor in Russia.
20 August	Press reports Russian authorities arrested two men attempting to steal 9.5 kg of uranium 238 from the Arzamas-16 nuclear weapons research facility.
18 August	Press reports indicate Estonian police arrested a man and seized 3 kg of U-238 he had buried under his garage. According to press
	reporting, about 100 uranium-contaminated drums were stolen from South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation plant in Pelindaba, Transvaal.
12 August	Press reports indicate that St. Petersburg police arrested three men trying to sell 60 kg of unidentified nuclear material.
12 August	Press reports indicate German police in Bremen arrested a German who claimed to have 2 g of plutonium; the sample contained only minute amounts of legally obtainable plutonium.
10 August	Press report indicates that over 500g of nuclear material were seized at Munich airport. The trial began on 10 May 1995 of two men for possession of 363g (12.8 ounces) of weapons-grade plutonium-239.
August	Unconfirmed press report says 3kg of enriched uranium were seized in August in southwestern Romania.
July	Press reporting dated 19 July indicates Turkish National Police arrested seven Turks and seized 12 kg of weapons-grade uranium.
July	According to 6 July press reporting, Russian authorities in Shezninks discover 5.5 kgs of U-238 previously stolen from the Chelyabinsk-65 nuclear facility.
July	According to a 2 November press report, police in Timisoara, Romania, arrested five Romanians trying to sell 2.6 kg of Russian uranium.
13 June	Press reporting indicates a seizure of 0.8g of uranium 235 (enriched to 88%) occurred in Landshut, Germany.
June	According to 6 June press reporting, Russian security official announce the arrest of three Russians in St. Petersburg who allegedly tried to sell 3.5 kg of HEU.
June	According to an 8 July press report, Russian authorities arrested three officers from the Northern Fleet accused of having stolen 4.5 kgs of U-238 from their base in Nov 93.
June	According to a 2 November press report, police in Pitesti, Romania, arrested three Romanians trying to sell 3 kg of uranium tablets.
May	According to 30 July press reporting, 56 g of material, including 6 g of plutonium 239, were seized and Adolf Jaekle, a German citizen, was arrested in Germany in May.

---------- 1993 ----------

November

In a case stemming from an incident in November 1993 in which a Russian naval officer stole 4 kg of 20 percent enriched U 235 nuclear fuel rods from a poorly guarded area at Severomorsk, a Russian court found the officer guilty but gave him a suspended sentence because he admitted the act. Two accomplices were sentenced to three years at a labor camp.

Source: ÒThe Continuing Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction,Ó The Nonproliferation Center, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1996), 20-31.
___________________________________________________________

Table 4.--Biological Weapons

BIOLOGICAL WEAPON

SYMPTOMS

LETHALITY

INCUBATION PERIOD

BACTERIA

Anthrax	Sores or blisters form on hands and forearms; non-specific chest cold symptoms followed by respiratory distress, fever, shock, or death Death results from pneumonia, systemic infection, and organ failure	Death usually occurs within 24 hours of acute phase onset. Fatality rate for untreated pulmonary anthrax is over 90 percent High priority for biological warfare	2 to 7 days, most cases within 48 hours
Glanders	Skin abrasions, causing large lesions, and ulcers in skin, mucous membrane and viscera tissues. Chronic glanders affects the joints and muscles with ulcerated, pus-forming lesions	Almost all untreated cases are fatal and lethality for chronic cases ranges from 50 to 70 percent	3 to 5 days
Brucellosis	Prolonged fever, headaches, profuse sweating, chills, pain in joints and muscles, fatique	Fatality rate averages around 2 percent	1 to 3 weeks, sometimes months
Tularemia	Sudden onset of chills, fever, headaches, profuse sweating, chills, pain in joints and muscles, fatigue	This bacterium is 60 percent fatal and is 100 percent fatal if left untreated.	2 to 10 days, average being 3 days
Plague	High fever, headaches, general aches, extreme weakness, glandular swelling, pneumonia, hemorrhages in skin and mucous membranes possible, extreme lymph node pain.	This disease only lasts for 1 to 2 days before death occurs High priority for biological warfare	Bubonic: 2 to 6 days, unvaccinated; few days longer, vaccinated Pneumonic: 1 to 6 days
Cholera	Acute infectious gastrointestinal disease, vomiting, diarrhea, rapid loss of fluids, severe muscular cramps, and collapse.	Cholera is fatal in 3 to 30 percent of treated cases and 50 to 80 percent in untreated cases.	1 to 5 days, with 3 days in the average
Typhoid Fever	Dull frontal headache, fever, rose colored spots on skin, constipation or diarrhea, abdominal tenderness	Recoverable	3 to 60 days depending on dose, usually 10 to 14 days

RICKETTSIA

Q Fever	Sudden onset of fever, headache, chills, weakness, profuse perspiration, upper respiratory problems, mild coughing; chest, muscle and joint pain	Recoverable	2 to 3 weeks depending on infecting dose
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever	Fever, chills, headache pain in joints and muscles, skin rash spreads rapidly on third and fourth day from ankle and wrist to legs , arms, and chest; neurological abnormalities extremely prominent	Recoverable	3 to 14 days
Typhus	Headache, high fever, general aches and pains, chills, rash		6 to 14 days, usually 12 days

VIRAL

Ebola	Sudden onset of fever, weakness, muscle pain, headache and sore throat. This is followed by vomiting, diarrhea, rash, limited kidney and liver functions, and both internal and external bleeding. The hemorraghic symptoms begin on the fifth day.	Fatalities occur in about 50 to 90 percent of all cases High priority for biological warfare	2 to 21 days
Encaphilitis	Headache, fever dizziness, drowsiness or stupor, tremors or convulsion, severe prostration, occasional paralysis, muscular coordination	No information available	2 to 15 days
Small Pox	Severe fever, small blisters on the skin, bleeding of skin and mucous membranes	Full recovery if treated	7 to 17 days with 10 to 12 days before onset of illness, 2 to 4 days more to onset of rash
Dengue Fever	Grades of severity, hemorraghic fever, chills, intense headache, backache, excruciating joint and muscular point, weakness, prostration, irregular rash, loss of appetite and constipation, abdominal discomfort with colicky pains and tenderness, spontaneous bleeding in to the skin, gums, and gastrointestinal tract, circulatory failure, profound shock with no blood pressure	Low priority for biological warfare	3 to 15 days, usually 5 to 8 days
Yellow Fever	Range from very mild to malignant, sudden onset of chills, fever, prostration, headache, backache, muscular pain, congestion of mucous membranes, nausea, vomiting, jaundice from liver damage, bleeding from stomach and gums, black vomitus	Within 2 weeks, victim either dies or makes full recovery High priority for biological warfare	3 to 6 days, rarely longer
Rift Valley Fever	Headache, general aches and pains, nausea, vomiting, photophobia	No information available	3 to 12 days

TOXINS

Ricin	About 3 hours after inhaling ricin, the likely symptoms are coughing, tightness of the chest, difficulty breathing, nausea and muscle aches. This progresses to respiratory duress, and death within 36 to 48 hours	Death results from at least 60 percent of those infected.	As fast as 5 minutes to 1 hour; otherwise 1 to 12 hours
Botulinum	First symptoms are drooping eyelids, dry mouth and throat, difficulty talking and swallowing, blurred and double vision. Paralysis starting from face and progressing downward into chest musclesÑresulting in asphyxia	Death usually occurs within 24 to 48 hours. Fatal in 60 percent of cases because of muscle paralysis and respiratory failure Stable but inpersistent; stable 7 days in water, 12 hours in air; destroyed by bases or boiling 15 minutes	1 to 12 hours

Source: Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy CBR Defense/U.S. Marine Corps NBC Defense Handbook, April 1995. See also Javed Ali, Leslie Rodrigues, and Michael Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, (Alexandria, VA: JaneÕs Information Group Press, 1997), 93-94. ___________________________________________________________

Source: Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer, AmericaÕs AchillesÕ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998): 169.

Table 6.--Responsibility for Counter-Terrorism

Source: Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer, AmericaÕs AchillesÕ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998): 271-272.

2Walter Laqueur, ÒPostmodern Terrorism,Ó Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Issue 5, (September/October 1996): 24.

3Peter Probst, ÒHow Can We Tackle TomorrowÕs Terrorists?Ó Security Management, Volume 40, Issue 1, (January 1996): 102.

4United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1998): 1.

5Peter Probst, ÒHow Can We Tackle TomorrowÕs Terrorists?Ó, 102.

6Richard P. Hallion, Air Power Confronts an Unstable World, (Washington: BrasseyÕs, 1986): 9.

7Sam Nunn, ÒThe New Terror: Nutcakes with Nukes,Ó New Perspectives Quarterly, Volume 13, Issue 1, (Winter 1996): 32. See definition of UWMD in beginning of chapter 1.

8Ibid, 32.

9Richard A. Falkenrath, ÒConfronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism,Ó Survival, Volume 40, #3, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Autumn 1998): 43.

10Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1997): 32.
11Gregori Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, was assassinated after being injected with a sarin-filled pellet that slowly poisoned him to death.

12Chemical and biological agents can be transported as any other hazardous chemical. Special preparations may be made to transport small quantities that are best suited for terrorist operations, such as roof-top sprayers, or spray cans filled with agent. Nuclear weapons are more difficult to transport because they are likely to be heavy and awkward. However, certain specially engineered nuclear weapons such as Òsuitcase nukesÓ or Òspecial atomic demolition munitionsÓ may be ideal for terrorist operations. See section on nuclear terror weapons and dissemination methods.

13Purportedly, chemical and biological production and dissemination directions are accessible through such channels as the Internet, unclassified government documents, and are innate in advanced agrarian societies due to the dual-use nature of these agents. Nuclear weapons are allegedly becoming more available to consumers because of the demise of the Soviet Union and weakened nuclear constraints. See chapter three.

14Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, AmericaÕs AchillesÕ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1998): 1.

15Ibid, 43.

16James R. Woolsey, conference, ÒThe 1997 Sam Nunn Policy Forum,Ó Athens, GA: 28 April 1997.

17George J. Tenet, personal interview, 29 July 1998.

18Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, (Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., February 1984): vii.

19Office of the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, Preface to the Defense Science BoardÕs 1997 Summer Task Force Final Report, October 1997.
20Joseph Douglass, Jr. and Neil C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987): 2.
21United States, Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States: 1995, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995): ii.
22This definition is an assemblage of the authorÕs definition and outside sources that attempt to define terrorism. See James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, (Seminole, FL: Interact Press, 1997): 7.

23United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ÒTerrorism in the United States, 1995,Ó (Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center: National Security Division, 1995): ii.
24Gail Bass and Brian Jenkins, ÒA Review of Recent Trends in International Terrorism and Nuclear Incidents Abroad,Ó RAND. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1983): 2.

25James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, (Seminole, FL: Interact Press, 1997): 7.

26Jeffrey D. Simon, ÒTerrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons,Ó RAND, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, December 1989): 5.
27United States, Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1997): 76.

28Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 214-215.

29Louis J. Freeh, ÒThreats to US National Security,Ó Statements made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC: 28 January 1998.

30United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1997): 1.

31 United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1999): 1.

32United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, 1.

33Jose Vegar, ÒTerrorismÕs New Breed: Are TodayÕs Terrorists More likely to use Chemical or Biological Weapons?Ó Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 54, Issue 2, (March/April 1998): 51.

34Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 214.

35It is important to mention that the World Trade Center bombers attempted to cause mass casualties by disseminating a chemical weapon in their bomb. Fortunately, their attempt to disseminate the nerve agent in the blast failed. The nerve agent, sodium cyanide, incinerated in the blast rather than aerosolizing, which would have caused it to rise throughout the building with the smoke.

36Nonproliferation Center, ÒThe Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat,Ó (Washington, DC: National Defense University, March 1996): 6.

37United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ÒTerrorism in the United States, 1995,Ó 1.

38William J. Perry, Report to the President: The Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 September 1996): 1.

39David G. Kibble, 98.

40United States, U.S. Department of State, Factsheet: Bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 07 August 1998).

41Daniel Schorr, ÒFacing TerrorismÕs Reach,Ó Christian Science Monitor, Volume 88, Issue 159, (12 July 1996): 15.
42John Miller, interview, 24 December 1998.
43ÒReducing the Threat of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism,Ó prepared testimony of Donald D. Cobb, Director Nonproliferation and International Security Programs and Walter L. Kirchner, Director of Defense Programs, 13 March 1996, to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate.

44Leonard A. Cole, The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare, (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1997): 90.

45John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, ÒThe Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences,Ó (London: Methuen, 1989): 244.

46United States, Annual Report to the President and Congress, April 1997, 76.

47Testimony of John Deutch, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, before the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 20 March 1996. Also see Rodney W. Jones, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 5.

48ÒChemical and Biological Terrorism,Ó JaneÕs Defence Weekly, 14 August 1996, 16.

49William R. Van Cleave, ÒThe Future Role of the U.S. in the International System,Ó International Security Seminar, Lecture, Kiel Germany, 29 July 1993, 15-16.

50Richard Lugar, ÒClear and Present Danger,Ó Harvard International Review, Volume 18, Issue 4, (Fall 1996): 30.

51William H. Webster, The Nuclear Black Market, (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998): 19.

52Abt Clark, ÒConfronting the Nuclear Threat,Ó Technology Review, Volume 99, Issue 5, (July 1996): 1C.

53Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ÒFuel Rods Theft Blamed on Lax Naval Security,Ó Izvestiya, 12 May 1995, 31.

54Judith Miller and William Broad, ÒDollar is Weapon of Choice in War on Bacterial Perils,Ó New York Times, (08 December 1998): 1.

55Jonathan B. Tucker, ÒUnderstanding CB Terrorism,Ó Brad Roberts, eds., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997): 97.
56Ibid.

57Weapons-usable materials are located in nearly 100 facilities in the FSU, mostly in Russia--weapons material production facilities, weapons research and manufacturing facilities, nuclear power research facilities, nuclear fuel production and fabrication facilities, and naval fuel fabrication and storage facilities. See William H. Webster, The Nuclear Black Market, 20.

58Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, (Cambridge, MA: The Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996): 21.
59Ibid.

60Ibid.
61Robert Joseph and Barry Blechman, ÒDeterring Chemical and Biological Weapons,Ó eds. Hans Binnendijk and James Goodby, Transforming Nuclear Deterrence, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997): 7.

62Paul Klebnikov, ÒRussian Nukes for Sale,Ó Forbes, Volume 160, Issue 12, (01 December 1997): 264.

63A breeder reactor is a reactor that produces more fissionable fuel than it consumes. The new fissionable material is created by capture in fertile materials of neutrons from fission. See United States, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Nuclear Terms: A Glossary, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1964): 7.

64Bill Powell and Melinda Liu, ÒIf You Really Want to Worry, Think Loose Nukes,Ó Newsweek, Volume 131, Issue 21, (25 May 1998): 33.

65William R. Van Cleave, ÒThe Future Role of the U.S. in the International System,Ó 15-16.

66John Sopko, ÒThe Changing Proliferation Threat,Ó Foreign Policy, Issue 105, (Winter 1996/1997): 1.

67United States, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Nuclear Terms: A Glossary, (Oak Ridge, TN: Technical Information Center, 1964): 31.

68ÒThe Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction,Ó Nonproliferation Center, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1996): 3.

69Paul Klebnikov, 267.

70Tom Wilkie, ÒTerrorists and the Bomb,Ó World Press Review, Volume 43, Issue 9, (September 1996): 1.
71Karl-Heinz Kamp, ÒÕLoose NukesÕ: A Distant But Still Critical Threat,Ó Christian Science Monitor, Volume 88, Issue 185, (19 August 1996): 19.

72Gordon C. Oehler, The Continuing Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: The Nonproliferation Center, March 1996): 27.

73ÒNuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report: Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union,Ó A Cooperative Project of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Number 2 (December 1994): 39-58.
74Richard Lugar, 31.

75Alexander Bolsunovsky and Valery Menshchikov, ÒNuclear Security is Inadequate and Outdated,Ó The Monitor: Nonproliferation , Demilitarization, and Arms Control, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia, February 1995): 1-2. Also see Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, 23.

76Richard Lugar, 31.

77The term, Nth terrorist, is used to describe unknown terrorist groups that currently do not exist or are not acknowledged and that may eventually emerge as an NBC terror threat.
78Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 214-215.

79The characteristics that may attract terrorists to NBC weapons are explained later in chapter three.

80Yonah Alexander, ÒContemporary Terrorism,Ó National Forum, Volume 72, Issue 4, (Fall 1992): 33.
81Louis J. Freeh, ÒThreats to U.S. National Security,Ó Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 28 January 1998): 7.

82Yonah Alexander, ÒContemporary Terrorism,Ó 33.

83James K. Campbell, 104.

84Ibid, 124.

85Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism, (United Kingdom: JaneÕs Information Group Limited, September 1997).
86Ibid.

87Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, (Massachusetts: Brown and Company, 1977): 12.

88John Baylis and N.J. Rengger, Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): 231.

89James K. Campbell, 42.

90Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak, ÒWhy HavenÕt Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?Ó Armed Forces Journal, (April 1998): 17.

91James K. Campbell, 33.

92Stephen Sloan, ÒTerrorism: How Vulnerable is the United States?Ó Eds, Stephen Pelletiere, Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front, (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, May 1995):5.

93United States, Annual Report to the President and Congress, April 1997, 76.

94David Ronfeldt and William Slater, The Mindset of High Technology Terrorists: Future Implications From an Historical Analogy, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1981): 25-31. Also see James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, (Seminole, FL: Interact Press, 1997): 42.

95Brad Roberts, ÒTerrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Has the Taboo Been Broken?Ó Politics and the Life Sciences Volume 15, Number 2 (September 1996): 216. Also see Kathleen Ann Teitel, The Bioterrorist Threat to the United States and Israel (Springfield, MO: Southwest Missouri State University, 1997): 63-64.

96Covert NBC terrorism may be the only means by which political terrorists may act without loosing credibility in the eyes of the public, international supporters, and foreign governments. Even then, responsibility for an NBC attack is likely to be determined after some time so NBC terrorism may not be appropriate for the needs of some political terrorists. Ibid, 61.

97Kathleen Ann Teitel, 59.

98Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998): 87.
99Brian Michael Jenkins, ÒStriking Home: The Terrorist Threat on AmericaÕs Doorstep,Ó The TVI Report, Volume 12, Number 3, (1996): 25.

100Kathleen Anne Teitel, 66.

101Numbers of active, identifiable terrorist groups from 1968 to the present are derived from the RAND--St. Andrews University Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents. Also see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 90.

102The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, was responsible for three incidents (which killed a total of fifty six people); the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front for two (killing thirty seven people); a Saudi Arabian dissident group for two (causing thirty deaths); the Egyptian al-GamaÕa al-Islamiya for one (eighteen deaths); unspecified Kashmiri rebels for another incident (where eight persons died); and the Turkish Islamic Jihadfor the remaining one (in which seventeen people died). Ibid, 90.

103Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Aznini, and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999): 17.

104Ibid.
105Ibid.

106Kathleen Ann Teitel, 66.

107Bruce Hoffman, ÒFuture Trends in Terrorist Targeting and Tactics,Ó Special Warfare, Volume 6, Number 3, (July 1993): 32.
108Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 88.

109Bruce Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993): 2.
110Adel S. Elias, ÒSpeaking Out for Terror,Ó World Press Review, Volume 45, Number 1, (January 1988): 47-48.

111In the past, authors have argued that terrorists are constrained by the fear of retaliation, which would lead to the annihilation of their cause, sponsors and possibly their existence.

112Joel Greenberg, ÒA Bloody Ticket to Paradise,Ó International Herald Tribune, 26 January 1995, A5.

113Adel S. Elias, ÒSpeaking Out for Terror,Ó 47-48.

114John Kifner, ÒIsraelis Investigate Far Right; May Crack Down on Speech,Ó New York Times, 8 November 1995.
115Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 92.

116Ian OÕ Lesser, et al, Countering the New Terrorism, 19.

117Bruce Hoffman and Donna Kim Hoffman, ÒChronology of International Terrorism 1995,Ó Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 8, number 3, (Autumn 1996): 87-127.

118Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996): 28.

119John Miller, ÒUsama Bin Ladin: Americans are Paper Soldiers,Ó Middle East Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 4, (December 1998): 76.

120James K. Campbell, 41.

121Norman Cohen, The Pursuit of the Millennium, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970): 19-61. Also see James K. Campbell, 41.

122Norman Cohen, ÒMedieval Millennarism: its Bearing on the Comparitive Study of Millennarian Movements,Ó in Sylvia Thrupp ed., Millennial Dreams in Action: Studies in Revolutionary Religious Movements, (New York: Schocken Books, 1970): 31. Also see Kathleen Ann Teitel, The Bioterrorist Threat to the United States and Israel, (Springfield, MO: Southwest Missouri State University, 1997): 70.

123Kathleen Ann Teitel, 70.

124Ibid.

125Richard Falkenrath, ÒTerrorism,Ó Lecture series at Southwest Missouri State University, 26 March 1999.
126J. Coats, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987): 23-36. Also see James K. Campbell, 106.

127Ibid, 13.

128Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, (London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1995): 186.

129James K. Campbell, 105.

130The Posse Comitatus movement was opposed to the U.S. federal system, including state and federal taxes, the primacy of federal courts and the Federal Reserve Bank. It was founded by American neo-Nazi Mike Beach in 1969. The movement was primarily anti-Semitic and and white supremacist. The name of the organization translates from Latin as ÒThe power of the county.Ó See Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons Jr., and Gregory E.J. Scott, Almanac of Modern Terrorism, (New York: Facts on File, 1991): 206.

131Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre DF Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism.

132Ibid.

133Louis J. Freeh, 28 January 1998.
134United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ÒTerrorism in the United States, 1996,Ó (Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center: National Security Division, 1996): 17.

135Louis J. Freeh, 28 January 1998.

136The following are examples of CBW terrorism among right-wing terrorists, each example provided is from different sources and each taken from James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, 104.

137John George and Laird Wilcox, American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists, & Others, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996): 242.

138Richard C. Clark, Technological Terrorism, (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair Company, 1980): 111.

139Ron Purver, ÒChemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to Open Literature,Ó report, Canadian Scuity Intelligence Service, June 1995. Also see James K. Campbell, 105.

140Morris Dees, ÒFalse Patriots: The Threat of Antigovernment Extremists,Ó report, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL: 1996. Also see Ibid, 105.

141Ibid, 32.

142John Sopko, 5.

143Ibid.

144David E. Kaplan, ÒTerrorismÕs Next Wave: Nerve Gas and Germs are the New Weapons of Choice,Ó U.S. News and World Report, Volume 123, Number 19, (17 November 1997): 27.
145James K. Campbell, 42.

146Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak, 17.

147Brown, Michael E., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996): 4-7. Also see Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 201.

148 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, AmericaÕs AchillesÕ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, 201.
149Ibid, 202.

150Javed Ali, Leslie Rodrigues, and Michael Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, 28.

151These cases are described in chapter two.

152Louis J. Freeh, ÒThreats to U.S. National Security,Ó Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 28 January 1998): 4.

153United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ÒTerrorism in the United States, 1996,Ó 18.

154Stefan Leader, ÒThe Rise of Terrorism,Ó Security Management, Volume 41, Issue 4, (April 1997): 34-40.

155Raphael F. Perl, 4.

156David Kibble, ÒResponding to Two-Dimensional Terrorism,Ó Proceedings, Volume 125, (March 1999): 98.

157The Taliban are the ruling majority of Afghanistan. They have a radical Sunni Islam affiliation and aim to establish an ethnic Pashtun, radical Sunni Islamic regime across the whole of Afghanistan. For profile on the Taliban, see Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre DF Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism, (United Kingdom: JaneÕs Information Group Limited, September 1997): Taliban. Also see United States, Defense Intelligence Agency, ÒWhat Does the Intelligence Community Know About Osama Bin Laden?,Ó Notes taken from discussion with senior intelligence officials. (Washington, DC: DoD, 10 July 1998).

158Ibid.

159Kenneth Katzman, 49.

160United States, Defense Intelligence Agency, ÒWhat Does the Intelligence Community Know About Osama Bin Laden?,Ó Notes taken from discussion with senior intelligence officials. (Washington, DC: DoD, 10 July 1998).
161David Kibble, 99.

162United States, Defense Intelligence Agency, ÒWhat Does the Intelligence Community Know About Osama Bin Laden?,Ó 10 July 1998.

163John Miller, interview, ABC News: World News Tonight, 24 December 1998.
164United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, 64.

165United States, Defense Intelligence Agency, ÒWhat Does the Intelligence Community Know About Osama Bin Laden?,Ó 10 July 1998.

166Comments taken from discussion with member of the State DepartmentÕs Bureau of Diplomatic Security on the anti-terrorism Rewards program. See Joanne Moore, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 18 June 1998.
167James Campbell, 8.

168Ibid.

169Yonah Alexander, ÒContemporary Terrorism,Ó 29.

170United States, ÒOpening Statement of Senator Sam Nunn,Ó Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hearings before the Permanent Subcomittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 104^th Congress, 1^st Session, (Washington, DC; Government Printing Office, 31 October and 1 November 1995): 5.
171Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 167.

172Walter Laqueur, ÒPostmodern Terrorism,Ó Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Issue 5, (September/October 1996): 34.

173Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 169.

174Richard Falkenrath, ÒTerrorism,Ó Lecture series at Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, MO, (26 March 1999).

175Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 169.

176Glenn Schweitzer and Carole Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York, NY: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1998): 251-252.

177Italicize type represents non-state terrorist group affiliations. Non-italicized type represents state-sponsorship or closely affiliated relationships with state-sponsors.

178United States, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ÒRemarks on Designation of Terrorist Organizations,Ó (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 8 October 1997): 2.

179William H. Webster, 15.

180Richard Falkenrath, ÒTerrorism,Ó Lecture series at Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, MO, (26 March 1999).

181Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregory E.J. Scott, Almanac of Modern Terrorism, (New York, NY: Facts on File, 1991): 231.

182James K. Campbell, 34.

183Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, Almanac of Modern Terrorism, 232.

184United States, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, iv.

185Raphael F. Perl, ÒTerrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy,Ó CRS Issue Brief, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 03 July 1996): 4., 11.

186Ibid, 14.

187Glenn Schweitzer and Carole Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York, NY: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1998): 41.

188Raphael Perl, 11.

189ÒU.S. Security Policy Toward Rogue Regimes,Ó Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, First Session, 28 July and 14 September 1993, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994): 1.

190Ibid, 40.

191James Adams, ÒUnderstanding CB Terrorism,Ó Brad Roberts, eds., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997): 41.

192Louis J. Freeh, ÒThreats to US National Security,Ó Statements made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

193Kenneth Katzman, ÒSuccess Against Terrorism,Ó Middle East Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 4, (December 1998): 46.

194United States, Terrorist Group Profiles, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986): 2.

195Jeffrey D. Simon, 15.

196Ibid, 6.

197United States, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, 29.

198Yonah Alexander, ÒContemporary Terrorism,Ó 32.

199Beau Grosscup, The Newest Explosions of Terrorism: Latest Sites of Terrorism in the Ô90s and Beyond, (Far Hills, NJ: New Horizon Press, 1998): 385.

200Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, Almanac of Modern Terrorism, 66.

201Richard Murphy, ÒThe Rational WorldÕs Dilemma,Ó New Leader, Volume 81, Issue 10, (07 September 1998): 17.

202Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 186-187.
203United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ÒTerrorism in the United States, 1995,Ó 18.

204United States, Terrorist Group Profiles, 2.

205Kenneth Katzman, 9.

206William Graham, ÒNational Missile Defense,Ó Defense & Strategic Studies, Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, MO, 15 October 1998.

207Dr. J.D. Crouch, ÒCuban Missile Crisis,Ó Lecture on International Security Politics, Southwest Missouri State University, Department of Defense & Strategic Studies, 02 December 1998.
208Pamela S. Falk, ÒCuba in Africa,Ó Foreign Affairs, Volume 65, (Summer 1987): 1077-1092.

209Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, 106-107.

210Ibid.

211William H. Webster, 15.

212Judith Miller and William Broad, ÒIranians, Bioweapons in Mind, Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists,Ó New York Times, (08 December 1998): 1A.

213Paula A. DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 1997): 50.

214Ibid, 43.

215Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1996): 15.

216Paula A. DeSutter, 50.
217Judith Miller and William Broad, 1A.

218Paula A. DeSutter, 51.

219Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, 151.

220Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre DF Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism, (United Kingdom: JaneÕs Information Group Limited, September 1997).

221Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre DF Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism, Hezbollah.

222Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, 151.

223Ibid, 145.

224Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism.

225Gail Bass and Brian Jenkins, 33.

226Kenneth Timmerman, ÒSaddam May Soon Have the Bomb,Ó Wall Street Journal,Ó (18 March 1999): A21

227Ibid.

228Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf, (New York: Times Books, 1990): 256.

229Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, 153.

230ÒThe Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction,Ó Nonproliferation Center, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1996): 10.

231Richard Preston, ÒThe Bioweaponeers, The New Yorker, (09 March 1998): 60.

232Arthur Goldschmidt, A Concise History of the Middle East, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996): 342.

233A binary chemical weapon is a munition in which chemical agents, held in separate containers in a weapon, react when mixed or combined as a result of being fired, launched, or otherwise initiated to produce a chemical agent.

234ÒThe Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction,Ó 10.
235R. Jeffrey Smith, ÒPoison, Germ Weapons Would Not Be Direct Targets,Ó The Washington Post, (22 February 1998): A28.

236Ibid, 12.

237Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, 154.

238Robert W. Stookey, America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter, (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975): 238.

239Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregorye E.J. Scott, 172.

240Ibid.

241The Abu Nidal Organization is considered the most vicious Palestinian terrorist organization. The ANO is the most wide-ranging and unrelenting terrorist group that has killed scores of people in locations ranging from Karchi and Istanbul to Rome and Vienna. See United States, Terrorist Group Profiles, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986): 4.

242United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, 33.

243Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat, (Washington, DC: Brasseys, 1986): 57.

244Michael OÕHanlon, ÒStopping A North Korean Invasion, Why Defending the South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon thinks,Ó International Security, Volume 22 Number 4, (Spring 199): 141.

245Michael OÕHanlon, 135-170.

246Raphael F. Perl, 13.

247Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, and Gregory E.J. Scott, 234.

248Tom Wilkie, 1.

249Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995): 31.

250Peter Deriabin and T.H. Bagley, KGB: Masters of the Soviet Union, (New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1990): xi.
251See Thalif Deen, 5.

252ÒMissing Nukes,Ó MacLeanÕs, Volume 110, Issue 37, (15 September 1997): 29.

253ÒSuitcase Nukes,Ó MacLeanÕs, Volume 110, Issue 41, (13 October 1997): 40.

254William Arkin, ÒRussiaÕs Port-A-Nukes,Ó Nation. Volume 265, Issue 9, (29 September 1997): 6.

William R. Van Cleave, ÒIII Rationale, Strategy, and Objectives of Unconventional Nuclear Threats,Ó (Stanford: Stanford Research Institute, Dec. 1968): 13.

Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I, (Cambridge, MA: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 1984): 47-54.

Ibid.

By human portable, I mean the weapons are compact and light enough to be transported by foot-born or small vehicle-terrorists.
Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I, 60.

Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, (Cambridge, MA: The Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996): 46.

John Norris and Will Fowler, NBC: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare on the Modern Battlefield, (Herndon, VA: BrasseyÕs LTD, 1997): 39.

Bruce Hoffman, ÒTerrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities,Ó Rand, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, January 1986): 1.

Bruce Hoffman, ÒTerrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities,Ó 1.

The idea of the truck bomb applies to any vehicle that may be loaded with high explosives and used as a delivery vehicle to any target location such as a nuclear reactor, barracks, government building, or the like. A vehicle may also be loaded with NBC agents for surreptitious delivery and detonation.

Bruce Hoffman, ÒTerrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities,Ó 1.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, 21.

Paul Klebnikov, 264.

David Hughes, ÒWhen Terrorists Go Nuclear,Ó Popular Mechanics, Volume 173, Issue 1, (January 1996): 56.

William H. Webster, 11.

Fissile materials are divided into two categories: 1.) fissile materials, such as plutonium-239 or uranium-235, and 2.) other radioactive materials, such as uranium-Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 1996): 3.

Gavin Cameron, ÒNuclear Terrorism: A Real Threat?Ó JaneÕs Intelligence Review, September 1996, 422.
Testimony given by Gordon C. Oehler 27 March 1996, ÒThe Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction,Ó Available online at CIA publications, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1996/go_testimony_032796.htm> (09 April 1998). Copies available.

James L. Ford, ÒRadiological Dispersal Device: Assessing the Transnational Threat,Ó Strategic Forum, Number 136, (March 1998): 1.

Radiation exposure is measured in RADs, or Radiation Absorbed Doses. Short-term exposure to 1,000 RADs will affect the central nervous system, inflict coma, convulsions, and death within days. A level of 800 RADs will induce diarrhea and vomiting, which in some instances could be confused with conventional shock. Recovery is unlikely and death occurs within three weeks of exposure. With 400 RADs exposure the victim will experience mouth ulcers, loss of teeth and hair, and immune deficiency; death could come after about 30 days. Survival is possible but unlikely. With exposures of 150 RADs or less the victim could recover with proper treatment after experiencing symptoms of nausea. See John Norris and Will Fowler, NBC: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare on the Modern Battlefield, (Herndon, VA: BrasseyÕs LTD, 1997): 39.

James L. Ford, 2.

Center for Defense and International Security Studies, ÒDevilÕs Brew in Details: Nuclear Weapons,Ó Last updated 29 January 1999, Available online at: http://www.cdiss.org/nw.htm (01 March 1999).

Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 1996): 3-4.

John Sopko, 7.

The pit is the active ingredient from which the nature of the weapon is determined. The term pit generally refers to the nuclear material that is used in either nuclear weapons or radioactive dispersal devices. RDDs are more likely to use nuclear material other than weapons grade fissile material due to the increased difficulty and expense in obtaining such materials.
Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, 15.

W. Sutcliffe, R. Condit, W. Mansfield, D. Myers, D. Layton, and P. Murphy, ÒA Perspective on the Dangers of Plutonium,Ó CSTS-48-95, Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 14 April 1995.

John Sopko, 7.

Walter Laqueur, 28.

Cesium-137 is a radioactive material that causes cancer and other severe health problems when it comes into contact with human skin, is ingested, or is inhaled.

Richard Lugar, 30.

James L. Ford, 2.

Ibid, 3.

Ibid, 4.

Anatol Rapoport, Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, Ed., (London: Penguin Books, 1968): 14.

Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1979): 45.
Paul P. Craig and John A. Jungerman, Nuclear Arms Race: Technology and Society, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990): 444.

Karl-Heinz Kamp, 19.

United States, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, 45.
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, 284.

Ibid, 47.

David Hughes, 57.

Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of the Many: The Arms Control Challenges of the Ô90s, (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991): 10.

United States, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Nuclear Terms: A Glossary, (Oak Ridge, TN: Technical Information Center, 1964): 41.

Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons, (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 13 April 1995): 9.

David Hughes, 57.

Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of the Many: The Arms Control Challenges of the Ô90s, 10.

Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, 99.

David Hughes, 57.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 100.

Javed Ali, Leslie Rodriques, and Michael Moodie, JaneÕs U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, (Alexandria, VA: JaneÕs Information Group, 1997): 21.

Ibid, 75.
Ibid, 22.

Ibid, 22-24.
Javed Ali, Leslie Rodrigues, and Michael Moodie, 31.

Terrorists tend to copy the actions of other terrorists. It is feared that since chemical precedence has been established, other acts of terrorism utilizing UWMD will follow. See Jeffrey D. Simon, ÒTerrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons,Ó RAND, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, December 1989): 13.

Ibid, 38.

Barend ter Haar, The Future of Biological Weapons, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991): 5.

The PKK is a terrorist organization with sponsors in Syria that seeks to establish a Marxist state in the Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey. Its primary targets are Turkish government forces and civilians in the southeastern region, but the group is becomingly increasingly active in Western Europe. See Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons Jr., and Gregory E.J. Scott, 168.

United States, Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 1996): 5.

Brian M. Jenkins, ÒFocusing on Motives,Ó Brad Roberts, eds., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses, (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997): 45.
David E. Kaplan, ÒTerrorismÕs Next Wave: Nerve Gas and Germs are the New Weapons of Choice,Ó 27.

Brad Roberts, 30.

David E. Kaplan, ÒTerrorismÕs Next Wave,Ó U.S. News and World Report, Volume 123, Number 19, (17 November 1997): 30.

United States, Department of Defense, Counterproliferation: Chemical-Biological Defense Annual Report, (24 February 1998) Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/cprc97.htm> 3.1.

James Anderson, ÒMicrobes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism,Ó The Heritage Foundation: Backgrounder, (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 26 May 1998): 5.

W. Seth Carus, testimony before Joint Hearing of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 105^th Congress, 2^nd session, 04 March 1998, 10.

Steven Strasser and Hideko Takayama, ÒA Cloud of TerrorÑ-And Suspicion,Ó Newsweek, Volume 125, Issue 14, (03 April 1995): 38.

The following chronology of events is not wholly the authors and is taken from a timeline of chemical and biological attacks provided by W. Seth Carus in his book, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20^th Century. See W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20^th Century, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, August 1998): 64-65.

Ibid, 64-65.

Gordon C. Oehler, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat, (Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Center, 01 November 1995): 14.

Frederick R. Sidell, William C. Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell, JaneÕs Chem-Bio Handbook, (Alexandria: JaneÕs Information Group, 1998): 16.

Ibid, 32.

Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, 32.

ÒChemical and Biological Terrorism,Ó JaneÕs Defence Weekly, (14 August 1996): 20.

Frederick R. Sidell, William C. Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell, JaneÕs Chem-Bio Handbook, 38.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Seymour Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare: AmericaÕs Hidden Arsenal, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968) 49.

Frederick R. Sidell, 63.

Ibid, 63.

Paul Elek, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II, (New York: The Humanities Press, 1973) 49.

Frederick R. Sidell, 53.

Ibid.
Ibid, 56.

W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20^th Century, 69.

Frederick R. Sidell, 80.

Brad Roberts, ÒNew Challenges and New Policy Priorities for the 1990Õs,Ó in Brad Roberts, ed., Biolgical Weapons, Weapons of the Future? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993): 69.
United States, ÒFact Sheet: Biological Weapons Convention: The Special Conference and Beyond,Ó Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 9 August 1994): 2.

Jeffrey D. Simon, 2.

U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 82.

Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993): 50.

Peter Brooksmith, Biohazard: The Hot Zone and BeyondÑMankindÕs Battle Against Deadly Disease, (London: Brown Packaging Books, 1997),142.

The definitions that follow are an accompilation of the author and outside sources. See Javed Ali, Leslie Rodrigues, and Michael Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, 78.
Javed Ali, Leslie Rodrigues, and Michael Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook, 78.
Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, 5.

Peter Brooksmith, 142.

ÒThe Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat,Ó Central Intelligence Agency, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office): 1.

Ibid.
The table describes the symptoms that may follow a biological attack, the time of lethality depending upon treatment or not, and the incubation period a human will endure before the agent runs its full course.

United States, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 75.

Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, (Cambride, MASS: The MIT Press, 1998): 65.

K. Scott McMahon, ÒUnconventional Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Delivery Vehicle Methods: Whither the ÒSmuggled Bomb,Ó (Arlington: Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation): 123.

Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, 69.

Ibid.
Ideally, a CBW will remain 6-10 feet from the ground. This distance will increase the likelihood that an agent will be ingested by the target population. Ibid, 16.

Ibid, 22.

Frederick R. Sidell, Dr. William Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell, 22.

Ibid.

John Norris and Will Fowler, 42.

Ibid.

Frederick R. Sidell, 25.

Ibid, 24.
Brad Roberts, 40.

ÒTerrorists and Rogue Nations Threaten Large Casualty Tolls," Signals, Volume 52, Number 4, December 1997, 38.

Frederick R. Sidell, 27.
Ibid.

Line-source delivery can be achieved by either a CBW configured aircraft spraying a liquid or dry agent or by a terrorist walking along a line while disseminating the agent from a multi-gallon garden sprayer. The line of dissemination is perpendicular to the wind and upwind of the target. See Frederick R. Sidell, Dr. William Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell, JaneÕs Chem-Bio Handbook, (Alexandria, VA: JaneÕs Information Group Press, 1998): 117-118.

Frederick R. Sidell, Dr. William Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell, 28.

Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, 35.

Ballistic missile systems are certainly an effective means of delivery but may also be counter-productive to a clandestine attack or one that retains plausible deniability. Ballistic missile attack is most likely to originate from state-sponsored terrorists because non-state organizations are less likely to be able to acquire such weapons systems. It may be more prudent for states sponsoring terrorism to use the means of the lesser-equipped terrorist in order to retain that certain degree of denial.

James L. Ford, 2.

Walter Laqueur, 27.
Center for Defense and International Security Studies, ÒDevilÕs Brew in Details: Nuclear Weapons,Ó 01 March 1999.

Ibid.
United States, Nonproliferation Center, The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 1996): 35.
Frederick R. Sidell, Dr. William Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell, 30.

Ibid, 30-32.
Gail Bass and Brian Michael Jenkins, 11.

Ibid.

Peter Probst, ÒHow Can We Tackle TomorrowÕs Terrorists?Ó, 103.

Henry Cooper, ÒMissile Defense from SDI to ??,Ó personal interview, (Springfield, MO: Defense & Strategic Studies, 04 March 1999).

Center for Defense and International Security Studies, ÒDevilÕs Brew in Details: Nuclear Weapons,Ó 01 March 1999.

United States, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, 1.

Gail Bass and Brian Jenkins, 8-10.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, 27.
These two examples have been modified from their original script and taken from the following source; see Brad Roberts, Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, Volume XV, Number 1, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993): 42.

Ibid.

Peter Brooksmith, Biohazard: The Hot Zone and BeyondÑMankindÕs Battle Against Deadly Disease, 143.

Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 170-171.

Kathleen Ann Teitel, 266.

Information taken from lecture by Kathleen C. Bailey in DSS 697, Special Topics, at Southwest Missouri State University--Defense & Strategic Studies. Also see Leonard Cole, ÒThe Specter of Biological Weapons,Ó Scientific American, (December 1996): 61.

Information taken from lecture by Michelle Van Cleave in DSS 697, Special Topics, at Southwest Missouri State University--Defense & Strategic Studies.

Joseph Douglass, Jr. and Neil C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare, 16.

Ibid, 16.

Edwin J. Rokke, Strategic Assessment 1995, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995) 119.

James Anderson, 7.

Brad Roberts, 23.

Ibid, 24-25.

Joseph Douglass, Jr. and Neil C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare, 18.
In Oregon 1984, members of the cult Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cultured salmonella in a secret lab and dumped the bacteria into salad bars and coffee creamers at 10 restaurants. Supermarket produce was also contaminated, and plans were made to poison the city water supply. In all, some 751 people fell ill. It took investigators a year to link the attack to the sect. See Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, 8.

Not all chemical agents provide immediate results. Some chemical agents, such as mustard gas, may require some time before the onset of symptoms.

ÒThe Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction,Ó 9.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1984): 8.

Ibid, 7.

Kathleen Bailey, ÒThe Costs of Chemical, Toxin, and Biological Weapons Proliferation,Ó Kathleen Bailey, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs versus Benefits, (Washington, DC: National Security Research, Inc., 1995): 102.
Leonard A. Cole, 157.

Gideon Rose, ÒIt Could Happen Here,Ó Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, Number 2, (March/April 1999): 134.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, 7.

Javed Ali, Leslie Rodriques, and Michael Moodie, 40.

James Anderson, 6.

ÒThe Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons,Ó Nonproliferation Center, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 1996): 4.

The Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons,Ó 8.

Leonard A. Cole, 158.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993): 54.

Richard Betts, ÒWeapons of Mass Destruction,Ó Foreign Affairs, Volume 177, Number 1, (January/February 1998): 32.
James Anderson, 6.
Ibid.

J.H. Rothschild, TomorrowÕs Weapons: Chemical and Biological, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964): 22. Also see Leonard A. Cole, The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare, (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1997): 7.

Ibid, 23.
United Nations, ÒThis is the Face of Terror,Ó UN Chronicle, Volume 133, Issue 3, (1996): 18.

Ibid, 23.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1984): 8.

Information taken from lecture by Michelle Van Cleave in DSS 697, Special Topics, at Southwest Missouri State University--Defense & Strategic Studies.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, ix.
John Norris and Will Fowler, NBC: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare on the Modern Battlefield, (Herndon, VA: BrasseyÕs LTD, 1997): 39.

Ibid.

Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, 16-17.

Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983): 55.

Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, 23.

Ibid, 22.

Leonard A. Cole, 165.
Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak, 16.

Jerry D. Simon, vi.

Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the Ô90s, 8.

Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998): 17.

Critical mass is the amount of concentrated fissionable material compressed efficiently in an exact short period of time required to sustain a chain reaction. The exact mass of fissionable material needed to sustain a chain reaction varies according to the concentration and chemical form of the material, the particular fissionable isotope present, its geometrical properties, and its density. When pure fissionable materials are compressed by high explosives in implosion type atomic weapons, the critical mass needed for a nuclear explosion is reduced. See Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998): 323.

Kathleen C. Bailey, 14.
David Hughes, 56.
Ibid, 10.

Ibid.

Ibid, 33.

Stefan Leader, 37.
Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak, 16.

Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons In the Hands of Many, 31.

Jeffrey D. Simon, ÒTerrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons,Ó 11.
James P. Campbell, 3.

Ibid, 5.
Ibid, 3.
Leonard A. Cole, The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare, (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1997): 89.
Bin Laden has been implicated in the bombings of the Khobar Towers, American embassies in Africa, and the World Trade Center, which left over 2000 people either injured or dead.

Bruce Hoffman, ÒThe Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s,Ó Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 1, number 3 (July 1989): 363.

Gideon Rose, ÒPublic Affairs Lecture Series: Terrorism,Ó Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, MO: 29 January 1999.

Bin Laden recently issued a fatwa to all Muslims everywhere to take up arms against Western societies that support Israel and the United States. The fatwa is a call to wage a jihad or Holy War on all Americans everywhere. A fatwa is a religious edict issued by a religious authority. See John Miller, ÒUsama Bin Ladin: Americans are Paper Soldiers,Ó Middle East Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 4, (December 1998): 76.

Leah James, Christopher Morris, and Andre DF Pienaar, JaneÕs World Insurgency and Terrorism, (United Kingdom: JaneÕs Information Group Limited, September 1997): Hezbollah.

Ehud Sprinzak, ÒThe Great Superterrorism Scare,Ó Foreign Policy, Issue 112, (Fall 1998): 112.

K. Scott McMahon, 126.

United States, U.S. Department of State, ÒReport of the Accountability Review Records: Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998,Ó (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 07 August 1998): 1.

Gideon Rose, ÒIt Could Happen Here,Ó Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, Number 2, (March/April 1999): 131.

Yehudit Barsky, ÒFocus on Hamas: Terror by Remote Control,Ó Middle East Quarterly, (June 1996): 4.

James K. Campbell, 33.

Ibid, 6.

Ibid, 33.

Richard Falkenrath, ÒConfronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism,Ó Survival, Volume 40, number 3, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Autumn 1998): 48.

Ibid.
The critical infrastructures affected in the Aum Shinrikyo in this particular case were the medical facilities, transportation, and various government functions such as local law enforcement.

Richard Falkenrath, ÒConfronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism,Ó 48.

Ibid.
Ibid, 49.

Ibid.
Richard Falkenrath, ÒConfronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism,Ó 49.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, 49-50.
J.J. Kohout et al, ÒAlternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States,Ó Comparative Strategy, Volume 14, (United Kingdom: Taylor and Francis, 1995): 380.

United States, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, iii-iv.

Ibid.

Department of State, ÒGist: International Terrorism,Ó U.S. Department of State Dispatch, (08 July 1991): 496-497.

United States, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, iii-iv.

White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39, 21 June 1998, available at <http:www.fas.org/irg/offdocs/pdd39.htm>

Office of the Press Secretary, ÒFact Sheet Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62,Ó (Annapolis: Government Printing Office, 22 May 1998).

David E. Kaplan, ÒEveryone Gets into the Terrorism Game,Ó U.S. News and World Report, Volume 23, Number 19, (17 November 1997): 32.

The U.S. Department of Justice, as delegated to the FBI, has the lead for crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents in the United States. DEST, an interagency group activated in 1995 to provide expert advice to domestic agencies during crisis incidents involving WMD. See James H. Anderson, ÒMicrobes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism,Ó The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, Number 1182, (26 May 1998): 9.

David E. Kaplan, ÒEveryone Gets into the Terrorism Game,Ó U.S. News and World Report, Volume 23, Number 19, (17 November 1997): 32.

Glenn Schweitzer and Carole Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York, NY: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1998): 251-252.

United States, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, iv.

Richard Falkenrath, lecture, Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, MO.

Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 39.

Ibid.

White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39.
Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 262.

James H. Anderson, ÒMicrobes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism,Ó 13.

John Sopko, ÒThe Changing Proliferation Threat,Ó Foreign Policy, 18.

Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 262.

John Sopko, 18.

Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 263-264.

Ibid, 263.

ÒMilitary Adding 10 ÒChem-BioÓ Response Teams,Ó The Washington Post, (18 March 1998): A3.

Department of Defense, Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 01 May 1997): 1.1.
United States, Department of the Army, Army Public Affairs Report--Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 01 May 1997, Information taken from U.S. Army News Release at: http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/May1997/r19970506wmdprep.html, (20 April 1998) Source available upon request.

David Franz, Colonel, U.S. Army, testimony before Joint Committee on Judiciary and Intelligence, U.S. Senate, 105^th Congress, 2^nd Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 04 March 1998): 2.
Ibid.
Remarks taken from the text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, See United States, Office of the Press Secretary, Chemical and Biological Weapons, 12 November 1997, Available online from Whitehouse Publications at http://www.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/11/18/6.text.1, (16 April 1998). Source available upon request.

J.D. Crouch, ÒTestimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Chemical Weapons ConventionÓ, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 13 March 1996, 2.

Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many, 73.
John D. Holum, ÒThe Clinton Administration and the Chemical Weapons Convention: Need for Early Ratification,Ó in Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, ed. By Brad Roberts (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994): 1.

J.D. Crouch, 6.

Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many, 70.

Leonard A. Cole, 11.

Kathleen Ann Teitel, The Bioterrorist Threat to the United States and Israel, (Springfield, MO: Southwest Missouri State University, 1997): 211.
Central Intelligence Agency, The Biological and Chemical Wafare Threat, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office): 9.

Ibid, 11.

Barend ter Haar, ÒThe Future of Biological Weapons,Ó The Washington Papers, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991): 17.
Leonard A. Cole, 5.

U.S. Department of Defense, ÒNuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense,Ó Annual Report to Congress, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1994): 3.
Raphael F. Perl, 3.
Peter Probst, ÒHow Can We Tackle TomorrowÕs Terrorists?Ó 103.

James H. Anderson, 18.

Ibid.

Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, ÒLugar Takes up the Serious Issues; is Anybody listening?Ó The Baltimore Sun, (08 January 1996): 9A.

Ibid.

Ibid.

John Sopko, 21.

William R. Van Cleave, Nuclear Proliferation: Opposing Viewpoints, 207.

Raphael F. Perl, 4.

John Endicott, ÒThe Doctrine of Massive Retaliation,Ó American Defense Policy, Fourth Edition, (1977).

Eugene B. Habiger, 4.
Richard Paulsen, The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Era, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, September 1994): 10-11.
Richard Paulsen, 145.

Ibid, 144.

Raphael F. Perl, 5.
Brian Michael Jenkins, ÒStriking Home: The Terrorist Threat on AmericaÕs Doorstep,Ó 26.

William R. Van Cleave, Nuclear Proliferation: Opposing Viewpoints, 204.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Gail Bass and Brian Jenkins, 11.

William R. Van Cleave, Nuclear Proliferation: Opposing Viewpoints, 205.

Ibid, 204.

David Kibble, 98.
John Diamond, ÒAdministration Targets TerroristsÕ Hosts,Ó Philadelphia Enquirer, Associated Press, (08 February 1999): 1.
Raphael F. Perl, ÒTerrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy,Ó 6.

John Diamond, 1.

The principles of Article 51 recognize the right of all nations to autonomous national acts of self-defense, including the right to act against threats before they become the overt use of violence. United Nations, ÒArticle 51: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,Ó United Nations Department of Public Information, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997). Also see UN Website at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm Also see William R. Van Cleave, Nuclear Proliferation: Opposing Viewpoints, 210.

Neil Livingstone, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor ManÕs Atomic Bomb, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1984): 20.

Douglas Pasternak, ÒAmerican Colleges are ÔWeapons UÓ For Iraq,Ó US News and World Report, Volume 124, Issue 9, (09 March 1998): 32.

Yehudit Barsky, 9.

Douglas Pasternak, 32.
James P. Campbell, 145.

James Campbell, 145.

James H. Anderson, 14.

Ibid, 16.

Ibid.

Anita Manning, ÒUS Not Ready for Biological Threats,Ó USA Today, (11 March 1998): 3A.

The Ògolden hourÓ represents the immediate amount of time following an NBC attack that has the greatest impact on the nature and spread of the injuries, if treated within this time frame. However, due to the nature of some CBW agents, symptoms may not occur until some time after the initial exposure to CBW agents(s).

Richard Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley Thayer, 321.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Sam Nunn, 36.

James H. Anderson, 15.
Raphael F. Perl, ÒTerrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy,Ó CRS-7.

Brian Michael Jenkins, ÒStriking Home: The Terrorist Threat on AmericaÕs Doorstep,Ó 26.

Ibid.

Peter Probst, ÒHow Can We Tackle TomorrowÕs Terrorists?,Ó103.

Yehudit Barsky, 8.

Ashton Carter and John Deutch, 82.

James H. Anderson, 17.

Kyle B Olson, ÒThe Matsumoto Incident: Sarin Poisoning In a Japanese Residential Community,Ó Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, February 1995. See also James H. Anderson, ÒMicrobes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism,Ó The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, Number 1182, (26 May 1998): 12.
Obviously, traditional nuclear weapons would be detected instantaneously upon detonation and do not require special detection.

John Donnelly, ÒBases in Korea and Mideast to Get Bio-Warning Networks,Ó Defense Week, (26 January 1998): 1.

Sam Nunn, 36.

Brian Michael Jenkins, ÒStriking Home: The Terrorist Threat on AmericaÕs Doorstep,Ó 27.

Richard A. Falkenrath, ÒConfronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism,Ó 61.

Ibid, 44.
Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White, The Changing Role of Information in Warfare, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999): 75.
Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 336.

Richard Falkenrath, ÒConfronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism,Ó 54.

Jerome H. Kahan, ÒRegional Deterrence Strategies for New Proliferation Threats,Ó Strategic Forum, Number 70, (April 1996): 1.
Brian Michael Jenkins, ÒStriking Home: The Terrorist Threat on AmericaÕs Doorstep,Ó 26.

Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, 337.